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maintained that the 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
views of 
analyst 
psychotherapeutic process 
should remain neutral and 
objective in order to successfully negotiate the transference 
neurosis (Freud, 1912/1961) . An emotional reaction on the 
part of the analyst, a signal of failed objectivity, should 
be realized and "overcome" (Gorkin, 1987). 
Most contemporary theorists maintain that absolute 
therapeutic neutrality, as originally postulated by Freud to 
be the necessary and attainable role of the analyst, is 
simply not possible. The personal values of the therapist 
are generally believed to enter into the therapeutic 
relationship (Arnstein, 1986; Bergin, 1991; Beutler, 1972; 
Dragan, 1974; Giglio, 1993; Grant, 1985; Grimm, 1994; Grosch, 
1985; Hankoff, 1979; Joyce, 1977; Kessel & McBrearty, 1967; 
Kovel, 1982; Meehl, 1959; Norcross & Wogan, 1987; Parloff, 
Iflund, & Goldstein, 1960; Pentony, 1966; Schwehn & Schau, 
1990; Smyrnios, Schultz, Smyrnios, & Kirkby, 1986; Strupp, 
1980; Walker, Ulissi, & Thurber, 1980; Welkowitz, Cohen, & 
Ortmeyer, 1967). Some have even suggested that therapists 
may be actively persuading or coercing patients in line with 
their own values and ideals (Bergin, 1985; Beutler, 1979; 
Beutler, Arizmendi, Crago, Shanfield, & Hagaman, 1983; Corey, 
2 
Corey, & Callanan, 1990; Gelfman, 1971; Humphries, 1982; Ney, 
1985; Patterson, 1989; Pepinsky & Karst, 1964; Tjeltveit, 
1986; Warshaw & Bailey, 1966; Weisskopf-Joelson, 1980). 
Many investigators appear to favor the assumption that 
a patient participating in individual psychotherapy is likely 
to be "shaped" by their re spec ti ve psychotherapist into 
endorsing the latter's personal values. Research 
demonstrating greater post-treatment versus pre-treatment 
value correspondence between patient and therapist is 
consistent with this assumption. Indeed, such an approach 
has been frequented to demonstrate that many patients do 
report a change in their values during the course of 
individual psychotherapeutic treatment (e.g., Beutler, 1981; 
Beutler & Bergan, 1991; Kelly, 1990; Pentony, 1966; Schwehn 
& Schau, 1990) 
Moreover, it appears that the values of patients often 
tend to approximate the values of their respective 
therapists, that a patient "becomes like the therapist." 
This phenomenon has been termed value convergence, the 
"increasing similarity of patients' values with therapists' 
values during therapy" (Kelly, 1990, p. 1 71) . Such value 
convergence has been associated with favorable 
psychotherapeutic outcome (Arizmendi, Beutler, Shanf ield, 
Crago, & Hagaman, 1985; Kelly, 1990; Kelly & Strupp, 1992). 
Although studies of value convergence have been somewhat 
fruitful, it remains possible that the notion of value 
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convergence may not accurately describe or fully account for 
the value change reported by many psychotherapy participants. 
Al though some form of patient value change does seem to 
regularly occur during treatment, there remain many 
unanswered questions regarding the mechanism(s) or 
process(es) underlying such value change. Perhaps this is 
because patient value change has historically been measured 
or interpreted relative to the values of a corresponding 
therapist (again, because the implicit assumption seems to be 
that the therapist is somehow shaping the patient's values). 
However, it may also prove informative to investigate patient 
value change without necessitating a comparison to some 
external criterion. In other words, there may be multiple 
factors affecting patient value change other than the 
patient's personal values relative to those of the therapist, 
including factors that the patient may bring to the treatment 
situation. When posed outside of value convergence theory, 
such questions as "Under what sorts of conditions does 
patient value change occur?" or "For whom will value change 
most likely occur?" are certainly important in their own 
right. 
Little is known, for example, about the role of subject 
variables in patient value change. Shaughnessy and 
Zechmeister (1990) define subject variables as "a 
characteristic or trait that varies consistently across 
subjects" (p. 9) . Examples of subject variables include age, 
gende~, socio-economic status, 
examination of select subject 
and intelligence level. 
variables would lead 
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An 
to 
increased research attention focused on the patient's 
contributions to the value change process. 
One subject variable that has been empirically linked to 
value preference is that of personality traits. The 
personality construct of Psychoticism, for instance, has been 
connected to the endorsement of achievement-oriented values 
(Brown, 1975). Additionally, personality variables including 
introversion-extraversion have been related to value change 
in non-clinical settings (Hoge & Bender, 1974). It is 
unknown, however, to what extent personality traits may be 
likewise related to the process of patient value change (as 
opposed to value preference) during psychotherapeutic 
intervention. 
There may also be additional patient contributions to 
the value change process that have been largely 
underemphasized in the existing literature. An important 
aspect of post-positivistic scientific philosophy, for 
example, includes an appreciation of the phenomenological 
experience of the research participants (Gorkin, 1987). 
There is, however, little information available concerning 
the patient's perceptions of the value change process. It is 
uncertain whether a patient would even acknowledge or agree 
with the notion that he or she is "becoming like the 
therapist." 
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:t is also unclear whether or not patient value change 
is context specific. The vast majority of studies have 
addressed patient value change within the framework of 
individual adult outpatient psychotherapy. There have been 
few investigations of patient value change associated with 
alternative therapeutic settings or modalities. Relatively 
less information is therefore available concerning the 
process of patient value change in inpatient settings, for 
example. 
The primary goal of the present study was to understand 
more fully the patient's role in the process of value change. 
This was accomplished through an investigation of the 
relationship between patient value change (but not 
necessarily convergence) and clinical improvement in an 
inpatient psychiatric setting. In this context, the 
contributions of select personality factors to the value 
change process were also examined. A related goal was to 
explore the patient's phenomenological experience of the 
value change process. 
Participants were asked to complete the NEO-FFI, the 
Rokeach Value Survey, and the Brief Symptom Inventory upon 
psychiatric hospital admission. These three questionnaires 
served as measures of personality factors, values, and 
symptom severity, respectively. The latter two instruments 
were re-administered prior to discharge, along with a 
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quest~onnaire assessing the patient's perceptions of both 
treatment and value system satisfaction. 
It was anticipated that differential response patterns 
on the NEO-FFI would be associated with varying degrees of 
patient value change. It was also expected that self-
reported clinical improvement would be positively related to 
the degree of value change, or personal value re-
organization, reported by patients. These predictions 
allowed for consideration of patient value change as a 
therapeutic phenomenon, and whether the process of value 
change reflected a curative experience. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Value Convergence 
The standard methodology applied to value convergence 
and outcome literature involves administering a pre-treatment 
measure of both patient and therapist values followed by a 
post-treatment measure of patient values, thereby allowing 
investigators to compute the degree of pre- and post-
treatment patient and therapist value similarity as well as 
the magnitude of observed convergence. The therapist' s 
values are typically thought to remain stable by virtue of 
the nature of his or her role in the therapeutic 
relationship, yet this is often not validated through 
consideration of a post-treatment measure of therapist 
values 1 • Various outcome measures may be employed so as to 
evaluate treatment effectiveness, which can then be 
correlated, for instance, with pre-treatment value 
similarity, degree of value convergence, and/or post-
treatment value similarity. In addition, other measures used 
to control for confounding variables may also be administered 
1Tjeltveit (1986) objects to the term "convergence," 
maintaining that this wording suggests both patient and 
therapist moving toward one another, whereas in actuality the 
therapist's value system appears to remain stable (Kelly, 
1990). 
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(e.g., a pre-treatment measure of adjustment may be used to 
rule out a systematic effect for psychopathology) . 
A variety of value measures were employed in the early 
studies of value convergence (e.g., Beutler, Pollack, & Jobe, 
1978; Cook, 1966; Rosenthal, 1955). The majority of recent 
value convergence studies, however, have drawn upon the 
programmatic work of Milton Rokeach concerning the nature of 
human values. Rokeach (1973) defines a value as " ... an 
enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state 
of existence is personally or socially preferable to an 
opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of 
existence" (p. 5) . A value system is defined as " ... an 
enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes 
of conduct or end-states of existence along a continuum of 
re la ti ve importance" (p. 5) . 
Values, according to Rokeach (1973), are hierarchically 
more important to the individual than attitudes or interests, 
the latter of which are dependent on values. It is the 
evaluative aspect, the judgment of that which is "personally 
or socially preferable," that further distinguishes values as 
a special class of enduring beliefs. Others have emphasized 
the affective investment afforded values in contrast to 
attitudes or beliefs (Beutler & Bergan, 1991; Ehrlich & 
Wiener, 1961; Gazda & Sedgwick, 1990) . Values transcend 
specific situations and serve as fundamental motivational 
concepts which lead to cognitive, affective, and behavioral 
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sequelae (Beutler, 1979). A change in values, compared to a 
change in attitudes, would therefore lead to more pronounced 
differences in thoughts, feelings, and actions. Rokeach's 
definition further allows values to be differentiated from 
"norms (which refer only to specific situations), and traits 
(which are not subject to change)" (Kelly & Strupp, 1992, p. 
34) . 
While underscoring the pervasiveness of the value 
construct, Rokeach (1973) suggested that many forms of human 
change (including change through psychotherapy) may be 
reflected in a shift in values or value systems. He 
therefore developed the Rokeach Value Survey (hereafter 
referred to as the RVS) as a means of operationalizing the 
value construct and measuring value modification. 
The RVS is comprised of two sets of 18 values with 
instructions that the respondent provide a rank ordering of 
each independent set. The first set is made up of "Terminal 
values, " while the second set consists of "Instrumental 
values." Terminal values are defined as "desirable end-
states of existence." Instrumental values are defined as 
"desirable modes of conduct" or means to ends (Rokeach, 1973, 
p. 7, italics in original) . Examples of Terminal values 
include "A Comfortable Life" and "True Friendship," while 
examples of Instrumental values include "Logical" and 
"Polite." 
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There has been wide-spread use of the RVS in studies of 
value change associated with psychotherapeutic treatment. 
Early value convergence studies using the RVS focused on 
change in Terminal and Instrumental values as a whole, but 
findings were often equivocal. A recent trend has been to 
investigate change in the individual values comprising these 
sets, but again, the results are difficult to interpret. 
To date, research on values in psychotherapy has 
progressed in a piecemeal fashion, with a great deal of 
uncertainty remaining about the isolated process of value 
convergence, let alone the interdependent relationships 
between pre-therapy value similarity, subsequent value 
convergence, post-therapy value similarity, and 
psychotherapeutic outcome. The complex relationships between 
these variables may become increasingly evident as studies 
are reviewed and considered. What follows is a summary of 
various research findings. 
Pre-therapy Value Similarity and Convergence. Early 
literature suggested a curvilinear relationship between pre-
therapy patient and therapist similarity and value 
convergence (Cook, 1966; Parloff, Waskow, & Wolfe, 1978, as 
cited in Schwehn & Schau, 1990) . Strong pre-therapy 
similarity or dissimilarity did not seem to lead to value 
convergence, whereas moderate similarity did. However, in a 
systematic review of the existing literature, Beutler (1981) 
determined that the likelihood of value convergence was 
positively associated with pre-therapy dissimilarity. 
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This 
finding was supported in a later study with better design 
quality (Beutler, Arizmendi, Crago, Shanfield, & Hagaman, 
1983), and also reaffirmed by Kelly (1990) in a subsequent 
literature review. 
Convergence and Outcome. Rosenthal (1955) is generally 
credited with the first systematic investigation of value 
convergence in psychotherapy. Of interest to Rosenthal were 
moral values [i.e., "values thought to involve behavior which 
is seen as right or wrong, good or bad, permissible or not 
permissible, worthy of reward or punishment" (p. 433)], in 
contrast to general life values. Although both moral and 
general life values were assessed, evidence of convergence 
was found solely in the former. 
Rosenthal administered several questionnaires and Q- sort 
procedures early in treatment and again at termination to 
nine inpatients and three outpatients of a psychiatric 
clinic. Duration of therapy averaged five months with a 
range of three weeks to one year. Instruments included 
Frank's Symptom-Disability Check List; the Butler-Haigh Self 
Concept items; the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Scale of Values; 
and a Q-sort addressing moral values concerned with "behavior 
around which psychological conflicts commonly arise: sex, 
aggression, and authority" (p. 432) 
completed the latter two instruments. 
Therapists also 
In addition, three 
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independent judges rated patient improvement on the basis of 
a post-treatment interview report prepared by the author. 
Rosenthal concluded that improvement, particularly when 
defined by judges' ratings, was related to patients becoming 
increasingly similar to their therapists in moral values. 
Lack of improvement (or worsening) was related to patients 
becoming increasingly dissimilar to their therapists in moral 
values. Rosenthal reported that the actual changes in 
patient moral values were fairly small. Additionally, one 
third of the patients became similar to their therapists in 
general 1 if e values, as measured by the Allport-Vernon-
Lindzey Scale of Values, whereas two thirds of the patients 
became increasingly dissimilar than their therapists. 
Increased patient-therapist similarity in general life values 
was not significantly related to improvement. 
Beutler, Pollack, and Jobe (1978) found evidence of 
value convergence being positively correlated with the 
patient's estimation of global improvement. A total of 13 
clinical psychology graduate students and 13 patients were 
compared, prior to treatment and again following session 12, 
on a questionnaire designed to measure values regarding such 
areas as Christianity, Communism, social laws, and premarital 
sexual behavior. Beutler et al. ( 19 7 8) noted that the 
restrictive sample of graduate student therapists limited 
generalizability. Unfortunately, it is also difficult to 
extend these findings to the construct of values as d~f ined 
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and assessed by the RVS. Beutler (1981) later concluded, on 
the basis of an extensive literature review, that there is 
fairly consistent evidence of value convergence being related 
to positive outcome. 
Martinez (1991) examined convergence in both religious 
values and religious fundamentalism. 
Scale of the Study of Values and a 
The Religious Values 
measure of religious 
fundamentalism were administered to 30 university counseling 
center patients and 16 therapists. Participants were 
assessed prior to treatment and again at termination or 
session eight. Outcome was measured with a nine point global 
improvement scale completed by both therapists and patients. 
In this manner, Martinez found evidence of religious value 
convergence and religious fundamentalism convergence being 
associated with therapist (but not patient) ratings of 
improvement. The relationship between religious value 
convergence and therapist outcome ratings was most robust 
when therapists had initially higher religious values than 
their patients. 
Beutler, Arizmendi, Crago, Shanfield, and Hagaman (1983) 
attempted to elucidate the complex ties between the degree of 
introductory patient-therapist value correspondence, 
subsequent value convergence, and final therapeutic outcome. 
Working from the perspective that psychotherapy is 
essentially a means of "interpersonal persuasion" in which 
the therapist strives to affect the "beliefs, behaviors, 
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and/or feelings of the patient in a way that will leqd to 
increased personal adjustment" (p. 231) , the authors 
hypothesized that the patient's degree of susceptibility to 
persuasive influence might also prove relevant to value 
convergence and outcome. Susceptibility was thought to be 
related to locus of control, with individuals demonstrating 
an external locus of control being more persuadable than 
their internal locus counterparts. 
A sample of 45 psychiatric outpatients receiving 
individual psychotherapy through a university clinic were 
administered the RVS, the SCL-90-R, and a measure of locus of 
control prior to receiving treatment. The Eysenck 
Personality Inventory was also administered at this time, not 
as a predictor of convergence or outcome, but as a control 
for non-random assignment (i.e., 
patient personality style and 
ensuring independence of 
therapist orientation) . 
Outcome was assessed with the SCL-90-R, as well as patient 
and therapist ratings of global improvement. 
Patients participated by and large in weekly individual 
psychotherapy with an emphasis on fostering insight. 
Psychotherapists were comprised of 22 advanced students 
representing several mental heal th disciplines. A lower-
limi t of three completed sessions was required for study 
participation. The mean length of treatment was 16.5 
sessions with a standard deviation of 8.26. Patients 
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completed the outcome measures and the RVS at termination or 
withdrawal from treatment. 
Although Beutler et al. (1983) failed to find support 
for their persuadability hypothesis, the study did reaffirm 
earlier notions of value convergence being positively 
associated with outcome, particularly in regard to Terminal 
values as assessed by the RVS. However, therapist ratings of 
patient gain was again the sole outcome indicator related to 
convergence. Patient ratings of either global change or 
specific symptom reduction were unrelated to convergence. 
Initial degree of patient-therapist value similarity was also 
unrelated to final outcome. 
More recently, Schwehn and Schau (1990) hypothesized 
that a process of value stabilization, or the solidification 
of relatively diffuse patient values in accordance with 
relatively secure therapist values, is in itself a curative 
force underlying psychotherapy. Administering the RVS to 
their sample of psychotherapy participants (13 multi-
disciplinary therapists and 62 patients) both before 
treatment onset and at termination or six months, Schwehn and 
Schau derived average pre- and post-treatment rankings for 
all patients paired with a given therapist. In this manner, 
the authors found evidence of patients 11 realigning" their 
values in accordance with the relatively constant values of 
their therapists, as well as increased patient value 
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stabilization as inferred by patients' likert-type confidence 
ratings of the validity of their stated value rankings. 
Although Schwehn and Schau's findings are consistent 
with their value stabilization perspective in terms of 
psychotherapy process, the study lacks any component of 
outcome assessment and is therefore limited in its ability to 
advance the notion that patient value stabilization is indeed 
curative. In other words, the relationship between 
stabilized values and psychosocial adjustment is unknown. 
Moreover, the absence of follow-up data leaves open the 
question as to whether the observed patient value stability 
was truly an enduring change reflecting increased patient 
value solidification, or perhaps an artifact of the therapy 
process and/or timing of assessment. Additional difficulties 
include a limited description of the therapeutic process, 
both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
In his assessment of the empirical literature, Kelly 
(1990) suggested that the only reasonable and empirically 
grounded conclusion is that therapist ratings of improvement 
stand as the single reliable indicator of beneficial outcome 
following convergence. Beutler and Bergan (1991) concede 
that the relationship between value convergence and treatment 
outcome appears most robust when outcome 
therapist ratings. They nevertheless 
is measured by 
maintain that 
occasional support is found across multiple outcome measures. 
Pre-therapy Value Similarity and 
(1978) hypothesized that therapeutic 
Outcome. 
approach 
17 
Martini 
(i. e • / 
theoretical orientation and intervention) might influence the 
relationship between pre-therapy similarity and outcome. 
several therapeutic approaches emphasizing treatment of 
alcohol dependence were conducted in group format with 24 
couples and 14 singles (N=62) during a single weekend. When 
collapsing across therapeutic approach, Martini found an 
overall positive correlation between the degree of initial 
patient-therapist value similarity, as measured by the 
Terminal value scale of the RVS, and subsequent therapist 
ratings of patient improvement. A break-down by therapeutic 
approach revealed significant positive correlations for 
rational emotive and psychodrama approaches, but not for 
behavior modification. 
The emphasis on brief treatment of alcohol dependence of 
course limits the generalizability of these findings to 
therapies of longer duration and/or alternative emphasis. 
Moreover, the author noted that the differential 
participation of couples in particular groups may have also 
biased the results. That is, only singles participated in 
rational emotive therapy, whereas only couples participated 
in psychodrama and behavior modification treatments. This 
study is further hampered by a choice of outcome data 
demonstrating questionable reliability and sensitivity: 
"Therapists rated all clients at termination of treatment 
18 
with respect to achieved and anticipated progress on seven-
point rating scales" (p. 26). 
In a secondary analogue study, Martini (1978) found that 
initial patient-therapist value similarity 
associated with therapist ratings of patient 
was again 
improvement, 
when the degree of value correspondence between therapist and 
a fictitious patient was systematically manipulated. This 
finding was stable across therapeutic approach, yet Martini 
acknowledged the difficulty in extending these results to a 
genuine therapeutic interaction. 
Martinez (1991) found that patient (but not therapist) 
ratings of improvement were associated with initial patient-
therapist dissimilarity in religious values, regardless of 
whether therapists were higher or lower in such values 
compared to the patients. A similar relationship was found 
between both patient and therapist improvement ratings and 
dissimilarity in initial fundamentalism, but only when 
therapists ascribed more fundamentalist religious beliefs 
than their patients (see above for overview of methodology) . 
A somewhat confusing picture was obtained by Beutler et 
al. (1983) (see above for study description) concerning pre-
therapy similarity and outcome. The authors found that pre-
therapy similarity predicted convergence, and convergence in 
turn predicted outcome (i.e., therapist ratings of patient 
gain), but pre-therapy similarity alone did not predict 
outcome. 
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Arizmendi and colleagues, however, had discovered a 
trend toward global therapist rated outcome being a function 
of initial similarity on Instrumental value orientation, and 
initial dissimilarity on Terminal value orientation, as 
measured by the RVS (Arizmendi, 1983, as cited in Arizmendi, 
Beutler, Shanfield, Crago, & Hagaman, 1985). Moreover, the 
authors provided evidence suggesting that "centrality" or 
"personal relevance" (p. 1 7) of certain values may mediate 
the relationship between similarity, convergence, and 
outcome, with both similarity and dissimilarity on respective 
individual or isolated values (as opposed to the typically 
investigated global value orientation) being differentially 
related to outcome. They also pointed out that this 
relationship may further depend on whether outcome is 
assessed generally or in terms of specific symptoms. It was 
concluded that an investigation of specific values and 
specific symptoms, rather than general value systems and 
global outcome, might therefore prove informative. As such, 
the authors apparently re-analyzed data from the Beutler et 
al. (1983) study to explore these possibilities. 
As a result of this re-analysis, a significant 
relationship between pre-therapy similarity and outcome was 
thus found when relatively precise variables were considered 
(Arizmendi et al., 1985). It appeared that individual RVS 
values were differentially related to a reduction in discreet 
symptoms as measured by the Symptom Checklist-90-Revised (a 
20 
comprehensive self-report inventory of symptom severity), as 
well as general improvement ratings by both patients and 
therapists (see Arizmendi et al. for a detailed break-down of 
these relationships) . In conclusion, the authors suggested 
that: 
treatment outcomes are facilitated either when patients 
and therapists are initially dissimilar in values 
related to social attachment and separation [i.e., 
Rokeach values of Friendship, Social Recognition, 
Independent, Responsible, & Self-Control], or when they 
hold similar views of humanistic, abstract or 
philosophical values [i.e./ Rokeach values of 
Courageous, Forgiving, An Exciting Life, & National 
Security]. (p. 20) 
Kelly (1990) appealed to numerous methodological 
difficulties which detract from the findings in the value 
convergence literature. Most notably, Kelly implicated a 
lack of "specificity" in terms of the precision and 
sensitivity of both value measurement and outcome 
measurement. He therefore conducted a literature review of 
studies concerned with the involvement of values in the 
process or outcome of psychotherapy. 
A total of 10 studies examined by Kelly were judged to 
bear correspondence with the Rokeach construct of values. 
These studies were then evaluated in terms of "value 
definition and measurement, process and outcome perspective 
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and measurement, design quality, and results" (Kelly, 1990, 
p. 176). Commenting by and large on the Arizmendi et al. 
(1985) study, Kelly offered the following: 
The relationship between patient/therapist initial 
values similarity and improvement is complex ... Arizmendi 
et al. (1985) reported significant results with 13 of 
Rokeach's 36 individual values. They found that the 
initial similarity of some values and the initial 
dissimilarity of others is associated with either: (a) 
the therapist's rating of improvement or, to a lesser 
extent, (b) pre-post improvement on a standardized 
symptom checklist (the SCL-90R). (p. 182) 
Kelly concluded that conceivably there exists a sub-class of 
therapy relevant values from amongst the totality of values 
assessed in the research. 
The status of introductory patient-therapist value 
positions seems to suggest, tentatively, that similarity or 
dissimilarity contributing to outcome must be considered on 
an individual value basis (and perhaps even interacting with 
other therapist or patient subject variables). There is no 
uniform prescription concerning classes of values, at least 
as measured by the RVS. If indeed therapeutic outcome is a 
function of a pattern of similarity and dissimilarity on 
individual values, previous research using conglomerates of 
values (e.g., collective values comprising the Instrumental 
or Terminal dimensions of the RVS) may have been misleading. 
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Intra-dimension comparisons, at least using the RVS, may 
prove most fruitful. 
Post-therapy Value Similarity and Outcome. Welkowitz, 
Cohen, and Ortmeyer (1967) had 38 therapists and 44 patients 
complete the Ways to Live Scale and the Strong Vocational 
Interest Blank during the course of psychotherapeutic 
treatment. Of the 44 patients, 29 had been in treatment 
between six and nine months at the time of assessment. Only 
two patients had been in treatment less than two months. The 
authors found that value similarity was significantly greater 
in actual therapist-patient dyads compared to dyads of 
randomly paired therapists and patients. Length of treatment 
was positively correlated with the degree of patient-
therapist similarity. There also appeared to be a positive 
relationship between degree of patient-therapist similarity 
and degree of therapist-rated improvement. Although 
interesting, these findings are difficult to interpret in 
light of value convergence theory given the absence of pre-
treatment patient-therapist similarity data. In addition, 
random case assignment did not take place, so it is unknown 
whether chance levels of initial similarity were achieved. 
An analogue study was conducted by Mitchell (1993) to 
investigate whether the personal values of psychotherapists 
influenced their improvement ratings of value-laden clinical 
outcome vignettes. A total of 94 out of 229 psychologists 
completed two mailed surveys (30%). One mailing coniained 
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the survey of Interpersonal Values (SIV), an instrument 
assessing six values: Support, conformity, recognition, 
independence, benevolence, and leadership. The other mailing 
consisted of six clinical outcome vignettes in which the 
values of a fictitious patient were systematically 
manipulated to correspond to a given value from the SIV. 
Of the six values measured by the SIV, a statistically 
significant positive correlation was found solely between 
clinicians' personal ratings of the conformity value and 
their ratings of outcome in the conformity value vignette. 
Subsequent multiple regression analyses supported this 
finding while also indicating that clinician gender accounted 
for significant variance, with women therapists being 
particularly inclined to assign relatively low ratings to 
both conformity as a personal value and the conformity 
outcome vignette. 
In a similar fashion, there was a statistically 
nonsignif icant trend toward a positive correlation between 
clinicians' personal ratings of independence (which received 
the highest mean rating) and their outcome ratings in the 
independence vignette (again, the highest mean rating) . 
Mitchell noted that the values discussed thus far, conformity 
and independence, may be particularly relevant to mental 
health issues. He suggested the possibility that therapists 
may be inclined to 11 isolate their own values from their 
evaluations of client outcomes 11 (p. 163) where values not 
related to mental health are concerned. 
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Alternatively, 
Mitchell offered that the saliency of particular values, in 
this case both strongly held and strongly disavowed values, 
may be important to clinicians' ratings of improvement. 
In an effort to delineate specific types of values which 
may be most influenced by the psychotherapeutic process, 
Kelly and Strupp (1992) had post-therapy patients 
retrospectively rate their degree of perceived value change. 
It was hypothesized that an assimilation effect (i.e., 
convergence) would be evidenced in values concerning 
"interpersonal morality," as measured by the RVS Morality 
subscale. More specifically, it was predicted that patient 
values concerning interpersonal morality would most readily 
shift toward the position of the therapist, given that 
morality values may underlie many topics frequently addressed 
in psychotherapy. The authors also predicted that therapist 
ratings of improvement would be the single outcome indicator 
positively associated with the assimilation effect. Finally, 
post-therapy patient-therapist similarity on ideologically 
related values (which would contribute to a healthy working 
relationship) and dissimilarity on "life-style" related 
values (which would foster cognitive dissonance) were 
hypothesized to be associated with beneficial outcome. This 
final hypothesis is inconsistent with the earlier views of 
Arizmendi et al. ( 19 8 5) in which global therapist rated 
outcome was thought to be a function of initial similarity on 
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Instrumental values and initial dissimilarity on Terminal 
values. 
Kelly and Strupp had 36 individuals complete the RVS at 
one or two year follow-up after undergoing outpatient 
psychotherapy treatment (additional instruments were also 
administered, as this assessment was part of a larger 
psychotherapy research study) . These subjects were also 
instructed to rate the "change in importance" (p. 35, italics 
in original) of each value since the onset of their 
psychotherapy treatment. The therapists also completed the 
RVS after psychotherapy termination. Outcome assessment at 
follow-up included patient ratings of improvement, a global 
assessment of improvement completed by independent 
clinicians, and the Inferiority-Personal Discomfort subscale 
of the MMPI. Therapist ratings of improvement were obtained 
at termination and also used in outcome assessment. 
Several notable strengths of the Kelly and Strupp study 
include the use of relatively experienced mental health 
professionals, as well as the use of multiple outcome 
measures involving both subjective and objective assessment. 
Nevertheless, the authors failed to find support for their 
morality values hypothesis. Although patients did indicate 
that change had occurred in some morality values, non-
morali ty values by and large were thought to have undergone 
the greatest change. The authors suggested that values 
reflected in the RVS subscales of Personal Goals (e.g., 
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"Family Security," "True Friendship") and Competency (e.g., 
"Capable," "Independent") may be most affected by the 
therapeutic process. 
One of the most noteworthy findings of the Kelly and 
Strupp study was that the majority of patient value change 
(64%) "tended to be in a direction away from the therapist's 
values" (p. 37, italics added). The authors suggested that 
it may not be so straightforward that a patient becomes like 
his or her therapist. Although significant patient value 
change did occur, and some values did tend to approximate the 
values of the therapists, the process of patient value change 
overall seemed to be quite complicated. 
Kelly and Strupp did find support for their hypothesis 
that therapist ratings would be the single outcome indicator 
associated with the assimilation effect, yet this finding was 
restricted to the RVS Terminal values scale, and the Personal 
Goals subscale partially comprising the Terminal values scale 
(as well as the individual Personal Goal, "Family Security"). 
Kelly and Strupp renewed an earlier caveat (Kelly, 1990) in 
that therapists may tend to view increasing patient 
similarity to themselves as an important indicator of 
positive outcome. 
Kelly and Strupp failed to find support for their 
hypothesis concerning post-therapy patient-therapist 
similarity on ideologically related values and dissimilarity 
on "life-style" related values being associated ·with 
beneficial outcome. 
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The authors suggested rather that 
generalized post-therapy value similarity may contribute to 
positive therapy outcome as defined by multiple outcome 
measures (regardless of any specific pattern of value 
correspondence, with the possible exception of similarity on 
religious values) . The authors suggested that a modest 
degree of introductory patient-therapist value similarity 
ultimately yields significant improvement, while highly 
similar or dissimilar introductory value inclinations are 
unrelated or even negatively related to positive outcome. 
This finding hearkens back to the earliest research in this 
area suggesting a curvilinear relationship between pre-
therapy similarity and value convergence (e.g., Cook, 1966; 
Parloff, Waskow, & Wolfe, 1978, as cited in Schwehn & Schau, 
1990). 
Overall, Kelly and Strupp suggested an idiosyncratic 
appraisal of value assimilation (i.e., convergence). Their 
study indicated that there may not be a typical pattern of 
value convergence, although value convergence, in some form, 
may be evidenced for certain psychotherapy participants; 
perhaps as a function of the personal attributes of the 
patient and/or therapist. Given the idiosyncratic nature of 
such convergence, it may be most prudent to match patients 
and therapists who demonstrate a modest degree of 
introductory value congruence. 
28 
The Role of Patient Perceptions in Value Change 
Early research (Landfield & Nawas, 1964; Pentony, 1966) 
explored the notion that there may be some criterion other 
than the personal values of the therapist toward which the 
patient's values may converge. Pentony (1966), for example, 
acknowledged the possibility of multiple explanations which 
might account for patient value change including: 1) 
Therapist disclosure of values affects the patient in some 
unspecified manner, thereby leading to increased patient-
therapist value correspondence, and 2) Increased patient-
therapist value correspondence is an artifact of the extent 
to which both parties reflect some independent "mature and 
healthy approach to living" (p. 39). The second explanation 
is of particular interest because imbedded in this account is 
the suggestion that there may be some criterion other than 
the personal values of the therapist toward which the 
patient's values may shift. 
The methodology employed by Pentony (1966) is likewise 
intriguing. Working with a patient and therapist population 
engaged in client-centered therapy, Pentony hypothesized that 
these therapists could be discriminated from the metropolitan 
community at large based on personal values presumably 
derived from the client-centered orientation. A second 
hypothesis was that patient values would converge with the 
values endorsed by the client-centered therapists. 
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Participants were thus administered a Q-sort comprised 
of presumed universal values. In addition to three 
independent sorts in which participants rated 1) values as 
lived day-to-day, 2) self in regard to the values one has 
been taught (and therefore "ought" to live), and 3) an ideal 
desired image of one's values, the therapy patients also 
generated a sort based on how they perceived their respective 
therapists [i.e., "' ... the way you think your therapist would 
sort them as most descriptive of his present actual way of 
living'" (Pentony, p. 41)]. Patients initially completed 
these four sorts prior to treatment, and repeatedly at 
session 10, termination (or session 50), and six month post-
treatment. 
Pentony reported no comparisons or correlations across 
groups, but rather, intercorrelations within groups across Q-
sort administrations were provided (e.g. , the congruence 
between patient ratings of day-to-day values and ideal values 
obtained after ten therapy sessions is significantly greater 
than the corresponding congruence prior to therapy) . This 
finding suggests a shift in patient values in the direction 
of some patient-generated ideal image, yet the nature of this 
image remains unclear. It is noteworthy, however, that a 
trend, albeit statistically nonsignificant, may be observed 
in the direction of increased congruence between patient 
ratings of day-to-day values and patient perceptions of 
therapist at six month post-therapy follow up compared to 
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corresponding pre-therapy congruence; as well as increased 
congruence between patient ratings of ideal values and 
patient perceptions of therapist at either termination or 50 
sessions compared to corresponding pre-therapy congruence. 
The data analysis provided by Pentony (1966) does not 
address the correspondence between patient perceptions of 
therapist and therapist ratings of self. It is therefore 
possible that patient and therapist perceptions vary 
considerably, and the assumption of therapist ratings of self 
as the criterion toward which patient value convergence 
occurs remains unsubstantiated2 • 
There is evidence in the Pentony study suggesting that 
patient perceptions may be important in the value change 
process. Patient ideal values, the only criterion toward 
which patient day-to-day values actually shifted in a 
statistically significant manner, tended to correspond 
relatively highly with patient perceptions of therapist. 
Again, the correspondence between patient perceptions of 
therapist and therapist ratings of self is not reported, so 
it is unknown whether patients accurately construed their 
therapists. Pentony does provide data suggesting that the 
criterion toward which patient value convergence does occur 
may actually be some independent "mature and healthy approach 
2 In and of itself, however, correspondence between 
patient perceptions of therapist and therapist perceptions of 
self does not validate the claim that the latter variable is 
the criterion toward which patient values necessarily 
converge. 
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to living" (p. 39), as depicted within the client-centered 
orientation. 
All of Pentony's data analyses must be considered in 
light of the indeterminate psychometric properties and 
construct validity reflected in his Q-sort instrument, as 
well as a limited patient sample (N=20) . Nevertheless, his 
findings support the notion of a criterion other than 
therapist ratings of self toward which patient value 
convergence may occur. It is quite possible that this 
criterion has more to do with patient perceptions than any 
objective or independent indices. 
Influenced by George Kelly's Psychology of Personal 
Constructs (Kelly, 1955), Landfield and Nawas (1964) were 
keenly aware of the importance of the patient's frame of 
reference. They thus put forth the following hypothesis: 
"Improvement in therapy is accompanied by a shift in the 
present-self of the client towards the ideal of the therapist 
as described within the language dimensions of the client, 
rather than those of the therapist" (p. 337, italics in 
original) . 
Using an adjusted version of Kelly's (1955) Role 
Construct Repertory Test, Landfield and Nawas (1964) had 36 
patients and six therapists rate themselves at present, their 
ideal selves, and their current perceptions of their 
respective counterparts in terms of rank-ordered personally 
relevant constructs (i.e., both patient and ther~pist 
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generated personally meaningful dimensions, rank-ordered the 
combined dimensions from least to most important, and then 
rated themselves, their ideal selves, and their respective 
therapists or patients on these same dimensions) . This 
procedure was repeated at multiple points throughout the 
treatment. The data considered in this study included 
introductory and final ratings, with therapy continuing for 
a mean of eight sessions. 
Landfield and Nawas (1964) found that in the subset of 
patients deemed most improved by independent judges (18 of 36 
patients) , there was significantly more realignment of 
patient ratings of self in the direction of patient ratings 
of therapist, compared to the subset of least improved 
patients. In other words, patient perceptions of therapist 
may have been the criterion toward which patient value change 
occurred, and such value change was associated with 
independent judges' ratings of improvement. Unfortunately, 
the patients' reflections on this change were either not 
assessed or not reported, so it remains possible that there 
was yet another criterion toward which patients, based on 
their own subjective account, were converging. 
The most obvious shortcoming concerning the Landf ield 
and Nawas study ( 1964) , in terms of relevance to this 
project, is that personal construct dimensions are not 
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necessarily synonymous with values 3 • Surely the frame of 
reference of the patient is implicated as meaningful to the 
therapeutic process, yet in the Landfield and Nawas study it 
is a frame of reference concerning the patient's construct 
dimensions "for understanding people" (p. 3 3 8 ) , as in 
"'warm-distant'" (p. 339). Although it is quite likely that 
the notion of values as considered thus far directly relates 
to or influences one's repertoire of personally meaningful 
constructs, it may be unwarranted to treat values and 
personal constructs as interchangeable factors. 
Parenthetically, Landfield and Nawas (1964) also found 
support for a second hypothesis in that patient gain may 
depend on at least some degree of similarity between patient 
and therapist personal construct dimensions. Such similarity 
theoretically allows for a common framework of understanding 
within which meaningful therapeutic interactions might occur. 
If patients incorporate the views of their respective 
therapists, perhaps they do so through actively lending their 
own subjectively construed meaning to the therapeutic 
experience, and not automatically ingesting the therapist's 
frame of reference. 
Surprisingly few studies have reported the degree of 
congruence between patient ratings of therapist and therapist 
ratings of self (Beutler, 1979). Keeping in mind the 
3Horley (1991), a current proponent 
construct theory, argues that values and 
constructs are indeed interchangeable. 
of personal 
personal · core 
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standard methodology employed in the value convergence 
1 i tera t ure, it would appear to be unnecessary to measure 
patient ratings of therapist, yet this empirical question 
bears directly on the role of patient perceptions. In his 
review of the existing literature, Beutler (1981) questioned 
whether convergence might be related to perceived 
dissimilarity versus actual dissimilarity. According to 
Beutler ( 1981) , "perhaps some do not acquire a therapist's 
view because they don't perceive it as being different from 
their own even when it is objectively" (p. 97). What if 
convergence were only demonstrated when patients accurately 
assessed the values of their respective therapists? What if 
patient value change shifted in the direction of their 
perceptions of therapist, regardless of accuracy? 
Three doctoral dissertations concerning values in 
therapy seem to support the notion that therapists and/or 
patients are often inaccurate in describing the values of 
their respective counterparts (Billington, 1983/1984; 
Merryman, 1985/1986; Moses, 1969/1970). Other published 
journal studies echo these findings (Ju & Thomas, 1987; 
Parloff, Iflund, & Goldstein, 1960; Warshaw & Bailey, 1966). 
Warshaw and Bailey (1966), for instance, reported that six 
therapists and their 15 patients were administered the 
Cassell Ego Strength Q-sort with instructions to rate "values 
for human happiness" as would their respective counterparts. 
Neither patients nor therapists were accurate in their 
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perceptions, but patients tended to "project their own values 
for human happiness onto their therapists" (p. 592). 
Additionally, there was no indication of value convergence in 
this sample, at least as typically defined in terms of 
patient movement toward therapist values. 
The Warshaw and Bailey study is difficult to evaluate 
since no information is provided about the nature and extent 
of psychotherapy treatment. Their findings, however, are 
consistent with the notion that individual perceptions may 
play an important role in the process of patient value 
change. 
Analysis of the Value Convergence Phenomenon 
While considering the values in psychotherapy 
literature, it may prove informative to note the 
preponderance of seemingly one-sided terms and descriptors 
characterizing the process of value convergence: 
"Transmission," "disclosure," "imposition," "reinforce," 
"indoctrinating," "shaping," "pressing," "transfusion," 
"dissemination"--all of which suggest some action emanating 
from the person of the therapist, with a lack of clarity 
concerning the patient's role in this process. On occasion 
the patient's report of therapeutic outcome is assessed, but 
beyond this there is virtually no consideration of the 
patient's experience of convergence. It is as if the entire 
process is assumed to occur automatically outside of the 
patient's awareness and/or active participation. 
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Much research conducted in the area of value convergence 
may suffer from what Rychlak (1981) has termed an 
"extraspective" bias, referring to a third person frame of 
reference in which conclusions are drawn "about that item 
under observation" (p. 21, italics in original), in contrast 
to an introspective slant in which conclusions are drawn from 
the perspective of the subject. From the perspective of the 
investigator, for example, it very much seems that a patient 
"becomes like the therapist. 11 Yet virtually nothing is known 
about the patient's introspective experience of the value 
change process, including his or her level of awareness of or 
contribution to "becoming like the therapist"--if, for that 
matter, the patient even believes this to be the case. 
Value convergence has been repeatedly demonstrated, yet 
this is from the perspective of the investigator. The 
patient's values are measured, the therapist's values are 
measured, and during the course of therapy greater 
correspondence between patient and therapist values is often 
observed. The interpretation given to this finding is that 
the patient "becomes like the therapist. 11 This 
interpretation may be true to an extent, but perhaps the 
increasing correspondence observed between patient and 
therapist (as measured by each participant's ratings of self) 
is an artifact of yet another covert process, as suggested 
long ago by both Landf ield and Nawas ( 1964) and Pen tony 
(1966) . One possibility is that the patient is realigning 
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his or her values toward some criterion other than the 
personal values of the therapist. 
The point is that, on epistemological grounds, there are 
inherent difficulties associated with postulating, from the 
researcher's perspective, what may be a criterion toward 
which the patient's 
establishing this from 
Al though "shaping" may 
values are moving, without ever 
the perspective of the 
implicitly be assumed to 
patient. 
be the 
process by which patient value change occurs, there does not 
appear to be any direct test of this assumption in the 
literature. On the contrary, research concerning value 
change in non-clinical settings (e.g., Grube, 1982) would 
suggest that shaping alone can not entirely account for 
observed value change, given that values can not be 
manipulated in an arbitrary manner. According to Grube 
(1982), "In the final analysis, the value changes that occur 
are under the control of the subject and not the 
experimenter" (p. 533) . 
Nawas and Landfield (1963) offer a similar conclusion 
based on their psychotherapy outcome study: "There was a 
trend indicating that the most improved patient tends to 
increase in his preference for his own frame of reference, 
that he tends to become more himself rather than an echo of 
his therapist" (p. 97) . It may therefore be beneficial to 
ref rain from assuming that the personal values of the 
therapist are necessarily the target of patient value change, 
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and to also lay aside the accompanying meta-theoretical 
assumptions about the mechanisms of such change. The process 
of patient value change, in and of itself, must be explored 
more fully before patient value change toward some specified 
criterion can be meaningfully investigated. 
Additionally, there are at least three forms of 
empirical evidence suggesting that the values of one's 
therapist may not be the criterion toward which patient value 
change occurs. Such evidence casts further doubt on the 
validity of value convergence theory. 
First of all, Beutler (1971) found that therapist 
therapy may be ratings 
related 
of 
to 
improvement 
the couple 
following marital 
arriving at similar value-laden 
attitudes, irrespective of the values of the therapist. In 
other cases, improvement has been related to patient-
therapist value dissimilarity following treatment (Holzman, 
1961, as cited in Kessel & McBrearty, 1967; Mihalick, 
1969/1970) Furthermore, in their study of perceived value 
change, Kelly and Strupp (1992) found that the majority of 
patient value change "tended to be in a direction away from 
the therapist's values" (p. 3 7, italics added) These 
patients did not appear to be conceding themselves as similar 
to their therapists following treatment. These findings 
obviously suggest that some criterion, other than the 
personal values of the therapist, may be relevant to value 
change. 
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The second form of empirical evidence which calls value 
convergence theory into question centers on one's awareness 
of personal values held by another. If one rejects the 
assumption that patients are being automatically shaped by 
their therapists, but instead are actively and purposefully 
adjusting their values, then patients would certainly need to 
be aware of their therapist's values in order to emulate 
them. On the contrary, there does not appear to be any 
indication that patients are consistently able to accurately 
construe the self-reported values of their therapists 
(Billington, 1983/1984; Hamblin, Beutler, Scogin, & 
Corbishley, 1993; Merryman, 1985/1986; Moses, 1969/1970; 
Parloff, Iflund, & Goldstein, 1960; Warshaw & Bailey, 1966). 
Warshaw and Bailey ( 19 6 6) , for example, found that both 
patients and therapists were inaccurate in describing the 
values of their counterparts. One alternative hypothesis 
regarding value convergence, therefore, is that patients are 
realigning their values in accordance with their perceptions 
of the therapist (or some specified criterion) , regardless of 
accuracy. In any event, this finding underscores the need to 
reconsider using the self-reported values of a select 
therapist as the criterion toward which patient values are 
judged to move. 
The third form of empirical evidence concerns the 
observed effect sizes in studies of value convergence. 
Al though many (but by no means all) convergence studies 
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suggest that the degree of patient and therapist post-therapy 
value congruence is significantly greater than pre-therapy 
value congruence, rarely is the absolute magnitude of post-
therapy congruence reported in the literature. Without such 
information, it is impossible to conclude just how much 
patients are "becoming like their therapists." 
Rosenthal (1955) did opt to present such information in 
the form of initial and final patient-therapist 
correspondence in moral values for all 12 dyads investigated 
in his study. The average correlation between patient and 
therapist rankings went from .23 (initial) to .39 (final) for 
all six dyads evidencing an increase in moral value 
correspondence following treatment. Although suggestive of 
some change process concerning moral values, the variation 
accounted for by the average final patient-therapist 
intercorrelation is only 15 percent. It is important to keep 
this effect size in perspective when drawing any conclusions 
about the extent to which Rosenthal's patients were "becoming 
like their therapists." 
There are obviously multiple possible explanations for 
these findings. Still, it remains an empirical question as 
to whether such correlations would be more robust and 
findings more consistent if patient value change alone, 
without necessitating a comparison to a select therapist's 
values, were being considered. 
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Perhaps the unstated meta-theoretical assumptions 
pervading much of scientific psychology, assumptions born of 
a logical positivist philosophy patterned after Newtonian 
physics and most clearly reflected in the psychology of 
behaviorism, continue to exert a dominant influence on 
research methodology (Krasner & Houts, 1984; Rychlak, 1981). 
At first this may sound contradictory since surely the 
interest in values has flourished, whereas the logical 
positivists sought to purge issues such as values and 
subjectivity from the objective, factual endeavor of science 
(Hegselmann, 1987) . Yet the positivistic/behavioristic 
influence rests not in the topical area, for values are 
indeed being investigated, but rather in the tendency to view 
subjects extraspectively. 
In the positivist/behavioristic view, the individual 
might be depicted, from the researcher's perspective, as 
being passively and automatically shaped by the therapist's 
behavior, analogous to watching one billiard ball strike 
another as part of a perfectly mechanical universe. Although 
this approach was once believed to be sufficient and even 
desirable for natural science, an unfortunate concomitant was 
the reduction of the person to mechanistic processes, without 
intention, exclusively driven by external circumstances. 
Kovel (1982) underscores this extraspective and 
reductionistic trend in psychotherapy, noting that the quest 
for objectivity may result in the consideration of patients 
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as objects which "have position in time and space, and 
nothing else. They do not remember and 
anticipate. And they value nothing" (p. 111) 
clinicians might theoretically accept such a 
their patients, most psychotherapists would 
account. 
they do not 
Al though some 
depiction of 
reject this 
Commenting on the enterprise of science, Krasner and 
Houts (1984) offer the following: 
The fundamental assumption of objectivism is 
untenable, because it is neither physically nor 
philosophically possible to obtain knowledge 
without first choosing some assumptive framework. 
This framework is undetermined by observations; 
rather it constitutes the hermeneutic context for 
generating "facts" and giving meaning to 
observations (Heelan, 1983) . Though such 
assumptions are often tacitly held and subtly 
acquired in the socialization process of becoming 
a scientist, we believe it is fruitful to think of 
them as decisions that the scientist makes. As 
choices among an array of available assumptions, 
none of which has prior claim to "truth," 
discipline-specific assumptions function as value 
systems for the scientists. (p. 841) 
It is ironic that the value systems of researchers may be 
tacitly influencing their investigation of values in others. 
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Conceivably, there may yet remain a strong adherence to this 
positivistic/behavioristic "assumptive framework." 
It is my contention that the methodology employed in 
most value convergence research is itself influenced by an 
implicit behavioristic meta-theoretical assumption, i.e., the 
belief that the therapist is "shaping," or in some manner 
responsible for, patient value change. In other words, the 
notion that the patient is being passively affected by some 
external circumstance, rather than actively and purposefully 
structuring his or her own experience of value change. Some 
studies, for example, control for the amount of patient value 
change possible given the patient's initial value position 
compared to that of the therapist. Although methodologically 
appropriate given the variables being investigated, imbedded 
in this approach is the implicit notion that patient value 
change is dependent upon and even limited by some external 
factor--the values of the therapist. 
A related issue is that the standard methodology used in 
the value convergence studies (as well as the underlying 
metatheoretical assumptions) may have precluded some 
investigators from considering the role of subject variables, 
such as personality traits, as contributors to patient value 
change. If value change is the result of shaping, or 
external circumstances, it theoretically matters little what 
the patient brings to the treatment situation (with the 
exception of his/her introductory position on given values, 
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which in turn defines the amount of change possible with 
respect to the therapist's values) . If, in contrast, the 
patient is actively realigning his or her values in a manner 
he or she deems fitting, then their personality traits, or 
their "emotional, interpersonal, experiential, attitudinal, 
and motivational styles" (Costa & Mccrae, 1992, p. 14), may 
contribute significantly to the value change process. 
An additional problem that is particularly relevant to 
value research concerns the assumption that values are 
meaningfully equivalent across respondents, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. Qualitatively speaking, 
there is no guarantee that the patient and therapist are 
ascribing the same or similar meanings to a given value, even 
with Rokeach's brief ancillary descriptions (Glossop, 
Roberts, & Shemilt, 1975; Mueller, 1974). Consider the value 
"Sal vat ion," for example, described as "saved; eternal life." 
The phenomenological as well as the literal meaning of 
salvation may vary greatly depending on one's religious or 
spiritual experiences (Yavornitzky, 1993). Rokeach himself 
debated whether or not he should even structure the 
expression of one's values through his own defining labels 
(1973). Be this as it may, it is possible to make valid 
comparisons within a subject over time, given that the 
subject is free to idiographically construe a value in any 
way. Valid comparisons across subjects, as in suggesting a 
patient's values have "become like" his or her therapist's 
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values, are much more problematic (Thompson, Levitov, & 
Miederhoff, 1982). 
Quan ti tati vely speaking, Arizmendi et al. ( 1985) offered 
an intriguing notion when they suggested that "centrality" or 
"personal relevance" (p. 1 7) of certain values may be related 
to value change. One of the limitations associated with the 
ordinal ranking of values inherent in the RVS is that it is 
difficult to evaluate the "centrality" of values across 
individual patients. There is no reason to assume that the 
highest ranking value of one patient is meaningfully 
equivalent to the highest ranking value of another patient 
(or therapist), even though the specific value may be 
identical. Consider, for instance, two individuals, both of 
whom ascribe the lowest ranking to the value "Courageous." 
One individual may be exceedingly moved by courageousness and 
may live his or her life in an attempt to be courageous. The 
other individual may disavow courageousness (as well as 
perhaps the next three or four values ranked immediately 
above courageousness) . Surely the centrality of these values 
is not the same for both respondents, and such distinctions 
may remain 
orderings. 
hidden through an eyeball comparison of rank 
Once again, repeated measures of the same subject 
over time will yield information on the relative saliency of 
given values for that individual. Comparisons across 
subjects are fraught with confounds. 
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Finally, given the replicated finding of a positive 
association between patient-therapist value similarity and 
therapist ratings of patient improvement, the 
intersubjectivity of the therapeutic dyad is directly 
implicated. In this instance, one perceives that both the 
therapist's and the patient's frame of reference must be 
considered. The manner in which both parties construe 
objects and events--the infusion of meaning to all that is 
perceived- -must be understood introspectively. The 
conception of mental health, of therapeutic outcome, and even 
of self is envisioned through subjective glasses which frame 
(and perhaps of ten bend) experience. Previous research 
indicates that, next to social class, the values of the 
patient appear to be the strongest predictor of bias in 
clinician judgment (Abramowitz & Dokecki, 1977; as cited in 
Gartner, Harmatz, Hohmann, Larson, & Gartner, 1990). Since 
therapists find increasing patient similarity to themselves 
to be an important indicator of positive outcome, research 
incorporating the subjective experience of value change from 
all participants' frame of reference seems to be clearly 
indicated. 
In conclusion, it would seem that the process of patient 
value change has been conceptualized and investigated in an 
extraspective fashion. In selecting variables which may be 
relevant to the value change process, researchers have tended 
to emphasize situational parameters which seem important from 
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their own viewpoint, with relatively less emphasis on 
exploring the patient's introspective views of or 
contributions to the change process. Time and time again the 
self-reported values of the therapist have been selected by 
researchers as the criterion against which patient value 
change will be defined, in spite of decades of inconsistent 
findings based on this strategy. It seems reasonable at this 
point to independently investigate the 
perceptions and patient contributions, 
standard value convergence methodology, 
fully understand the change in values 
role of patient 
apart from the 
in order to more 
reported by many 
psychotherapy participants. The remainder of this chapter is 
devoted to 1) an analysis of patient value change outside of 
individual adult outpatient psychotherapy, 2) exploration of 
the relationship between personality factors and value 
preference, 3) the introduction of personality factors as 
constructs which might influence the patient value change 
process, and 4) a series of hypotheses concerning the 
specific relationships between personality factors, patient 
value change, and treatment outcome on an inpatient 
psychiatric ward. 
Value Change in Other Therapeutic Modalities 
Research on the role of values in therapeutic 
interventions other than individual outpatient psychotherapy 
has been sparse. The relatively few studies which have 
addressed group, marital/family, or inpatient treatments 
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have, by and large, been reviewed by Beutler in his analysis 
of the existing literature (1981). As was pointed out by 
Kelly (1990), early research prior to the wide-spread use of 
the RVS can be difficult to evaluate given that values were 
often defined and measured in a diverse and inconsistent 
manner. Nevertheless, according to Beutler ( 1981) , the 
general tone of these early studies seems to be that 
convergence is more readily observable in individual 
outpatient psychotherapy compared to group, marital/family, 
or inpatient treatments. This may be due to the shear number 
of studies investigating the former modality. 
There is indication of patient value change, as measured 
with the RVS, in outpatient group therapy settings (Hamblin, 
Beutler, Scogin, & Corbishley, 1993; Ukeritis, 1977). These 
authors have generally referred to value convergence theory 
when describing such value change (i.e., that patients are 
"becoming like the therapist") . The same criticisms of value 
convergence theory can of course be leveled in the case of 
group interventions. There is ample room for alternative 
interpretations of these findings. 
The role of value change in inpatient settings is 
considerably less clear. One of two studies using the RVS 
found value change in inpatient psychiatric settings (cf. 
Elzinga, 1980/1981; Simnegar, 1976/1978). Studies conducted 
prior to the RVS have yielded more consistent findings of 
value change among psychiatric inpatients (Beutler, Jobe, & 
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Elkins, 1974; Holzman, 1961, as cited in Kessel & McBrearty, 
1967; Parloff et al., 1960; Rosenthal, 1955), but often in 
ways not predicted by the investigators. Overall, it is 
difficult to reconcile these findings with value convergence 
theory. 
A series of studies conducted by Almond, Keniston, and 
Boltax (1968, 1969a, 1969b) addressing the role of values in 
an inpatient psychiatric setting led to some interesting 
conclusions which bear directly on the current project. The 
authors focused on what might be termed milieu "therapeutic 
values," or specific values regarding one's experience on an 
inpatient psychiatric ward (e.g., the notion that one should 
actively participate in treatment). This differs 
significantly from research on general life values (valuing 
"Family Security" or "Honesty," e.g.), as typically 
investigated in the value convergence literature. 
Nevertheless, this work is relevant to the present study 
because the authors maintained that values are intimately 
connected with one's therapeutic experience during inpatient 
treatment. 
It is important to note that values were not directly 
assessed by the researchers, but rather inferred from 
qualitative and quantitative data (Almond et al., 1968). A 
likert-type questionnaire was constructed assessing attitudes 
about ward practice, and views of self and treatment. Sample 
questionnaire items included "For a patient who has to be 
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hospitalized, groups are the most important treatment 11 and 11 A 
patient should be able to give up his symptoms after a short 
time here. 11 Questionnaire i terns were rationally grouped into 
the following six ten-item scales, presumably reflecting a 
specific ward value (Almond et al., 1968) 
1. Be a Member.--Be an active member of the ward social 
system; do not withdraw or disaffiliate from the ward 
culture. 
2. Be Open. - -Discuss problems openly with staff and 
other patients and do not insist upon privacy or 
confidentiality. 
3. Take Responsibility.--Do so for others and for one's 
own recovery. Do not rely on others to facilitate 
magically one's remission and discharge. 
4. Have Faith in Ward.--Believe in the efficacy of the 
unit for one's self and for others; view staff members 
as therapeutically oriented in their actions. 
5. View Family Realistically.--Recognize the existence 
of very real problems in communications and interaction 
in the family and attempt to deal with these adaptively. 
6. Face Problems Directly.--Symptoms should not be used 
to avoid problems; they should instead be openly 
confronted and discussed. (pp. 547-548, italics in 
original) 
The questionnaire was expanded to include an additional 60 
items from other sources (e.g., items focusing on 
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authoritarianism) . The psychometric properties of the 
questionnaire were not reported. 
A total of 66 out of 72 consecutively admitted 
psychiatric inpatients completed the questionnaire within two 
days of admission. Patients were characterized as "heavily 
weighted with acute psychotic reactions and severe 
depressions along with a lesser proportion of severe 
character disorders and organic problems" (Almond et al. , 
1968, p. 546). The interaction of psychiatric disorder and 
item endorsement was not reported. Questionnaires were re-
administered after one week, one month, and prior to 
discharge to those patients who remained hospitalized at each 
point. As such, latter administrations may be confounded by 
level of psychiatric disturbance. A total of 66 patients 
completed the questionnaire upon admission, followed by 61 
completing questionnaires at one week, 56 at four weeks, and 
42 at discharge occurring after four weeks. Fifteen staff 
members were randomly selected from their respective 
disciplines and instructed to complete the questionnaire as 
would an "ideal" patient. 
The authors based most of their discussion on the 
primary factor emerging from both veramax and "fixed point" 
criterion factor analyses of the questionnaire items: Social 
Openness and Ward Involvement. This factor was positively 
correlated ( O. 92) with the composite total of the six a 
priori ward values. According to the authors, ".l terns 
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defining this factor stress involvement in a community or 
group situation in which individuals are responsible towards 
one another and share their personal problems" ( 1968, p. 
549) The authors concluded that there is a system of shared 
values and beliefs toward Social Openness and Ward 
Involvement characterizing the ward as a whole. The 
patients, in effect, tended to embrace this position during 
the course of their hospitalization (1969b) . 
In many respects the Almond et al. project (1968, 1969a, 
1969b) differs from the value convergence studies because of 
methodological approach as well as the focus on specific 
therapeutic values rather than general life values. 
Moreover, the empirical findings reached by the authors are 
questionable due to statistical treatment of the data and 
methodological design. For example, the impact of demand 
characteristics and social desirability is of concern, given 
that several of the ward therapeutic values abstracted by the 
authors from questionnaire items are actually a priori 
"values and behavioral norms within the patient-staff 
community" (1968, p. 547) that are explicitly disclosed to 
patients. It is at the level of general conclusions drawn 
from this project that important insights are found regarding 
the process of value change as a therapeutic phenomenon. 
First of all, Almond et al. (1969b) concluded that 
milieu "therapeutic values" endorsed by psychiatric 
inpatients may change during the course of hospitalization. 
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It is therefore possible that a change in general life values 
may also occur during an inpatient stay. Curiously, the 
authors cited unpublished data by M. Holzman indicating that 
general life value convergence was not observed among a 
sample of psychiatric inpatients, even though there was 
presumably an identified individual psychotherapist. This 
same Holzman study, however, apparently detected value 
convergence among outpatient psychotherapy participants. It 
was suggested that convergence may not have been detected in 
the inpatient group because of the level of psychotic 
disturbance, but this hypothesis does not appear to have been 
investigated empirically. Whether the inpatient group 
experienced general life value change other than convergence 
was not reported. 
Secondly, at each successive administration, the ward 
"therapeutic values" of patients tended to become 
increasingly similar to the staff 1 s composite version of an 
"ideal" patient nearing discharge (1969b). With respect to 
value convergence theory, it is noteworthy that some 
criterion other than the personal "therapeutic values" of a 
primary therapist may have served as a criterion toward which 
patient value change occurred (unless, of course, in the 
unlikely event that the mean values of an "ideal patient" as 
determined by staff happen to be synonymous with the staff 1 s 
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own "therapeutic values"--but this remains an empirical 
question) 4 • 
Another important aspect of this finding is that patient 
11 therapeutic values" change was a function of length of 
hospitalization, and that change in the Social Openness and 
Ward Involvement factor was observed after as little as one 
week (£< .10) . Moreover, the authors determined that the rate 
of change in this factor was greatest in the first week 
following admission. This is relevant to the present study 
since the current average length of inpatient psychiatric 
hospitalization has substantially decreased compared to the 
Almond et al. era. 
Thirdly, Almond et al. (1969a) found considerable 
variability in the patients' experience of the value change 
process. The authors used a variety of statistical and 
qualitative procedures to divide the sample into three 
relatively distinct groups, or "value change profile types." 
Although an elaboration of these profile types is beyond the 
scope of this project, Almond et al. provided evidence that 
4This finding illustrates once again the arbitrary 
nature of selecting a criterion from the researcher's 
perspective. A form of convergence has been demonstrated, 
yet the patient "therapeutic values" and staff ideal 
"therapeutic values" were still significantly different upon 
discharge. It is unknown whether movement in patient 
"therapeutic values" toward the ideal version of staff is in 
line with the patients' phenomenological experience. It may 
very well be, but this must be determined from the 
perspective of the patient. 
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these groups differed significantly with respect to several 
subject variables including age and social class. 
Although not formally assessed, there exists the 
possibility that personality factors might further account 
for some of the variance between these groups. Consider, for 
example, the primary factor of "therapeutic values" change--
Social Openness and Ward Invol vernent- -comprised of i terns 
emphasizing "involvement in a community or group situation in 
which individuals are responsible towards one another and 
share their personal problems" ( 196 8, p. 54 9) . One would 
expect that an individual's degree of both Extraversion and 
Openness to Experience, as defined by Costa and Mccrae (1992; 
see below), would relate to these qualities. 
In a related study, Reiss, Costell, and Almond (1976) 
found that the personal needs of professionals (a construct 
related to personality) interacting with these same 
"therapeutic values" predicted the preferred therapeutic 
intervention offered by inpatient psychiatric staff members. 
Predictions were also applicable to the preferred therapeutic 
intervention received by psychiatric inpatients. Although 
this finding is only tangentially related to personality 
factors in patient value change, the inter-determination of 
personality and values with respect to clinical treatment was 
formally implicated. 
A more recent study (Tyler, Clark, & Wittenstrorn, 1989) 
indicated that patient-therapist pre-treatment similarity in 
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mental health values influenced treatment response in 100 
inpatient alcoholics. 
mental health values 
In contrast to general life values, 
were defined as specific values 
regarding "what constitutes healthy emotional functioning" 
(p. 204). The authors found that patterns of patient-
therapist similarity/dissimilarity on eight mental health 
value dimensions, as measured by the Mental Health Values 
Questionnaire, differentially related to outcome as measured 
by MMPI profile scores, counselor ratings, and patient self-
report. 
Caution must be used in drawing conclusions from this 
study due to numerous methodological issues, not the least of 
which is non-random assignment of patients to one of only two 
principal counselors. The authors also opted to use the 
self-reported values of the primary counselor as the 
criterion toward which patient values were assumed to move. 
This criterion selection seems quite arbitrary, given that 
their description of the treatment program suggests that an 
intensive value-laden position may be espoused by the 
treatment program overall, much like the ward "therapeutic 
values" investigated by Almond et al. (1968, 1969a, 1969b). 
Consider the following: 
Inpatient therapy at Glenmore is a multifaceted program 
that involves training in Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) 
principles, group and individual therapy, a 5-day family 
therapy program, and bibliotherapy ... Contact with the 
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primary counselor is through twice daily group-therapy 
sessions and includes some additional individual 
contacts as well ... The culmination of the program is the 
completion of the fifth step of AA, a confessional 
experience that is accomplished in the presence of a 
minister . (Ty 1 er et a 1 . , p . 2 0 6 ) 
In light of the multifaceted nature of the treatment 
experience, as well as important qualifications on the nature 
and extent of primary therapeutic contact, there seems to be 
no obvious reason for selecting the primary counselor's 
values as the criterion toward which patient value change 
would presumably occur. It is not surprising that a 
differential (and quite varied) pattern was found between 
patient-therapist mental health value congruence and 
treatment outcome. 
Nevertheless, what the Tyler et al. study does reveal is 
that a change in mental health values, regardless of 
direction, was reported by this sample during the course of 
an inpatient treatment experience (average length of 
treatment was three to four weeks) . As such, there is again 
reason to suspect that general life values may also change 
during the course of inpatient treatment. 
Personality and Value Preference 
Several studies have investigated the relationship 
between value preference, the endorsement of particular 
values at a particular time (which is not the same as value 
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change), and personality factors (Brown, 1975; Butt, 1966; 
Furnham, 1984; Heaven, 1993; Heaven & Furnham, 1991; Luk & 
Bond, 1993; Mahoney, 1977; Martin, 1985; Mitchell, 1984, 
1989; Rim, 1984; Serra & Pollitt, 1975; Simmons, 1976). It 
is difficult to draw specific conclusions from this research, 
however, because a variety of instruments have been used to 
measure the constructs of values and personality. 
There are also important limitations on the 
generalizability of the findings. For example, subjects have 
typically consisted of adolescents or college students rather 
than individuals representing the entire life span. A 
particular interaction of value preference and personality 
may be unique to this cohort given the identity-
solidification issues experienced at this developmental stage 
(Arnstein, 1986). Nevertheless, there seems to be consistent 
indication that value preference may be connected to 
personality functioning. 
An early study (Butt, 1966) investigated the 
relationship between the Sixteen Personality Factor 
Questionnaire and five value dimensions extracted from the 
Ways to Live Value Scale. Butt found several relationships 
between value preference and select personality dimensions in 
her sample of 201 Canadian male undergraduates. The 
personality dimension of Extraversion, for example, was 
negatively correlated with the value dimension of Withdrawal 
and positively correlated with the value dimensiOn of 
Receptivity. 
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The personality dimension of Independence 
tended to overlap considerably with value preference, with 
roughly 32% of the Independence variance attributed to the 
value factors. In contrast, the personality dimension of 
Anxiety bore no significant relationship with value 
endorsement. Finally, the personality dimension termed 
Tendency toward Environmental Manipulation was positively 
correlated with the value dimensions of Enjoyment in Action 
and Sociability and negatively correlated with the value 
dimension of Withdrawal. 
Mitchell (1984) also made use of the Sixteen Personality 
Factor Questionnaire in his analysis of personality factors 
and value preference. Mitchell developed the "Life Values 
Inventory," a 55-item scale factor analyzed into 14 
dimensions and described by the author as similar to but more 
comprehensive than Rokeach's Terminal values. Through 
submitting the personality and value scores of 310 university 
students to a factor analysis, Mitchell found that eight 
instances of common-factor variance were shared between the 
personality traits and the value dimensions. These findings 
were replicated in a similar study completed by Mitchell 
(1989) which made use of the same "Life Values Inventory" and 
the Comrey Personality Scales. 
Serra and Pollitt (1975) found a statistically 
significant negative correlation between Extraversion and 
four questionnaire items deemed to assess certain life values 
60 
(which, on the surface, may bear some relationship to a few 
of Rokeach' s Instrumental values). A statistically 
significant positive correlation was also found between 
Neurotic ism and these same life values. Even though an 
established measure of personality factors was employed (the 
Maudsley Personality Inventory) , and the authors made use of 
a clinical sample, the limited measure of values detracts 
from this study. 
Rim (1984) found value preference to be related to the 
Eysenckian personality dimensions of Neurotic ism, 
Extraversion, and Psychoticism in his 
candidates for a preparatory course of 
[Israeli] institute of technology" (p. 245). 
sample of "100 
studies at an 
Using the RVS, 
a total of 10 (out of 18) Instrumental values and 12 (out of 
18) Terminal values distinguished re la ti vely low versus 
re la ti vely high scorers on one or more of these three 
personality dimensions. Al though the breadth of these 
findings alone would suggest that value preference may be 
related to personality factors, there are several 
methodological issues which make it difficult to assert this 
conclusion. The findings, for example, are of questionable 
validity given that Rim used a median split to divide his 
sample into relatively high and relatively low scorers on 
each personality dimension, but information on the 
variability of personality scores was not provided. It is 
therefore unknown whether groups of high and low scorers were 
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significantly different on a given personality dimension. 
Cultural and language confounds may also be involved, 
particularly since there is no mention of adjustment to 
questionnaires published in the English language. 
Using a methodology similar to that of Rim, Martin 
(1985) found significant differences in value preference as 
a function of personality factors in his sample of 113 
juvenile delinquents incarcerated in Madrid. Martin observed 
that the mean ranking of 10 (out of 18) RVS Terminal values 
and 8 (out of 18) RVS Instrumental values was statistically 
different between relatively high and relatively low scorers 
on one or more of the Eysenckian personality dimensions of 
Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Psychoticism. Curiously, only 
three Terminal values and four Instrumental values were 
identical to the 22 significant values found in Rim's (1984) 
earlier study. In other words, the specific values which 
varied in relation to personality factors differed, by and 
large, between the two studies. There are multiple 
explanations for this discrepancy including both cross-
cultural and sample differences. 
Mahoney (1977) found that cultural context may indeed 
mediate the relationship between personality and value 
preference. Citing an earlier study (Rim, 1970, as cited in 
Mahoney, 1977) in which the endorsement of values by neurotic 
Israeli male and female college students differed 
significantly from their normal counterparts, Mahoney 
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attempted to replicate these findings using an American 
sample. He found that neurotic American males (but not 
females) tended to endorse different values than their normal 
counterparts, but the overall pattern of value endorsement 
differed between the American and Israeli samples. Mahoney 
concluded that "the values associated with neuroticism are 
culture and gender-specific, 
characteristic of each culture" 
Following an assertion 
paralleling 
(p. 312). 
by Rokeach 
the values 
(1973) that 
personality itself might be construed as a value system, 
Simmons (1976) investigated whether the Eysenckian 
personality dimensions of Neuroticism and Extraversion might 
simply be re-conceptualized as particular value orientations. 
College student subjects were asked to rate 100 values on a 
seven point likert-type scale ranging from "extremely 
valuable to me" to "extremely non-valuable to me." Responses 
were then compared with performance on a short form of the 
Eysenck questionnaire. 
viewed cautiously due 
Overall, Simmons' findings should be 
to the indeterminate psychometric 
properties of his value measure. 
No significant relationship was found between value 
endorsement and Neuroticism. However, there was support for 
a mild positive association between 22 of the 100 values and 
Extraversion. Simmons qualitatively grouped the relevant 
values (those associated with high Extraversion) into three 
categories: 
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1) Valuing open, warm and loyal social relations (8 
values) 
2) Valuing vibrancy, vitality, vigor and viability in 
daily living (7 values) 
3) Valuing the search for individuals with integrity (6 
values) 
The specific value of "participating in the business life of 
the community" did not appear to be readily amenable to these 
categories. 
Simmons' work is important for another reason. His 
categories seem to bear a strong resemblance to aspects of 
the five-factor personality model of Costa and Mccrae (1985, 
1992; see below). Category #1, for instance, may overlap 
with the "Warmth" facet of the Extraversion Domain. Category 
#2 may involve several facets of the Openness to Experience 
Domain. 
Additionally, Simmons suggested that Extraversion might 
embody a "value-affirming position" (p. 913), in light of the 
consistency of positive correlations observed. Imbedded in 
Simmons' account, therefore, is the suggestion that 
personality factors may affect one's stylistic approach to 
value endorsement (i.e., being "value-affirming") , in 
addition to affecting the endorsement of specific values, per 
se. 
A relationship between value preference and personality 
factors may exist for adolescents as well as adults (Brown, 
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1975; Furnham, 1984; Heaven & Furnham, 1991; Martin, 1985). 
Heaven and Furnham (1991), for instance, found statistically 
significant intercorrelations between several multi-item 
value constructs and the Eysenckian personality factors in a 
sample of 185 Australian adolescents. The following 
statistically significant results were obtained using a 
·measure, comparable to the RVS, in which respondents rate 
(rather than rank-order) particular values: Neuroticism was 
positively correlated with the value constructs of 
International harmony and equality; Traditional religiosity; 
Personal growth and inner harmony; Positive orientation to 
others; and Propriety in dress and manners. Extraversion was 
positively correlated with National strength and order; 
Traditional religiosity; Personal growth and inner harmony; 
and Religious commitment. Psychoticism was negatively 
correlated with National strength and order; Traditional 
religiosity; Personal growth and inner harmony; Positive 
orientation to others; and Propriety in dress and manners. 
It had earlier been observed by Furnham (1984) that an 
interaction of independent personality dimensions further 
predicted value preference. For example, in Furnham' s sample 
of 70 English adolescents, individuals who were 
simultaneously high in Neuroticism and low in Extraversion 
tended to assign higher ratings to the Rokeach values of 
"Freedom" and "Self-respect" compared to other groups. 
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In a subsequent multivariate analysis of the Heaven and 
Furnham data, Heaven (1993) found that high Psychoticism/low 
Neuroticism individuals did not endorse the values of 
Traditional religiosity, Personal growth and inner harmony, 
Secure and satisfying interpersonal relationships, Positive 
orientation to others, and Propriety in dress and manners. 
Similarly, low Neuroticism/low Extraversion individuals 
tended to not endorse the values of Religious commitment and 
Secure and satisfying interpersonal relationships. Heaven 
also found in a sample of 89 undergraduate psychology 
students that Psychoticism was inversely related to the 
values of Secure and satisfying relationships, Positive 
orientation to others, and Propriety in dress and manners. 
There is some indication that the Eysenckian personality 
dimension of Psychoticism is related to achievement-oriented 
values in adolescents (Brown, 1975) . Subjects were 
administered a composite values inventory which yielded 
information about six factors "expressing aspects of 
achievement orientation" (p. 13 9) . Respondents were divided 
into high, medium, and low scoring groups on each of the 
achievement factors. Performance on the Eysenck Junior 
Personality Questionnaire was then compared 
groups. The following statistically 
relationships were obtained in a sample of 
across these 
significant 
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adolescents: High Psychoticism 
Passivity (particularly for 
was associated with low 
males) , high Passivity 
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(particularly for females), and high Cynicism (particularly 
for males). Low Psychoticism, in contrast, was associated 
with high Family Loyalty and high Educational Primacy. 
One curious aspect of Brown's study is that the mean 
Psychoticism scores for both males and females is greater 
than one standard deviation below the normative data provided 
by Eysenck. The relative comparisons he reported may 
therefore be sample-specific. Brown also cautioned that high 
Family Loyalty, high Passivity, and high Educational Primacy 
tended to co-vary with the Eysenckian Lie Scale, a measure of 
social desirability. 
Several of Brown's achievement factors may also relate 
to the five-factor personality model of Costa and Mccrae 
(1985, 1992; see below). The achievement factor of Cynicism, 
for example, may be compatible with "Trust," one of the six 
facets comprising the Agreeableness domain. Similarly, the 
achievement factor of Passivity may be compatible with 
"Competence," a facet of the Conscientiousness domain. 
The only personality dimension other than Psychoticism 
to show any relationship with achievement values in the Brown 
study was that of Neuroticism, with high scorers tending to 
endorse the achievement factor of Intolerance--the extent of 
the individual's ability to tolerate imperfections in others. 
Brown suggested that such a finding may indicate "a person of 
extreme irritability who was unwilling to compromise with the 
deficiencies of others" (p. 144) . This description may 
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correspond to the "Angry Hostility" facet of the Costa and 
McCrae Neuroticism domain. 
Only one published study to date (Luk & Bond, 1993) has 
compared the five-factor personality model to value 
preference. The NEO-PI was used to assess personality 
factors, while the recently developed survey by Schwartz 
(Schmitt, Schwartz, Steyer, & Schmitt, 19 9 3) was used to 
measure values. Several significant relationships were 
indeed found between value endorsement and all five 
personality dimensions, particularly Agreeableness, in a 
sample of Chinese university students. Still, in light of 
the culturally-specific findings of earlier studies, cross-
cultural generalization of these results must be made with 
caution. The Luk and Bond ( 1993) study does suggest, 
however, that further exploration of the five-factor 
personality model in relation to value issues is indeed 
warranted. 
In conclusion, the specific relationships between 
personality factors and value preference are difficult to 
ascertain in light of the variety of instruments that have 
been used to measure these constructs. The extent to which 
a given measure of values correlates with the RVS (the most 
widely recognized and accepted measure of values available) 
is generally unknown or unreported. Moreover, the majority 
of this research has been conducted with Eysenck's model of 
personality, which differs in structure from the more recent 
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five-factor model of Costa and Mccrae (1985, 1992; see 
below) . There is nevertheless some indication that the five-
factor model may relate to value preference in ways that have 
yet to be examined, particularly with respect to the Openness 
to Experience, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness 
personality domains. The five-factor model will be 
elaborated in the next section. 
In spite of these shortcomings, aspects of value 
preference have been consistently found to co-vary with 
personality factors. It is noteworthy, however, that 
different studies often yield dissimilar patterns between 
personality factors and specific values. Although there are 
some expectable trends, as in Extroverts tending to endorse 
the Rokeach value of "An Exciting Life," a consistent one-to-
one correspondence between a given personality factor and a 
given value is infrequently observed. 
Perhaps this is because, first and foremost, personality 
factors may influence the manner in which an individual 
experiences the particular values and value issues in his or 
her life, rather than being connected to any absolute value 
preference. In other words, personality factors may serve as 
a means of organizing and lending meaning to value issues, 
rather than determining specific value preference, per se 
(the latter of which would undoubtedly be influenced by 
cultural or contextual issues) There is some indication, 
for example, that personality factors may influence 6ne 1 s 
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stylistic approach to value endorsement, with extroverts 
demonstrating an inclination to "grapple with" values in 
their lives. 
According to Mitchell (1984), "What seems most likely is 
that personality characteristics provide a critical 
substratum that determines and molds receptivity to the 
environmentally supported values that are supposed to be 
learned and adopted" (pp. 
conducted by Mitchell 
1-2) . Factor analytic studies 
(1984, 1989) support this 
interpretation, yet again, because of instrument selection, 
it is difficult to extend his findings to the present study. 
Luk and Bond (1993) offered a similar formulation of the 
relationship between personality and value endorsement. They 
suggested that individuals learn to satisfy personality needs 
in select ways, and these ways come to be valued. There may 
be multiple value priorities which serve to meet personality 
needs. A change in personality needs or in one's stylistic 
approach to meeting such needs would therefore be reflected 
in a change in value preference. For Luke and Bond, then, 
the relationship between personality factors and value 
preference must be understood as a dynamic process, not as a 
static constant. 
Theoretically speaking, personality may fashion the 
manner in which values are established, experienced, and/or 
changed. It seems reasonable to predict that the process of 
value change observed among many psychotherapy participants 
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may also be related to personality factors. This notion does 
not appear to have been investigated empirically. 
The Five-Factor Personality Model 
In a very general sense, the construct of personality 
can be thought of as "the style a course of behavior takes 
on" (Rychlak, 1981, p. 823) . There have been numerous 
attempts to explain these styles of personality (e.g., 
Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; Maddi, 1980; Rychlak, 1981), but 
psychologists in the tradition of studying individual 
differences have uniquely conceptualized the construct 
through formulating objective techniques for measuring 
personality. 
One extensively used objective technique is that of 
self-report inventories. Such inventories include items that 
have been conceptually selected and empirically determined to 
differentiate individuals in a reliable and meaningful 
manner. Through factor analytic approaches, it is possible 
to parsimoniously account for the collective variance in a 
particular inventory (Anastasi, 1988), thereby suggesting the 
underlying factors or determinants of personality style. The 
discovery and delineation of such factors can result in 
theoretical models which describe the fundamental structure 
of personality. 
Perhaps the most widely known factor analytic model is 
that of Eysenck (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975), who endorsed the 
three personality factors or dimensions of Neuroticism, 
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Extraversion, and Psychoticism (the first two dimensions will 
be described shortly, as they are relevant to the present 
study) . Each of these dimensions of personality are 
generally understood to reflect an approximately equal 
combination of constitutional and environmental determinants, 
somehow interacting to comprise an enduring and discernable 
personality factor (Meyer, 1987). 
These core dimensions appear to reflect a pervasive and 
generalized underlying personality style, or collection of 
related traits, as opposed to a state or situationally based 
response phenomenon. Such dimensions reveal basic and 
enduring qualities of both perception and affect modulation, 
constitutionally evident, and exerting a life-long influence 
on one's experience of the world. There is support for 
cross-cultural congruity of Neuroticism and Extraversion, for 
example, as well as within-subject consistency of these 
dimensions over time periods up to five decades (Meyer, 
1987). 
Such models of personality take the form of two or more 
axes or dimensions (depending on the number of factors) on 
which an individual's score can be plotted. These factors 
are theoretically independent, so any combination of loadings 
on the factors is possible (e.g. , one might observe High 
Factor 1 - High Factor 2, or perhaps High Factor 1 - Low 
Factor 2, etc.). 
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Costa and Mccrae (1985, 1992) have developed the NEO 
Personality Inventory (NEO-PI), the NEO Personality 
Inventory-Revised (NEO-PI-R), and the NEO Five Factor 
Inventory (NEO-FFI) as operationalizations of a five-factor 
model of personality. The five-factor model is the 
culmination of several decades of research and theory 
regarding personality differences, and this model continues 
to receive empirical support in the literature (Costa & 
Mccrae, 1992; Mccrae & Costa, 1987) 
According to Costa and Mccrae (1992), the five factors 
characterize an individual's "emotional, interpersonal, 
experiential, attitudinal, and motivational styles" (p. 14). 
Moreover, such factors have consistently emerged in a variety 
of personality and mood inventories (Costa & Mccrae, 1992; 
Meyer & Shack, 1989) , thereby lending support to the ability 
of these inventories to measure the very structural and 
universal components of personality. Of note is the 
comprehensive nature of the five-factor model for describing 
personality variation, particularly in terms of its ability 
to subsume other factor analytic systems including the 
Eysenck model (Mccrae & Costa, 1989) 
The five domains of personality measured by the NEO-PI-R 
include Neuroticism (N) , Extraversion (E) , Openness to 
Experience (0) , Agreeableness (A) , and Conscientiousness ( C) . 
In addition, 3 O facet scales have been demonstrated to 
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comprise the global domains (six facets per domain), making 
intradimensional comparisons between subjects possible. 
The first domain, Neuroticism, "identifies individuals 
prone to psychological distress" (Costa & Mccrae, 1985, p. 
2). The second domain, Extraversion, is concerned with the 
individual's "quantity and intensity of interpersonal 
interaction ... and capacity for joy" (ibid. ) . The third 
domain of Openness to Experience "assesses proactive seeking 
and appreciation of experience for its own sake [as well as] 
toleration for and exploration of the unfamiliar" (ibid.). 
The fourth domain, Agreeableness, measures "the quality of 
one's interpersonal orientation along a continuum from 
compassion to antagonism" (ibid.) . The final domain of 
Conscientiousness is concerned with "the individual's degree 
of organization, persistence, and motivation in goal-directed 
behavior" (ibid.) . An extensive description of these domains 
and corresponding facets is provided in Costa and Mccrae 
(1985, 1992). 
Summary and Hypotheses 
Following the recognition of psychotherapy as a value-
laden enterprise, several decades of research has sought to 
delineate the role of values within individual psychotherapy. 
The quest for specific values meaningfully related to the 
psychotherapeutic process has been both promising and 
contradictory, with some recognition that methodological 
design may contribute to the discrepancies. The concept of 
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value convergence, the "increasing similarity of patients' 
values with therapists' values during therapy" (Kelly, 1990, 
p. 171), has been proposed to describe the change in values 
reported by many psychotherapy participants. Value 
convergence, however, remains an elusive concept, with a lack 
of clarity concerning the conditions under which value 
convergence may occur. 
It has been suggested that the construct of value 
convergence may itself be an epiphenomenon, a by-product of 
unstated meta-theoretical assumptions which have influenced 
lines of research inquiry. Although many patients do report 
a change in their personal values during the course of 
individual psychotherapy, there is no convincing evidence, at 
least from the perspective of participating patients, that 
one's values are being realigned in accordance with the 
values of one's respective therapist. 
There is clearly a need to investigate more fully the 
mechanism(s) or process(es) underlying such value change, 
including the patient's understanding of the value change 
process, apart from a methodology which presupposes that 
patient values "become like" therapist values. There is good 
reason to suspect that personality factors may contribute to 
both value preference and one's stylistic approach to 
endorsing values in nonpatient adolescents and adults. It is 
therefore possible that personality factors may also 
influence the process of value change experienced by many 
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psychotherapy participants. In other words, personality 
factors (perhaps along with other subject variables) may 
predict the nature and extent of value change experienced by 
psychotherapy participants. 
Research on patient value change has by and large been 
restricted to individual outpatient psychotherapy. Patient 
value change through other therapeutic interventions or 
modalities is largely a matter of conjecture. There have 
been a few studies addressing change in "therapeutic values" 
associated with participating in inpatient milieu therapy, 
but the available information on this topic is sparse and its 
applicability to general life values is unknown. 
If change were discovered in the personal values of 
psychiatric inpatients during the course of comprehensive 
treatment 5 , it would be more difficult to explain such value 
change as the product of "shaping" by an individual 
psychotherapist. It would be likely that there were some 
criterion other than the values of a single identified 
psychotherapist toward which a given patient's values were 
shifting. 
This study was proposed as a means of addressing some of 
the aforementioned issues. Namely, to consider the role of 
the patient, with respect to both personality factors and 
subjective perceptions, in fashioning his or her experience 
5Comprehensive treatment involving several practiti9ners 
~ffering diverse therapeutic interventions, as well as milieu 
interaction. 
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of value change. Through 1) exploring value change open-
endedly in an inpatient setting with multiple therapeutic 
influences (rather than expecting convergence with a single 
targeted therapist), 2) discovering variability in the nature 
of value change on the basis of select personality factors, 
3) demonstrating a relationship between value change and 
improvement, and 4) providing evidence that the patient 
idiographically construes his or her treatment situation with 
respect to potential value influences, the groundwork may be 
laid for a greater appreciation of the patient's 
contributions to the value change process. The following 
hypotheses concern the relationships between personality 
factors, patient value change, patient perceptions, and 
clinical outcome in an inpatient psychiatric setting. 
Personality Factors and Value Change. Several 
dimensions of the five-factor personality model may relate to 
a patient's experience of value change. The personality 
dimension of Openness to Experience, for example, yields 
information about an individual's "proactive seeking and 
appreciation of experience for its own sake," as well as 
"toleration for and exploration of the unfamiliar" (Costa & 
Mccrae, 1985, p. 2). One facet of Openness to Experience, 
moreover, has been identified as a "readiness to reexamine 
social, political, and religious values" (Costa & Mccrae, 
1985, p. 12) . Individuals re la ti vely high on Openness to 
Experience may therefore be inclined to re-organize their 
values during the 
psychiatric treatment. 
intensive experience of 
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inpatient 
The extent to which an individual immerses him or 
herself in ward activities may also bear directly on value 
change. The personality dimension of Extraversion provides 
information about the "quantity and intensity of 
interpersonal interaction; activity level; [and] need for 
stimulation" (Costa & Mccrae, 1985, p. 2) Individuals 
relatively high on Extraversion may therefore be prone to 1) 
engage in value-laden activities and 2) "grapple" with value 
issues they may encounter, thereby increasing the likelihood 
of value change. 
The personality factor of Agreeableness also describes 
a dimension of interpersonal behavior. Individuals high on 
this factor might be described as altruistic, cooperative, 
willing to lend a hand, and trusting of others, while low 
scorers may be seen as competitive and skeptical. It is 
predicted that these qualities will also influence the 
process of value change, with low scorers demonstrating some 
resistance to changing their values. 
Hypothesis #1: The amount of Terminal and Instrumental 
value change reported by study participants can be 
significantly predicted on the basis of one's standing on the 
personality dimensions of Openness to Experience, 
Extraversion, and Agreeableness. 
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la. Openness to Experience will be positively 
correlated with value change. 
lb. Extraversion will be positively correlated with 
value change. 
le. Agreeableness will be positively correlated with 
value change. 
Value Change and Outcome. Some have suggested that 
psychopathology or psychological distress might be 
conceptualized as an inadequate or unstable value system 
(e.g., Dolev, 1976; Gelfman, 1971; Gralnick, 1985; Leitner, 
1981; Mickleburgh, 1992; Morris, Eiduson, & O'Donovan, 1960; 
Purzner, 1988; Rogers, 1964; Rokeach & Regan, 1980; Schwehn 
& Schau, 1990; Tucker, 1976). Following this line of 
reasoning, the value system espoused by an individual during 
a sustained period of pronounced psychological distress 
should differ qualitatively from that individual's value 
system in times of relatively less subjective distress. The 
value re-organization often reported by patients may 
therefore reflect a bolstering of psychological defenses or 
a shift in available coping strategies between the onset and 
termination of treatment (assuming that a new prioritization 
of values acquired by the patient is more adaptive than the 
value priorities held at the onset of treatment) . If this is 
the case, a positive correlation would be expected between 
the process of value change and clinical improvement for 
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those patients who initially present with pronounced 
psychological distress and report less distress upon retest. 
Hypothesis #2: Improvement, as measured by the BSI, 
will be positively and significantly correlated with the 
amount of Terminal and Instrumental value change reported by 
participants. 
Additionally, given the affective component of values 
discussed by many theoreticians, the establishment of a new 
value priority in place of an inadequate or unstable value 
system would likely prove emotionally rewarding or 
satisfying. However, there exists the possibility that some 
individuals may re-organize their values in a manner that is 
not related to increased adjustment, in which case value 
change may not be experienced as favorable. 
The BSI as an outcome measure will yield information 
about change in psychiatric symptomatology. A different form 
of outcome information can be gained through having 
participants indicate their satisfaction with their value 
priorities. Satisfaction ratings should presumably vary 
based on how well one's system of values is conducive to 
meeting one's psychological needs. This will allow for an 
indirect assessment of the adaptivity of observed value 
change. Favorable satisfaction ratings would not be expected 
if value change were random and/or unrelated to increased 
adjustment. As such, a positive correlation between value 
change and value satisfaction will suggest that patients 
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overall are re-organizing their values in a relatively more 
adaptive fashion. Hypothesis #3: A significant positive 
correlation will be observed between Terminal and 
Instrumental value change and patient satisfaction ratings of 
their value system. 
Finally, there will be an opportunity for participants 
to convey their subjective understanding of the value change 
process. This information will be assessed in a qualitative 
and exploratory manner. 
Subjects 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
A total of 56 participants were secured from two 
independent settings. Site I was the inpatient psychiatric 
service of a large Southern university hospital complex. 
Site II was the psychiatric service of a large public 
hospital in a city geographically some 25 miles from the 
location of Site I. Both services provide relatively short-
term inpatient psychiatric care. 
All new admissions to either site were screened on the 
basis of chart review and/or brief clinical interview for 
possible study participation. Eligibility was determined on 
the basis of the following three inclusion/exclusion 
criteria: 
1. Inclusion--the patient demonstrated no evidence of 
acute psychosis and/or hypermania which might 
reasonably be expected to compromise the validity 
of their questionnaires. 
2. Inclusion--the patient demonstrated the ability to 
complete the required tasks with respect to 
intellectual capacity and/or reading level. 
81 
82 
3. Exclusion--study participation might exacerbate a 
patient who was considered upon admission to be at 
risk for combative behavior. 
A total of 69 patients meeting all 3 criteria were 
admitted to Site I during a four month period. Of these 69 
patients, 22 were discharged prior to a requisite five day 
minimum hospitalization, leaving a potential subject base of 
47. All but 8 agreed to participate, and 3 patients failed 
to complete the retest, leaving a final n of 36 completed 
cases from Site I. 
A total of 43 patients meeting these same criteria were 
admitted to Site II during a three month period. The 
resulting potential subject base consisted of 25 patients 
whose length of stay was five or more days. Of these 25 
patients, 1 declined to participate, and 4 failed to complete 
the retest, leaving a final n of 20 completed cases from Site 
II. 
Demographic information is conveyed in Table 1. The 
overall sample was almost equally divided with respect to 
gender (52% female, 48% male) . The average age of 
participants was approximately 35 years. The majority of 
participants were single (46%), while 18% were married, 18% 
separated, 14% divorced, and 4% widowed. Racial background 
was predominantly Caucasian (50%), followed by African-
American (39%), Other (5%), Hispanic (4%), and Asian (2%) . 
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Table 1. Demographic Characteristics by Treatment Facility. 
DEMOGRAPHIC SITE I SITE II COMBINED 
VARIABLE (n=36) (n=2 o) (N=56) 
Gender 
Female 20 9 29 
Male 16 11 27 
Age M=34.06 M=36.45 M=34.91 
(SD=9. 99) (SD=9.14) (SD=9.68) 
Marital Status 
Divorced 5 3 8 
Married 9 1 10 
Separated 4 6 10 
Single 17 9 26 
Widowed 1 1 2 
Race 
Asian 1 0 1 
African-American 9 13 22 
Caucasian 23 5 28 
Hispanic 2 0 2 
Other 1 2 3 
Education M=ll.94 M=12.26 M=l2.05 
(SD=2.35) (SD=2.58) (SD=2.41) 
Em2loyment Status 
Employed 13 2 15 
Unemployed 21 17 38 
Student 2 1 3 
Religious 
Preference 
None 11 1 12 
Other 7 0 7 
Protestant 18 19 37 
DSM-IV Primary 
Diagnosis 
Adjustment Disorder 4 0 4 
Bipolar Disorder 10 0 10 
Depression NOS 4 3 7 
Major Depression 14 13 27 
Other 2 1 3 
Schizoaffective 2 3 5 
Psychotro12ic Meds 
No 6 0 6 
Yes 30 20 50 
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A high school education was completed on average, and 
68% of participants were unemployed, 27% were employed, and 
5% were students. Participants were predominantly Protestant 
(66%), followed by a religious preference of none (21%), and 
other (13%). 
The primary DSM-IV diagnosis given to most participants 
was some variant of a Maj or Depressive Disorder ( 4 8 % ) , 
followed by Bipolar Disorder (18%), Depression Not Otherwise 
Specified (13%), Schizoaffective Disorder (9%), Adjustment 
Disorder (7%), and other (5%) . The majority of participants 
(89%) were treated with psychotropic medication. There is no 
theoretical basis, however, for suspecting that 
pharmacological intervention, in and of itself, would 
directly influence the process of value change. 
Psychiatric Unit Characteristics 
The psychiatric service of Site I is divided into five 
units with unique specializations, and pre-screening efforts 
are made to match new admissions to the unit which will best 
address their needs. All 36 participants from Site I were 
treated on one of two units, unit A targeting patients with 
affective disorders (n=23), or unit B focusing on psychiatric 
patients with a concomitant medical condition (n=l3). Unit 
B patients were considered for study participation if they 
primarily received treatment for an affective disorder, 
having been assigned to unit B because of medical issues 
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(e.g., renal care following a drug overdose; Bipolar Disorder 
with Diabetes Mellitus) . 
Treatment at Site I was provided by a multidisciplinary 
staff. Patients had the opportunity to interact with 
psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, clinical social 
workers, pharmacologists, pastoral counselors, psychiatry 
residents, psychology interns, psychiatric nurses, 
occupational and activity therapists, medical students, 
pharmacology students, and additional students from several 
of these or other disciplines. Milieu interaction was also 
significant. As such, it is likely that a broad range of 
personal values were represented on the ward, as well as 
multiple therapeutic experiences which might serve to 
influence the personal values of a patient. 
Site II is a 22-bed facility encompassing a broad 
spectrum of psychiatric disorders. The ward is divided into 
two sub-uni ts, Progressive and Acute, with psychotic or lower 
functioning patients accommodated on the Acute wing. The 
majority of structured programming involves appropriate 
patients from both sub-units, yet patients typically remain 
in their respective locales during unstructured time. All 
participants from Site II received treatment on the 
Progressive sub-unit. 6 
60n occasion, a given participant was admitted to the 
Acute wing, most likely due to space constraints, but 
transfer took place as soon as possible. This is noted given 
the qualitatively different milieus characterizing either 
wing. 
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In addition to a substantial psychiatric nursing staff, 
patients were treated by a clinical psychologist offering 
group therapy, and master's level social workers offering 
individual sessions. Patients were also interviewed by an 
attending psychiatrist every day. Along with occupational 
and recreational therapy, a variety of psychoeducational 
groups were offered daily. Like Site I, a broad range of 
ward activities and personal values were likely represented 
on the unit. 
Measures 
NEO-FFI. The NEO-FFI is an abbreviated version of the 
NEO Personality 
Inventory-Revised 
1992). These 
Inventory (NEO-PI) and NEO Personality 
(NEO-PI-R) by Costa and Mccrae (1985, 
instruments are self-administered 
questionnaires that yield information about an individual's 
relative standing on five personality domains that correspond 
to the five-factor personality model. Information is also 
provided about the specific traits or facets that comprise 
each domain (except in the case of the NEO-FFI) . Since most 
of the available information relevant to the NEO-FFI concerns 
the NEO-PI and NEO-PI-R, the development and psychometric 
properties of these parent instruments were reviewed. 
The NEO-PI-R consists of 240 items presented in a 
likert-type format with five response alternatives ranging 
from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree, resulting in item 
scores of zero to four. Items are evenly distributed between 
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positive and negative wordings so as to help control for 
acquiescence and nay-saying. A sixth grade reading level is 
required to complete this instrument. The 240 items 
independently load onto 30 facets, with six facets comprising 
a given domain. Facet scores are then totaled for the 
respective domain scores of Neuroticism, Extraversion, 
Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. T-score 
conversions are easily computed with the aid of a profile 
sheet, and normative information is provided for several 
well-described samples. Both a self-report and an observer 
rating format of the NEO-PI-R currently exist. 
The authors used a combination of rational and empirical 
procedures for scale development. Rather than seeking to 
construct a new system of personality description, they 
reviewed existing personality assessment literature so as to 
measure "all major aspects of individual differences to yield 
a truly multipurpose personality inventory" (Costa & Mccrae, 
1992, p. 39). Initial items were written to reflect a 
particular factor, and then statistical analyses determined 
which items best represented each factor. The authors noted 
that there is strong (but not absolute) agreement throughout 
the scientific community as to the legitimacy of the five-
factor model. 
The majority of the development and validity research of 
the original NEO-PI was conducted on two longitudinal 
samples, the first of which consisted of over 2,000 primarily 
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Caucasian men volunteering to participate in the "Veterans 
Administration's Normative Aging Study in Boston" (Costa & 
Mccrae, 1985, p. 27), while the second sample was comprised 
of roughly 400 male and 300 female participants in the 
"Augmented Baltimore Longitudinal Study of Aging" (ibid.). 
Internal consistency correlations ranged from .60 to .86 for 
the 18 individual facets comprising the N, E, and O domains. 
However, the alpha correlations for the overall N, E, and O 
domains were expectedly higher with a range of .85 to .93. 
Test-retest reliability following a six month interval ranged 
from .66 to .92 for the individual facets, and .86 to .91 for 
the three domains. Unfortunately, reliability information 
was limited for the Agreeableness and Conscientiousness 
domains of the original NEO-PI. However, the internal 
consistency of these domains was estimated to be .56 and .84, 
respectively. 
Subsequent research has led to the development of the 
revised NEO-PI. An additional sample of 1,800 individuals, 
including many younger and non-white respondents, led to the 
delineation of the previously unidentified facets comprising 
the Agreeableness and Conscientiousness domains. Other 
di verse samples have also been used in reliability and 
validity studies, and some original items have been adjusted 
to improve the psychometric properties of the instrument. 
Correlations between the original and updated versions range 
from .93 to .95. 
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The authors now report internal consistencies of .56 to 
.81 obtained with the NEO-PI-R self-report facets (including 
the Agreeableness and Conscientiousness facets) . These 
levels are quite acceptable given that each facet is 
comprised of only eight items. The alpha correlations for 
the five domains range from .86 to .92. Similar results have 
been obtained with a variety of clinical and non-clinical 
samples. By comparing NEO-PI-R results in a sample of 208 
college students who completed an abbreviated form of this 
measure three months earlier, retest coefficients for 
Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and 
Conscientiousness were determined to be .79, .79, .80, .75, 
and .83, respectively. Impressive stability coefficients for 
Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Openness (.68 to .83) were 
obtained in a six-year longitudinal study. Similar 
coefficients (.63 and .79) were found in brief measures of 
the Agreeableness and Conscientiousness domains after three 
years. 
In terms of validity, the domain scores have been factor 
analyzed and found to correspond highly with the factorial 
structure of the original model, an indication that the NEO-
PI-R is a good representation of the five-factor model. The 
authors reported that such factorial validity has been upheld 
across gender, race, and age groups. The authors also 
reported evidence of convergent and discriminant validity 
with the Eysenck Personality Inventory, Guilford-Zimmerman 
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Temperament Survey, Meyers-Briggs Type Indicator continuous 
scales, and Revised California Personality Inventory, among 
other measures. Consensual validation has also been 
demonstrated by the strong correspondence between self-
ratings and observer ratings of the same subject. The 
construct validity and predictive power of this instrument 
has been repeatedly demonstrated in the areas of "vocational 
interests, health and illness behavior, psychological well-
being, and characteristic coping styles" (Costa & Mccrae, 
1992, p. 39). Overall, validity information is quite robust, 
and a more detailed description is provided in the test 
manual (Costa & Mccrae, 1992) . 
The abbreviated version of the NEO-PI-R, known as the 
NEO-FFI, was developed by combining the 12 items from the 
NEO-PI with the highest loadings on each of the five factors. 
A few item adjustments were then made to further balance the 
instrument. The resulting 60 item inventory yields 
information about the respondent's standing on each of the 
five personality dimensions. Information about facet scores 
is not provided. 
The psychometric properties of the NEO-FFI are 
acceptable, albeit somewhat lower than those of the NEO-PI-R 
(Costa & Mccrae, 1992). Internal consistency using 
coefficient alpha ranges from .68 for Agreeableness to .86 
for Neuroticism. The correlations between the NEO-FFI domain 
scores (N, E, 0, A, and C) and the corresponding NEO-PI-R 
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domain scores are .92, .90, .91, .77, and .87, respectively. 
Similar correlations were obtained between the NEO-FFI domain 
scores and the validimax factors of the original five-factor 
model. 
The major advantages of the abbreviated version are 
obviously speed and convenience, important considerations in 
the assessment of psychiatric inpatients. Costa and Mccrae 
(1992) noted, however, that some measurement precision is 
forfeited with the NEO-FFI. When discussing convergent 
validity, for example, the authors suggested that the NEO-FFI 
is able to account for approximately 85% of the convergent 
criteria variance compared to factor scores. 
In an exploratory study regarding the role of 
personality factors in patient value change, it would appear 
that the NEO-FFI provides an acceptable measure of the five-
factor model of personality functioning. The relative ease 
and speed of administration (the 60 item NEO-FFI usually 
requires 10 to 15 minutes to complete) allows for 
considerably less demand placed on inpatient psychiatric 
participants compared to the full 240 item NEO-PI-R version. 
As such, the NEO-FFI was included in the present study as a 
comprehensive measure of adult personality factors. 
The Rokeach Value Survey (RVS). Rokeach (1973) 
acknowledged five assumptions which influenced his thinking 
about the construct of values: 
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(1) the total number of values that a person possesses 
is relatively small; (2) all men everywhere possess the 
same values to different degrees; (3) values are 
organized into value systems; (4) the antecedents of 
human values can be traced to culture, society and its 
institutions, and personality; (5) the consequences of 
human values will be manifested in virtually all 
phenomena that social scientists might consider worth 
investigating and understanding. (p. 3) 
The RVS yields information on the relative standing of 
18 Terminal or end-state values, such as "A Comfortable Life" 
and "True Friendship," and 18 Instrumental or means to ends 
values, such as "Logical" and "Polite." Terminal values have 
been further distinguished by Rokeach as reflecting Personal 
goals (e.g., "Family Security") versus Social goals (e.g., "A 
World At Peace"), while Instrumental values are also divided 
into values reflecting Competency (e.g., "Independent") or 
Morality (e.g., "Forgiving"). The two independent sets of 18 
Terminal and 18 Instrumental values are presented along with 
a brief qualifying definition of the value. Respondents are 
instructed to "rank each value in its order of importance to 
you." Most people complete the RVS in 10 to 20 minutes. 
It may seem that some of the RVS values are fairly 
abstract and require some conceptual sophistication. Some 
respondents may indeed choose to complete the RVS in such a 
manner. Rokeach (1973) noted, however, that the task is 
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fairly projective in nature. That is, respondents are free 
to idiographically construe a given value however they like. 
The same "projective" process can then be brought to bear on 
the ranking task when the individual completes the RVS at 
some later point. Quite simply, the task is in the eye of 
the beholder. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the RVS 
has been used successfully with a sample of seventh grade 
students (Rokeach, 1973). 
The qualitative development of the RVS drew upon 
numerous sources. Following a literature review, a process 
of self reflection, a polling of 30 psychology graduate 
students, and interviews with 100 adults, Rokeach narrowed 
and refined a much larger pool down to 18 Terminal values 
deemed to be sufficiently thorough, yet manageable for 
purposes of rank ordering. The 18 Instrumental values, in 
contrast, were derived from 555 personality-trait words 
already compiled in the literature, and similarly narrowed 
and refined to a core of 18. 
Although Rokeach acknowledged that the RVS was developed 
intuitively, the psychometric properties of the instrument 
have been well-researched. Test-retest reliabilities of the 
18 individual Terminal values range from . 51 to . 88 in 
periods of up to seven weeks. Test-retest reliabilities of 
the 18 Instrumental values range from .45 to .70 in the same 
time frame. Rho reliability (median test-retest reliability 
of the entire rank-order) after at least 21 days is .74 for 
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Terminal values and .65 for Instrumental values in a sample 
of Americans, with similar rho reliabilities (.74 and .70, 
respectively) obtained with a sample of South Australian 
college students retested after a five week interval. 
Impressive rho reliability has been found for both Terminal 
(.69) and Instrumental (.61) values in intervals of 14 to 16 
months (Rokeach & Regan, 1980) These rho coefficients were 
based on RVS Form E, in which the respondent simply pencils 
in his or her numerical ranking. Slightly higher 
coefficients were obtained with Form D whereby respondents 
realign the values by peeling and re-affixing individual 
labels printed with each value and a brief definition. 
Validity information on the RVS is quite abundant. In 
short, the RVS has been successfully used to identify values 
which distinguish various "political, religious, economic, 
generational, and cultural groups and that relate to a range 
of social attitudes" (Braithwaite & Law, 1985, p. 250). In 
his review of value measures used specifically in 
psychotherapy research, Kelly (1990) acknowledged the RVS as 
the most widely accepted, versatile, comprehensive, and 
psychometrically sound operationalization of values 
available. It has been effectively used to measure values 
and value change in psychiatric outpatients (Arizmendi et 
al., 1985; Beutler et al., 1983; Kelly & Strupp, 1992; 
Martini, 1978; Schwehn & Schau, 1990), psychiatric inpatients 
(Elzinga, 1980/1981; Jansen, 1973; Khan & Cross, 1983; 
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Simnegar, 1976/1978), and inpatient alcoholics (Berryhill-
Paapke & Johnson, 1995; Jansen, 1973). 
The RVS does have some limitations (Miethe, 1985) . An 
ordinal level of measurement is obtained by virtue of the 
rank-ordering procedure. The use of most parametric 
statistical tests would therefore be questionable. Also, the 
saliency or "intensity" of a particular value cannot be 
determined, only the relative standing of values within the 
entire set. The RVS, moreover, is an ipsative measure, which 
indicates that scores are not completely independent. The 
position of the last value to be ranked, for example, is 
determined by the placement of other values. 
Rokeach (1973) has indicated that the violation of the 
independence assumption 
intercorrelation being 
is 
- • 06) / 
relatively small (average 
and it may therefore be 
acceptable to treat each value as a separate variable, a 
strategy which would broaden the potential uses of the RVS. 
Others challenge this conclusion, suggesting that the low 
intercorrelations are an artifact of ipsative measurement 
(Braithwaite & Law, 1985). 
Rokeach (1973, 1985) and others (Kelly, 1990; Miethe, 
1985) have provided a strong basis for favoring the RVS in 
spite of these shortcomings. At the level of construct 
validity, Rokeach maintains that in actuality the 
individual's experience of values in one of relative 
priori ties, " ... because [value] decisions in everyday life 
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are inherently and phenomenologically ipsati ve decisions" 
(Rokeach, 1985, p. 162) That is, the rank-ordering 
procedure of 
psychological 
the RVS is theoretically isomorphic to the 
process of value endorsement (Thompson, 
Levitov, & Miederhoff, 1982) The sensitivity afforded the 
researcher to detect such distinctions with the RVS, 
according to Rokeach (1985), would be lost given a level of 
measurement targeting the absolute magnitude of independent 
values. 
Miethe ( 1985) has provided empirical evidence suggesting 
that the rank-ordering procedure of the RVS is 
psychometrically superior to a rating procedure and two 
psychophysical scaling techniques (magnitude estimation and 
handgrip scaling) . The rank-ordering procedure yielded more 
favorable test-retest reliability, discriminatory power, and 
convergent validity (i.e., rank-ordering had the highest 
average intercorrelation with the other techniques) compared 
to the alternate procedures. 
the rating procedure and 
Rank-ordering was as good as 
better than psychophysical 
techniques in terms of predictive validity. Miethe concluded 
that the increased error variance associated with techniques 
other than rank-ordering may nullify the benefits gained 
through interval measurement. 
There is ample evidence that the RVS is sensitive to the 
change in values reported by many psychotherapy participants 
(Kelly, 1990). Given the primacy of the RVS in studies of 
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value change in psychotherapy, the use of this instrument in 
the present context will allow for the most direct comparison 
to existing research. As such, Form G of the RVS was used as 
a measure of value change (Rokeach, 1988). 
Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) . The Brief Symptom 
Inventory (Derogatis, 1992) is a standardized instrument in 
which respondents are asked to indicate on a five point 
likert-type scale the extent to which they have been 
distressed in the past seven days by 53 psychiatric symptoms. 
Scores range from "not at all" (0) to "extremely" (4). This 
instrument is an abbreviated version of the more widely known 
SCL-90-R (Derogatis & Melisaratos, 1983). Most people 
complete the BSI in approximately 8 to 10 minutes. A sixth 
grade reading level is required. The BSI has been 
effectively used as an outcome measure for a variety of 
populations including psychiatric inpatients (Piersma, 
Reaume, & Boes, 1994). Normative information for psychiatric 
inpatients is available. 
The BSI is comprised of nine dimensions representing 
particular symptom clusters including Somatization (SOM) , 
Obsessive-Compulsive (0-C), Interpersonal Sensitivity (I-S), 
Depression (DEP) , Anxiety (ANX) , Hostility (HOS) , Phobic 
Anxiety (PHOB), Paranoid Ideation (PAR), and Psychoticism 
(PSY) . There are also three global indices yielding 
information about the amount, depth, and intensity of 
symptomatology. 
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Derogatis and Melisaratos (1983) reported that internal 
consistency using Cronbach's coefficient alpha for the nine 
dimensions ranges from .71 to .85, and test-retest 
reliability ranges from .68 to .91. The correlations between 
the BSI and corresponding SCL-90-R symptom dimensions ranged 
from .92 to .98 in a sample of 565 outpatients (Derogatis, 
1992) 
Boulet and Boss (1991) investigated the reliability and 
validity of the BSI using a sample of 350 consecutive male 
forensic outpatients and 151 consecutive male forensic 
inpatients (!::!=501) primarily diagnosed with a paraphilic 
disorder. Boulet and Boss obtained slightly higher 
Cronbach' s coefficient alpha correlations than the test 
authors, with a range of . 75 to . 89. An assessment of 
convergent and discriminant validity was also completed on 
the basis of 338 valid MMPI profiles obtained with the same 
sample. There was some evidence of convergent validity, with 
several of the nine BSI symptom dimensions yielding expected 
correlations in the moderate range with MMPI scales (e.g., 
.53 between SOM & MMPI scale l; .50 between DEP & scale 2; 
.51 between PAR & scale 6; .54 between 0-C & scale 7; and .51 
between PSY & scale 8). However, there was poor evidence of 
discriminant validity, with most BSI dimensions correlating 
with multiple MMPI indices (e.g. , . 4 9 between SOM & both 
scales 6 and 7) . This difficulty with discriminant validity 
may be partly due to the criterion measure employed, given 
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that MMPI scales may not measure distinct constructs of 
psychopathology. Boulet and Boss, however, also found that 
few BSI items correlated most notably and appreciably with 
their target dimension, a finding which indicates that BSI 
dimensional comparisons may be of limited use. A principal 
component analysis of the scales, however, yielded one 
component accounting for 71% of the variance. 
A more recent factor analytic study 
psychiatric inpatients further indicated 
based 
that 
on 217 
the BSI 
adequately measures a "unidimensional construct of general 
psychological distress" (Piersma, Boes, & Reaume, 1994, p. 
338). The authors found that one principal factor accounted 
for a range of 59% to 79% of the variance in adults at 
hospital admission and adolescents at hospital discharge, 
respectively. As such, the Global Severity Index (GSI) , 
which indicates the average score, or degree of distress, 
across all 53 items was used as an indication of clinical 
change. 
Value Influence Scale. The Value Influence Scale (VIS), 
developed for the present study, is designed to measure the 
extent to which a patient identifies a particular ward 
experience as important to his or her treatment. The VIS 
also measures the patient's satisfaction with his/her value 
system. Respondent's are instructed to rate six select ward 
experiences, presented in random order, in terms of 
important to your treatment was [a given ward activity] 
"How 
II A 
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five point likert-type scale ranging from "Not at All" to 
"Extremely" yields item scores of O to 4. An additional item 
with a similar rating scale is included to measure the 
respondent's level of satisfaction regarding his or her 
system of values. Finally, respondents are given the 
opportunity to provide qualitative information regarding the 
process of value change. 
The six ward experiences included in the VIS were 
rationally derived, and judged, on the basis of the author's 
ward involvement, to frequently serve as key therapeutic 
experiences. An item targeting the patient's introspection 
or self-reflection as a vehicle for value change was 
purposefully omitted since such an item might be confounded 
with locus of control. The resulting six items all reflect 
"external" activities in which a patient may participate. 
The rationale for including the VIS was to investigate 
whether patients vary in their attribution of importance 
toward several ward experiences which might conceivable 
influence their values. Admittedly, this procedure suffers 
from an extraspective bias. By providing the patient with a 
list of experiences from which to discriminate, the 
opportunity is forfeited for the patient to spontaneously 
generate information about their experience of value change, 
nor does it capture the manner in which patients may 
idiographically construe each experience. There would be no 
indication that any of the targeted ward experiences on the 
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VIS, regardless of importance rating, were actually an 
influential contributor to patient value change7 • If, 
however, patients vary in ascribing importance toward various 
ward experiences, and such importance ratings correlate with 
value change, then such a finding would further call into 
question the standard practice of many investigators who 
select the self-reported values of an individual therapist as 
the sole criterion toward which patient values are believed 
to shift. There would be further support for the notion that 
the patient's subjective perceptions and experiences may be 
an important facet of the value change process. The VIS is 
included in Appendix A. 
Procedure 
All incoming patients were screened on the basis of 
chart review and/or brief clinical interview for possible 
study participation. Those individuals meeting 
inclusion/exclusion criteria were asked to participate on a 
volunteer basis. After the patient signed a consent form 
indicating that one understands both the policy of 
confidentiality and the right to discontinue involvement 
without penalty, the NEO-FFI, RVS, and BSI (along with a 
7Empirical justification would depend on measuring the 
relative degree of pre- versus post-treatment value 
similarity between patient self-reported values and multiple 
criteria. Such criteria would ideally be generated by the 
patient as well as the investigator, and include the 
patient's perceptions as well as independent indication of a 
given criterion, if applicable (i.e., "independent," as in 
therapist ratings of self) . 
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single "value satisfaction" item from the VIS) were 
administered in random order to each participant. Completed 
questionnaires were secured from all participants within 36 
hours of hospital admission. Participants whose length of 
hospital stay was equal to or greater than five days were re-
administered the latter two instruments along with the VIS 
prior to either discharge or two weeks post-admission, 
whichever was earlier. 
The five day minimum hospitalization requirement was not 
entirely arbitrary. There is ample evidence suggesting that 
personal values can change in a relatively brief period of 
time. Previous research, for example, required a minimum of 
three outpatient sessions in studies of value convergence 
(Arizmendi et al., 1985; Beutler et al., 1983), and multiple 
days of inpatient treatment are presumably more intensive. 
Significant and enduring value change (up to 21 months), 
along with expected cognitive and behavioral sequelae, has 
also been reported by Rokeach (1980) after a single session 
focusing on value clarification. Similarly, Elzinga 
(1980/1981) found that psychiatric inpatients reported a 
change in value priority as measured by the RVS after a 
single intervention of value education. Moreover, Almond et 
al. (1968, 1969a, 1969b) noted that the majority of change in 
"therapeutic values" amongst psychiatric inpatients occurred 
during the first week of hospitalization. In light of these 
findings, it was reasoned that five days of intensive 
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inpatient treatment would allow for a meaningful assessment 
of value change. 
Variable Definition 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Important methodological and interpretive issues are 
raised by the definition and measurement of both "value 
change" and "improvement. " It is therefore necessary to 
clarify the operationalization of these two variables prior 
to reviewing the results. 
Value change, in the present context, refers to 
systematic variation over time in the relative importance of 
one's personal values. A broad-based measure of change 
targeting one's overall value system(s) was preferred given 
that this was an initial study investigating the relationship 
between personality factors and value change. 
The Spearman correlation coefficient, similar to the 
Pearson correlation coefficient, yields a measure of linear 
association between two sets of rank-ordered data. Since the 
RVS provides information about two independent rank-ordered 
value systems, Terminal and Instrumental, a Spearman 
correlation was computed between initial and final rankings 
for each respective value system. As such, two separate 
Spearman correlations are available for all participants, 
each measuring the respective variation over time in either 
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Terminal or Instrumental value systems. 
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The lower the 
coefficient, the greater the change in values. 
Improvement, in the context of the present study, was 
defined as a reduction in the quantity and/or intensity of 
self-reported psychiatric symptomatology. The Global 
Severity Index of the Brief Symptom Inventory, which provides 
an overall indication of distress associated with various 
psychiatric symptoms, was used to compare initial and final 
levels of symptomatology for each participant. 
Improvement, however, is partially influenced by the 
amount of symptom reduction possible. Individuals who 
initially reported relatively pronounced symptomatology, for 
example, had more opportunity to demonstrate change on the 
Brief Symptom Inventory than comparably less distressed 
individuals. Following the precedent of other value 
researchers (e.g., Arizmendi et al., 1985; Beutler et al., 
1983) , a percent improvement score was computed for each 
participant based on the amount of change possible in order 
to correct for this discrepancy. The formula for this 
improvement score was the raw score difference between 
initial and final Global Severity Index scores divided by the 
initial Global Severity Index score. 
Preliminary Analyses 
A series of preliminary analyses were conducted prior to 
testing the main hypotheses. These analyses addressed 1) the 
merging of data obtained from two independent settings, 2) 
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unique factors associated with participant loss, 3) the 
occurrence of significant value change, and 4) the influence 
of subject variables on the value change process. 
Inter-Site Comparisons. Since the overall sample was 
comprised of participants from two independent settings, it 
was important to explore the possibility of there being 
significant differences between these two groups with respect 
to the relevant variables. Significant differences might 
necessitate a corrective procedure so that data could be 
combined from both settings. 
Table 2 provides the means and standard deviations 
broken down by site for the non-categorical variables 
Independent groups ~-tests revealed involved in this study. 
that the participants from each setting differed 
significantly on four out of 26 investigated variables. 
These four differences had to do with the number of various 
ward activities in which patients participated. This finding 
was not surprising given the differences in base rates 
between the two sites. Site I, for example, offered group 
therapy twice per week, whereas Site II offered group therapy 
five times per week. Most importantly, there were no 
significant differences between sites on any of the main 
dependent variables or primary predictor variables. 
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent and 
Predictor Variables by Treatment Facility. 
Variable 
Symptom Change 
Score++ 
Terminal Value 
Change++ 
Instrumental 
Value Change++ 
Neuroticism 
Ext ravers ion 
Openness 
Agreeableness 
Conscientiousness 
Initial GSI 
Symptom Level 
Final GSI 
Symptom Level 
Initial Value 
System Satisfaction 
Final Value 
System Satisfaction 
Individual 
Sessions/Interviews 
Group Therapy 
Sessions 
Activity 
Therapy Sessions 
Sessions/Interviews 
with Attending 
Psychiatrist 
Site 1 
(n 36)+ 
M SD 
- -
.1150 .1219 
.6150 .2263 
.4958 .2750 
67.58 8.55 
39.83 11. 56 
46.97 10.48 
37.83 9.73 
37.61 9.80 
61. 69 7.76 
54.42 9.02 
4.08 2.21 
5.46 1. 86 
n=28 
4. 86a 2.66 
0 .44a 0.69 
l.03a 1. 38 
3. 97a 2.02 
Site II 
(n 20) + 
SD 
-
.1230 .1218 
.5787 .1953 
.3815 .2320 
66.90 9.55 
45.25 9.71 
47.85 9.16 
40.80 10.80 
43.40 12.02 
59.20 8.65 
51.40 7.13 
4.35 2.03 
5.33 1. 97 
n=18 
1. 45a 1. 28 
3. 85a 1. 63 
4. 90a 2.38 
6. 45a 2.11 
Combined 
rn: 56)+ 
M 
-
.1179 .1209 
.6020 .2147 
.4550 .2642 
67.34 8.84 
41. 77 11.16 
47.29 9.95 
38.89 10.13 
39.68 10.91 
60.80 8.10 
53.34 8.46 
4.18 2 .13 
5.41 1. 88 
n=46 
3.64 2.79 
1. 66 1. 98 
2.41 2.59 
4.86 2.36 
Note. Means denoted with the subscript (a) are significantly 
different between sites at £ < . 05 as determined by the 
independent groups ~-test. 
+ Valid (g) unless otherwise indicated in variable cell. 
++ Denotes primary dependent variable. 
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Table 2 Continued. Means and Standard Deviations of 
Dependent and Predictor Variables by Treatment Facility. 
Variable 
Importance Rating: 
Individual Sessions 
Importance Rating: 
Group Therapy 
Importance Rating: 
Nurse Interaction 
Importance Rating: 
Patient Interaction 
Importance Rating: 
Activity Therapy 
Importance Rating: 
Sessions with 
Attending 
Psychiatrist 
Age 
Education 
Length of 
Hospitalization 
(# of Days) 
# of Previous 
Hospitalizations 
Site 1 
(n 36)• 
M SD 
2.93 1. 02 
n=28 
2.07 1.33 
n=14 
2.92 1. OS 
2.47 1.16 
2.36 1. 09 
n=22 
2.53 1.13 
34.06 9.99 
11.94 2.35 
8.08 2.92 
1. 97 2.32 
Site II 
(n 20) • 
M SD 
2.85 .99 
n=13 
2.75 1.21 
n=20 
3.05 0.94 
2.70 1.17 
2.95 1.18 
n=19 
2.70 1.45 
36.45 9.14 
12.26 2.58 
n=19 
7.10 1. 97 
3.58 3.83 
n=19 
Combined 
Ct:i 56). 
M SD 
2.90 1. 00 
n=41 
2.47 1. 28 
n=34 
2.96 1. 01 
2.55 1.16 
2.63 1.16 
n=41 
2.59 1. 25 
34.91 9.68 
12.05 2.41 
n=55 
7.73 2.65 
2.53 3.00 
n=55 
Note. Means denoted with the subscript (a) are significantly 
different between sites at Q < . 05 as determined by the 
independent groups ~-test. 
•Valid (g) unless otherwise indicated in variable cell. 
++ Denotes primary dependent variable. 
Further analysis indicated that, 
separately for each setting, only one of 
categorical variables which differed 
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when examined 
the four non-
between sites 
(i.e.,number of individual, group, activity, or attending 
psychiatrist sessions) was significantly correlated with any 
of the three primary dependent variables (i.e. , Terminal 
value change, Instrumental value change, and symptomatic 
improvement) . Since only one out of 24 investigated 
relationships were significant (which is less than would be 
expected by chance alone), it seemed unlikely that the site 
differences in these four variables would systematically 
affect testing of the main hypotheses. Accordingly, it 
seemed reasonable to use the overall combined sample for 
subsequent analyses. 
Attrition Comparisons. Personality factors and initial 
level of symptomatology were compared between the final 
sample and those participants lost through attrition. Any 
differences between those who completed the retest and those 
who did not might reveal unique characteristics of the final 
sample, which must then be taken into consideration when 
interpreting the results. A total of 38 participants began 
the study but did not complete the retest. All but seven of 
these participants were discharged prior to the requisite 
five day hospital stay. The remaining seven participants 
stayed five or more days, but 4 were discharged abruptly, 1 
left against medical advice, and 2 declined the 
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questionnaires at retest. Independent groups ~-tests between 
those who completed the retest and those who did not 
indicated no significant differences between groups on all 
five personality factors as well as initial level of 
symptomatology. There were also no significant differences 
on all available non-categorical demographic variables. 
Demonstrated Value Change. Since each hypothesis is 
contingent on the occurrence of systematic value change, it 
is important to consider the magnitude of value change 
observed in this sample. Rokeach (1973) reported median 
test-retest reliabilities for a sample of non-patient 
Americans as .74 for Terminal values and .65 for Instrumental 
values after at least 21 days 8 • Although this non-patient 
data may not be an appropriate referent for psychiatric 
inpatients, it is nevertheless worth noting that the median 
test-retest reliabilities in this sample were .61 for 
Terminal values and . 4 7 for Instrumental values after an 
average of approximately eight days. 
In addition, a paired-samples ~-test was used to compare 
differences between Terminal and Instrumental value change 
within the sample. In this manner, it was found that 
participants evidenced significantly more Instrumental versus 
Terminal value change, ~(55) = -3.70, £ < .001. 
8The index of value change used in the present study is 
essentially this measure of test-retest reliability. 
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Analysis of Subject Variables. One of the theoretical 
assumptions underlying this study is that the patient brings 
certain characteristics to the treatment situation that are 
more or less 
characteristics 
variables." 
conducive 
may be 
to value 
collectively 
change. 
termed 
These 
"subject 
There is some precedent in the existing literature to 
suggest that particular subject variables may be implicated 
in the value change process. Some have suggested, for 
example, that value change may be influenced by religious or 
spiritual factors (Kelly & Strupp, 1992; Martinez, 1991). 
Subject variables such as achievement orientation and 
cultural background have also been related to value 
preference (Brown, 1975; Mahoney, 1977). In light of these 
earlier findings, the relationship between select subject 
variables and the three primary dependent variables (i.e., 
Terminal value change, Instrumental value 
symptomatic improvement) were reviewed for 
sample. 
change, and 
the overall 
No significant correlations were obtained between the 
demographic variables of either age or educational level and 
any of the three primary dependent variables. A One-way 
analysis of variance further indicated that the three primary 
dependent variables did not differ with respect to gender, 
race, marital status, and employment status. There were, 
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however, several interesting albeit tentative findings 
regarding diagnosis and religious preference. 
First of all, Instrumental value change varied 
significantly as a function of religious preference, with 
those individuals identifying themselves as Protestant Cn=3 7) 
evidencing greater value change than individuals identifying 
a religious preference of Other (n=7) or None (n=12), E(55) 
4.819, 2 < .05. Having observed a disproportionate 
representation of Protestants at Site II (95%, n=19 out of 
20) compared to Site I (50%, n=18 out of 36), it was 
necessary to evaluate whether this finding had more to do 
with site difference as opposed to religious preference 
differences. This did not appear to be the case, however, 
since an independent groups ~-test revealed no significant 
difference in Instrumental value change between Protestants 
at either site, ~(35) = .428, Q > .10. A separate analysis 
was therefore conducted in which Protestant religious 
preference was included as a binary predictor variable in the 
regression of Instrumental value change onto significant 
personality factors. The results of this exploratory 
analysis will be described shortly (please see section below 
regarding "Exploratory Analyses"). 
Secondly, the data was also examined with respect to 
DSM-IV primary diagnosis 9 • Those individuals with a primary 
9 It should be noted that diagnostic validity remains 
suspect. No standardized interview was used, nor was there 
any comparison available to determine inter-judge 
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diagnosis of Schizoaffective Disorder (n=s) reported 
significantly more Instrumental value change compared to 
other diagnostic groups [i.e., Major Depressive Disorder 
(n=27), Bipolar Disorder (n=lO), Depression Not Otherwise 
Specified (n=7) , Adjustment Disorder (n=4) , and Other (n=3) J , 
f'.(55) 2.494, l2 < .05. Subsequent one-way analyses of 
variance revealed that the Schizoaffecti ve Disorder group was 
not significantly different from the other participants on 
the basis of initial level of symptomatology or any of the 
five personality factors. Other than DSM-IV primary 
diagnosis, the magnitude of Instrumental value change was the 
sole primary variable distinguishing this group. 
In order to interpret this finding, it is necessary to 
understand how the value change process differs for the 
Schizoaffecti ve group versus other participants. This may be 
accomplished, at least in part, by considering the test of 
each hypothesis with and without the inclusion of the 
Schizoaffective group. The results of this procedure are 
described below in the section on "Exploratory Analyses." 
In summary, the abovementioned preliminary analyses 
collectively suggested that the relationships between 
personality factors, value change, and self-reported 
improvement could be investigated in a straightforward 
manner. There was also sufficient evidence to justify a more 
reliability. This variable merely reflects the primary DSM-
IV diagnosis rendered by the attending psychiatrist. 
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detailed examination of both Protestant religious preference 
and DSM-IV primary diagnosis with respect to Instrumental 
value change. 
Hypothesis Testing 
Personality Factors Predicting Value Change. The first 
set of hypotheses concerned the prediction of value change on 
the basis of select personality factors. Specifically, it was 
anticipated that Openness, Extraversion, and Agreeableness 
would be positively associated with both Terminal and 
Instrumental value change. 
Two separate multiple regression analyses were conducted 
with either Terminal or Instrumental value change serving as 
the dependent variable. All five personality factors were 
entered in stepwise fashion, a preferred strategy when there 
is no a priori basis for determining the relative importance 
of predictor variables. The criteria for variable selection 
(probability of E-to-enter) and variable exclusion 
(probability of E-to-remove) were .05 and .10, respectively. 
The results of these analyses are presented in Tables 3 and 
4. 
Of all five personality factors, only Openness was 
significantly correlated with Terminal value change, with the 
univariate correlation (£=.313) accounting for 8.1% of the 
corrected variance. This finding suggests an inverse 
relationship between Openness and Terminal value change, with 
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Table 3. Multivariate Regression Analysis of Personality 
Factors Predicting Terminal Value Change. 
Personality Factor 
Neuroticism 
Ext ravers ion 
Openness+ 
Agreeableness 
Conscientiousness 
COMBINED MODEL 
Terminal Value Change 
(N=56) 
-
.052 
(.351) 
-.161 
(.118) 
.313 .313 
(.009) 
.063 
(.321) 
-.206 
(.064) 
.313 
Adjusted 
R Squarec 
.081 
.081 
-
5.864 
(.019) 
Note. Subscript (+) denotes significant variables included 
in model. 
a Univariate correlation between personality factor and 
Terminal value change, with significance level (1-tailed) in 
parentheses. 
b Multivariate correlation depicting incremental strength of 
association attributed to each variable. 
c Unique variance accounted for by each variable, corrected 
for error. 
ct E statistic testing variable inclusion, with significance 
level in parentheses. 
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Table 4. Multivariate Regression Analysis of Personality 
Factors Predicting Instrumental Value Change. 
Instrumental Value Change 
(N=56) 
Personality Factor 
Neuroticism 
Ext ravers ion 
Openness 
Agreeableness+ 
Conscientiousness+ 
COMBINED MODEL 
-
.035 
(.400) 
-.197 
(.073) 
.152 
( . 131) 
.314 
(.009) 
-.248 
(.033) 
.314 
.090 
.404 
Adjusted 
R Squarec 
-
.082 
.050 
.132 
5.917 
(.018) 
5.176 
(.009) 
Note. Subscript (+) denotes significant variables included 
in model. 
a Univariate correlation between personality factor and 
Instrumental value change, with significance level (1-tailed) 
in parentheses. 
b Multivariate correlation depicting incremental strength of 
association attributed to each variable. 
c Unique variance accounted for by each variable, corrected 
for error. 
ct E statistic testing variable inclusion, with significance 
level in parentheses. 
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a relatively low level of Openness being associated with 
Terminal value change. Contrary to predictions, a re la ti vely 
high level of Openness was associated with Terminal value 
stability. 
Both Agreeableness and Conscientiousness were 
significantly correlated with Instrumental value change, with 
the multivariate correlation CR=.404) accounting for 13.2% of 
the corrected variance. Al though Agreeableness was 
implicated in the value change process as predicted, the 
relationship between these variables was opposite of the 
hypothesized direction. That is, a relatively low level of 
Agreeableness (coupled with a relatively high level of 
Conscientiousness) offered the best prediction of 
Instrumental value change. 
Extraversion and Neuroticism were unrelated to either 
form of value change. Extraversion, however, had been 
expected to contribute to the value change process. 
Value Change and Improvement. The second hypothesis 
suggested that improvement, or self-reported symptom 
reduction, would be positively associated with value change. 
The relevant correlations are presented in Table 5. The 
correlations between symptomatic improvement and the five 
personality factors are also included in Table 5, so as to 
explore any potential mediational relationships amongst the 
variables. 
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Table 5. Univariate Correlations Predicting Symptomatic 
Improvement. 
Symptomatic 
Improvement 
(N=56) 
Variables 
Terminal 
Value Change 
Instrumental 
Value Change 
Neuroticism 
Ext ravers ion 
Openness 
Agreeableness 
Conscientiousness 
-.116 
(.198) 
- . 246* 
(.034) 
-.001 
(.498) 
.095 
(.242) 
-.208 
(.062) 
-.144 
( . 14 5) 
-.055 
(.344) 
a Univariate correlation with 
significance level in 
parentheses (1-tailed) . 
* 2 < . 05. 
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Instrumental value change was related to symptomatic 
improvement as predicted. The more an individual reported 
that his/her Instrumental values had changed, the more he/she 
also reported that psychiatric symptoms had abated. Terminal 
value change, in contrast, was unrelated to improvement. 
Value System Satisfaction. The third hypothesis 
suggested that patients who experience value change will 
indicate increased satisfaction with their resulting system 
of values. First of all, a paired-samples ~-test confirmed 
that participants (n=46, due to missing data) indicated that 
they were significantly more satisfied with their value 
system upon retest compared to initial testing, ~(45) = 
-4.11, £ < .001. The mean correlations between A) patient 
satisfaction ratings of values (initial and retest) and B) 
both symptomatic improvement and value change (Terminal and 
Instrumental) were then tested for significance. No 
significant results were obtained, with correlations ranging 
from . 054 (initial value system satisfaction and Instrumental 
value change) to .222 (final value system satisfaction and 
symptomatic improvement). It should be noted, however, that 
the correlation between value system satisfaction at retest 
and symptomatic improvement approached significance (£=.069, 
1-tailed) . 
It would seem that partial support was obtained for this 
hypothesis. The sample as a whole indicated greater value 
system satisfaction upon retest compared to admission, yet 
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such satisfaction appeared to be independent of the actual 
amount of value change experienced. There is a trend, 
however, toward greater value system satisfaction being 
associated with symptomatic improvement. Overall, the 
findings regarding value system satisfaction suggest that the 
value change observed in this sample was systematic and not 
merely the result of random value instability. 
Exploratory Analyses 
Treatment Factors Influencing Value Change. Having 
analyzed the direct relationships between personality 
factors, value change, and self-reported outcome, a secondary 
analysis was conducted to determine whether aspects of the 
treatment situation were related to the value change process. 
Table 6 provides the univariate correlations between select 
treatment variables, including frequency and importance 
ratings of several ward activities, and each of the three 
primary predictor variables. 
As can be seen from Table 6, only two treatment 
variables were significantly correlated with any of the 
primary predictor variables. 
both individual sessions 
The importance ratings given to 
and nurse interaction were 
positively associated with change in Instrumental values. 
Given that the mean importance ratings of two distinct 
ward activities emerged as significantly related to 
Instrumental value change, a paired-samples ~-test was used 
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Table 6. Univariate Correlations Between Select Treatment 
Variables and Primary Predictor Variables. 
Treatment Symptom Terminal Instrumental 
Variable Change Value Value 
Score Change Change 
Length of 
Hospitalization -.042 .201 .188 
(# of days) 
Individual -.120 .258 .242 
Sessions 
Group Therapy .036 -.021 -.178 
Sessions 
Activity Therapy .014 -.030 .025 
Sessions 
Interviews 
with Attending .044 .041 -.075 
Psychiatrist 
Importance Rating: 
Individual .035 -.110 -.379* 
Sessions Cn=41) Cn=41) (n=41) 
Importance Rating: .311 .041 -.262 
Group Therapy (g=34) (g=34) (n=34) 
Importance Rating: .165 .116 - . 298* 
Nurse Interaction 
Importance Rating: 
Patient .227 -.007 .029 
Interaction 
Importance Rating: .105 -.175 -.087 
Activity Therapy (n=41) (g=41) (n=41) 
Importance Rating: 
Sessions with .198 .022 -.063 
Attending 
Psychiatrist 
# of Previous -.076 -.176 .100 
Hospitalizations (n=55) (n=55) (n=55) 
Note. N=56, unless otherwise noted in specific cell. 
* :Q < .05. 
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to examine any differences between these ratings. No 
significant difference was observed between the importance 
attributed to individual sessions versus nurse interaction, 
t.(40) = 1.60, 2 > . 05. This finding suggests that both 
activities may be meaningful components of the value change 
process. 
The next stage of data analysis explored the 
contribution of these two identified treatment variables to 
the established regression equation involving personality 
factors and Instrumental value change. The importance rating 
given to both individual sessions and nurse interaction were 
entered in a single step as a secondary variable block after 
Agreeableness and Conscientiousness, with Instrumental value 
change serving as the dependent variable. The criteria for 
variable selection (probability of E-to-enter) and variable 
exclusion (probability of E-to-remove) were kept at .05 and 
.10, respectively. Since only 41 participants provided an 
importance rating for individual sessions (73%), the group 
mean was substituted for the remaining participants so as not 
to lose cases by listwise deletion. 
This method was pref erred over entering predictor 
variables on the basis of the magnitude of the univariate 
correlation (which would have given precedence to the 
importance ratings over the personality factors) because 
virtually no construct validity has been established for the 
importance ratings. From a methodological and interpretive 
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standpoint, the chosen procedure made it possible to examine 
the unique variance accounted for by the addition of the two 
importance ratings, above and beyond the variance already 
attributed to the personality factors of Agreeableness and 
Conscientiousness. In this manner, an increase of 3 percent 
was achieved in the prediction of Instrumental value change 
through adding the combined importance ratings of individual 
sessions and nurse interactions (the adjusted R square 
increased from .132 to .162). 
Protestant Group Comparisons. Having noted earlier that 
an identified religious preference of Protestant seemed to be 
related to Instrumental value change, participants were coded 
as either Protestant or non-Protestant, and this binary 
variable was included along with Agreeableness and 
Conscientiousness in a new regression analysis predicting 
Instrumental value change. As in the case of treatment 
importance ratings, religious preference was entered in a 
single step as a secondary variable block after Agreeableness 
and Conscientiousness, with Instrumental value change serving 
as the dependent variable. Again, the criteria for variable 
selection (probability of E-to-enter) and variable exclusion 
(probability of E-to-remove) remained . 05 and .10, 
respectively. The results of this analysis are displayed in 
Appendix B, Table 7. 
The identification of a Protestant religious preference 
resulted in a sizeable increase in predictive power. 
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Agreeableness and Conscientiousness alone accounted for 
roughly 13% of the corrected variance in the overall sample, 
whereas the inclusion of Protestant identification 
essentially doubled the variance accounted for by personality 
factors alone (adjusted R square=26.1%). 
Schizoaf fecti ve Group Comparisons. Preliminary analyses 
indicated that an atypical form of value change may have 
characterized those participants with a diagnosis of 
Schizoaffective Disorder. Since relatively few individuals 
received this diagnosis (n=S), a conservative approach was 
used to explore the value change associated with this 
diagnosis. Each of the three main hypotheses were re-tested 
without the inclusion of the Schizoaffective sub-sample. 
This strategy allowed for some consideration of how these 
five individuals influenced the overall findings. The 
results of these analyses are presented in Appendix B, Tables 
8-10. 
Briefly, both regression models involving personality 
factors and value change evidenced an increase in predictive 
power with the Schizoaffective Disorder group removed. The 
univariate correlation between Instrumental value change and 
improvement was also slightly more robust. The relationships 
between value system satisfaction, value change, and 
improvement were not significantly changed. 
Overview 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
The role of value change in inpatient psychiatric 
treatment has received relatively little research attention 
since Rosenthal (1955) first introduced the topic some four 
decades ago. It should therefore be noted, first and 
foremost, that a beneficial form of value change was observed 
in this inpatient psychiatric sample. 
Since 
individual 
conclusions 
most value 
outpatient 
drawn from 
research to date has 
psychotherapy, the 
this approach were 
focused on 
majority of 
undoubtedly 
influenced by existing assumptions regarding the nature and 
mechanisms of individual treatment. As suggested earlier, 
perhaps this is the reason that heretofore investigators have 
focused primarily on pre- versus post-treatment differences 
in patient-clinician value congruence. The present study, in 
contrast, advances the notion that certain patient and 
treatment characteristics jointly contribute to the value 
change process. 
More specifically, the results of this study favor the 
interpretation that select personality factors, alone or in 
combination with aspects of the treatment situation, predict 
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change and/or stability in certain values. 
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Instrumental 
value change, in turn, predicts self-reported improvement. 
These general findings will be explored and interpreted 
throughout the remainder of the chapter. Interpretation will 
proceed with an examination of the relationships between 
personality factors, value change, and improvement, and a 
moderational model will be proposed highlighting significant 
relationships. Particular findings will then be considered 
in light of the broader distinction between Terminal and 
Instrumental values. Additional patient and treatment 
characteristics related to the value change process will also 
be explored. A theoretical representation of value change, 
based on the work of Thomas Kuhn ( 1970) , will then be 
introduced. The chapter will end with a consideration of 
methodological limitations and directions for future 
research. General conclusions will also be offered. 
Personality, Instrumental Value Change, and Improvement 
As predicted, Instrumental value change varied as a 
function of personality factors, although not necessarily in 
ways that were anticipated. Individuals who were relatively 
low in Agreeableness and re la ti vely high in Conscientiousness 
were most likely to report change in Instrumental values. 
Such Instrumental value change was, in turn, related to 
improvement. The personality factors of Neuroticism, 
Extraversion, and Openness were unrelated to Instrumental 
value change or improvement. 
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In one sense, the contribution of Agreeableness seems 
counter-intuitive. According to Costa and Mccrae (1992): 
The agreeable person is fundamentally altruistic. He or 
she is sympathetic to others and eager to help them, and 
believes that others will be equally helpful in return. 
By contrast, the disagreeable or antagonistic person is 
egocentric, skeptical of others' intentions, and 
competitive rather than cooperative. (p. 15) 
Since individuals low on this factor are skeptical and view 
interpersonal interaction as competitive (in contrast to the 
high Agreeableness individual who experiences relationships 
altruistically) , one might expect such individuals to be 
resistant to changing their values vis-a'-vis an 
interpersonal therapeutic experience. This line of reasoning 
was the basis for predicting a positive relationship between 
Agreeableness and value change. 
One possibility for these counter-intuitive findings has 
to do with the range of Agreeableness scores represented in 
this sample (i.e., M=38. 89, SD=lO .13, in contrast to the 
expected mean of 50 with a standard deviation of 10). A 
negative relationship between Agreeableness and Instrumental 
value change may be restricted to the lower pole of 
Agreeableness scores, whereas the relationship between these 
two constructs may differ at the upper pole of Agreeableness 
scores. Such a curvilinear relationship may not have been 
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detected given the relative absence of high Agreeableness 
participants sampled in this study. 
The observed negative relationship between Agreeableness 
and Instrumental value change, however, is fairly consistent 
with the combined literature on value preference and value 
convergence. In their study of the relationship between the 
five-factor personality model and value preference, for 
example, Luk and Bond (1993) found that Agreeableness was 
negatively associated with Benevolence, a broad-based value 
domain encompassing many of the Rokeach Instrumental values. 
More specifically, the value domain of Benevolence, 
which measures the individual's motivation toward 
"preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with 
whom one is in frequent personal contact," (Schwartz, 1992, 
p. 11), is partially comprised of Instrumental values such as 
"Helpful, " "Loyal," "Forgiving," "Honest," and 
"Responsible . 1011 If Luk and Bond's findings extend to the 
current sample, one might expect these abovementioned 
Instrumental values to have received relatively little 
priority in the rankings of low Agreeableness patients. 
The point is that these collective Instrumental values 
may have been de-emphasized by patients low in Agreeableness, 
10 In actuality, at least 11 (out of 18) Instrumental 
values are embodied in Benevolence and other value domains 
that were associated with Agreeableness in the Luk and Bond 
study. For example, Agreeableness was also negatively 
related to the value domain of Self-Direction, which includes 
the Instrumental value of "Independent." 
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while emphasized by the ward community overall; thereby 
creating a discrepancy between patient and community values. 
Turning now to the value convergence literature, it was 
demonstrated that value change (or convergence) is most 
likely to occur when patient and therapist initially hold 
disparate value systems (Beutler et al., 1983). As such, 
there may have been the most "room" for change to occur given 
a discrepancy in the Instrumental values of the low 
Agreeableness patients and the ward community. 
To the extent that these (and perhaps other) 
Instrumental values were demonstrated and even encouraged 
within the ward community (and it is not difficult to imagine 
the fostering of "Responsibility" and "Honesty," for 
instance) , indi victuals low in Agreeableness, needing to 
develop a more adaptive system of valuation, may have entered 
into a therapeutic community where discrepant values were 
promoted. Discrepancy breeds change, and the low 
Agreeableness patient may have chosen to embrace these new-
found values in their attempt to re-organize a previously 
ineffectual Instrumental value system (please see section 
below entitled "Toward a Kuhnian Interpretation of Value 
Change"). 
If this 
relationship 
portrayal is accurate, then the observed 
between Instrumental value change and 
improvement further coalesces with earlier value convergence 
literature. Arizmendi et al. (1985) found that initial 
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patient/therapist discrepancy in the Instrumental values of 
"Responsible" and "Independent" predicted patient-reported 
symptomatic improvement on the SCL-90-R, the parent 
instrument to the BSI used in this study. 
If the ward as a whole promoted both an accountability 
for one's actions and a reliance on others, the stage may 
have been set for improvement to take place. Based on Luk 
and Bond's discovery, the low Agreeableness individual may 
have initially entered the hospital with relatively little 
emphasis on these values. A discrepancy-improvement 
relationship, as such, paralleling the findings of Arizmendi 
et al., may have existed in this sample. 
A consistency with previous literature, however, still 
does not explain why these particular relationships occurred 
between low Agreeableness, Instrumental value change, and 
improvement. The answer may lie in how such individuals 
construe both the treatment situation as well as the source 
of value change. 
Anecdotal evidence revealed that the vast majority of 
patients responding to the essay query "How do you account 
for any value change you may have experienced?" identified 
some internal as opposed to external agent of change. For 
example, "After a lot of thinking I was able to look at 
things differently." 
It seems likely that the patient low in Agreeableness 
would tend to experience him or herself in some form of 
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interpersonal competition with staff as well as other 
patients. Although speculative, perhaps this perceived 
competition is conducive to the value change process. That 
is, the patient low in Agreeableness may tend to negotiate 
the interpersonal treatment environment (experienced 
competitively) by staking claim to a new system of values as 
the product of his/her personal efforts (some internal agent 
of change), in contrast to acknowledging a persuasive 
influence on the part of others. The patient's stance may be 
something like, "You are not going to tell me anything. I 
know exactly what I need to do." Such a position may very 
well facilitate the internalization of a new Instrumental 
value system. Further study is needed to ·explore this 
possibility. 
Turning now to Conscientiousness, the other personality 
factor implicated in Instrumental value change, the 
involvement of Conscientiousness was, quite frankly, 
unexpected, but not surprising. 
for goal-directed behavior 
The motivation and capacity 
evidenced by the high 
Conscientiousness individual would likely prove an asset 
throughout treatment, in terms of taking the necessary steps 
to improve one's situation. Perhaps being presented with 
alternative values and new experiences during hospitalization 
provides an opportunity for the high Conscientiousness 
individual to adaptively re-organize his/her Instrumental 
values. This value re-organization, in turn, allows for the 
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high Conscientiousness individual to more effectively meet 
his/her needs. 
More interesting still is why this particular 
combination of personality factors, high Conscientiousness 
coupled with low Agreeableness, led to Instrumental value 
change. If the individual low in Agreeableness does indeed 
construe the treatment situation competitively and thereby 
attributes value change to his or her own personal efforts, 
perhaps the addition of high Conscientiousness allows for the 
added motivation and resolve to actualize such value change. 
The stance of the low Agreeableness/high Conscientiousness 
patient may be something like "You're not going to tell me 
anything. I know exactly what I need to do ... and I have the 
motivation and wherewithal to do it." 
A Moderational Model. It is possible to consider these 
results in light of Baron and Kenny's (1986) analysis of 
moderator variables. According to Baron and Kenny, a 
moderator variable is a third variable"· .. which partitions 
a focal independent variable into subgroups that establish 
its domains of maximal effectiveness in regard to a given 
dependent variable" (p. 11 73) . A moderator appears to be 
operating in the present context, given that the strength of 
the relationship between Instrumental value change and 
improvement varies as a function of Agreeableness (but not 
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Conscientiousness) 11 • Specifically, a relative increase in 
the personality factor of Agreeableness was associated with 
a corresponding decrease in the magnitude of association (~) 
between Instrumental value change and improvement. It may be 
said, therefore, that the personality factor of Agreeableness 
moderates the relationship between Instrumental value change 
and improvement. 
Personality Factors, Terminal Value Change, and Improvement 
The factor of Openness seemed to hold the most promise 
for predicting both Instrumental and Terminal value change, 
particularly since one of the Openness facets has to do with 
a willingness to re-examine value issues. Openness was 
indeed the single personality factor related to Terminal 
value change, but the relationship was the exact opposite of 
what was predicted! Individuals high in Openness evidenced 
the greatest Terminal value stability--they were least likely 
to experience value change. 
One possibility is that those individual high in 
Openness tended to have relatively short hospital stays. 
That is, a spurious relationship may exist between Terminal 
value stability and Openness, given that a higher value 
stability index might occur with shorter test-retest 
11From a statistical standpoint, the dependent or 
criterion variable of improvement was regressed onto (a) 
Agreeableness, (b) Instrumental value change, and (c) the 
interaction or product of these two predictors (a x b) . In 
this case, the interaction coefficient (c) singularly emerged 
as significant while controlling for these two independent 
predictors. 
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intervals. This does not appear to be the case, however, 
since length of hospitalization was not significantly 
correlated with Openness. 
A more plausible explanation is that the relationship 
between high Openness and Terminal value stability was formed 
prior to the time of hospitalization. That is, individuals 
high in Openness may be more attuned to values and perhaps 
even grapple with value issues more so than individuals low 
on this factor, but such experiences in an earlier 
developmental context may have ultimately served to solidify 
a secure system of Terminal values. Although the high 
Openness individual may not be afraid to continually question 
his/her convictions, that does not mean that such convictions 
will necessarily change. 
This interpretation is fairly consistent with the 
related literature on personality factors and personal 
projects analysis. Little, Lecci, and Watkinson (1992) 
provided evidence suggesting that Openness was positively 
correlated with consistency between one's fundamental values 
and their daily activities, a condition which would 
presumably foster or at least reflect value system stability. 
The authors interpreted that the tendency of the high 
Openness individual to initiate activities might have 
historically resulted in formative life experiences conducive 
to establishing a secure system of values. 
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Terminal value change was unrelated to improvement in 
the present study. This finding neither confirms nor 
disconf irms earlier conclusions stemming from the value 
convergence literature, but rather underscores the 
methodological and conceptual distinctions between value 
convergence and value change. 
It is difficult to extrapolate from the value 
convergence literature regarding the therapeutic or 
beneficial qualities of Terminal value change, because value 
convergence and value change (as defined here) are two 
different constructs. Value convergence involves a between 
subjects comparison (i.e. , patient to therapist) whereas 
value change is a within subjects comparison over two 
administrations. Nevertheless, value convergence is a form 
of value change, and earlier findings offer some basis for 
comparison. 
With this in mind, Terminal value convergence, for the 
most part, has been documented in individual outpatient 
psychotherapy; and characterized as beneficial on the basis 
of clinician judgments. Two noteworthy features of the 
present study, therefore, include the use of an inpatient 
psychiatric sample as well as an objective measure of 
outcome. 
These methodological distinctions point to several 
possible explanations for why, contrary to hypotheses, 
Terminal value change was unrelated to improvement in the 
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present study: 1) clinician judgment remains the sole 
outcome indicator related to Terminal value change, 2) the 
duration or nature of treatment in this study was too brief 
for a systematic change in Terminal values to occur, and 3) 
the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient lacks the 
necessary sensitivity to detect subtle forms of Terminal 
value change, particularly if a sub-sample of Terminal values 
are related to psychosocial functioning (Arizmendi et al., 
1985). 
Extraversion and Neuroticism 
Both Extraversion and Neuroticism were unrelated to 
either Instrumental or Terminal value change. Perhaps the 
first issue to note is the range of personality scores 
sampled in this study. A mean of 41.77 for Extraversion 
(SD=ll.16) and a mean of 67.34 for Neuroticism (SD=8.84) 
diverge from the expected T-score mean of 50 with a standard 
deviation of 10. The overall sample might therefore be 
characterized as fairly introverted and neurotic. 
Conclusions about the effects of these personality factors on 
value change are limited to the particular distribution of 
personality scores sampled12 • 
Extraversion was predicted to correlate positively with 
value change since individuals high on this factor might be 
12For example, it is not possible to draw conclusions 
about extremely extraverted patients, given that the highest 
obtained T-score for Extraversion was 63, with only three 
individuals scoring greater than or equal to 60. 
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more likely to participate in group ward activities. 
However, the treatment data leans toward the interpretation 
that the quality of treatment, particularly individually-
oriented experiences, may be more important to the value 
change process than the quantity of treatment, at least 
during a relatively short-term hospitalization (please see 
section below on "Additional Treatment Characteristics"). 
There is also some indication that value change may be 
associated with an introspective or self-reflective process, 
as inferred from respondents' comments regarding value change 
(e.g., "After a lot of thinking I was able to look at things 
differently.") . It may actually be the case that 
Extraversion is negatively related to value change, but such 
a determination requires a normal range of Extraversion 
scores. 
Even though this inpatient psychiatric sample was 
comprised of individuals scoring high on Neuroticism, the 
absence of any significant relationship between Neuroticism 
and value change (or even chronic values instability, which 
would imitate adaptive value change) was quite surprising. 
Although this may be partially due to the skewed distribution 
of Neuroticism scores, this finding in some ways vindicates 
earlier studies linking Neuroticism to value preference. 
It had been argued previously that the relationship 
between personality factors and value change must be 
understood dynamically. Personality was thought to influence 
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the manner in which values are established, experienced, 
and/or changed. Although this formulation may hold true in 
regard to Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness, it 
may not be the case for Neuroticism and Extraversion. These 
latter two personality factors may operate differently with 
respect to value preference and/or value change. 
very well be a culturally specific tendency 
There may 
to endorse 
particular values based on one's level of Neuroticism, for 
example. Further research with a normal range of personality 
scores is needed to clarify these issues. 
Terminal Versus Instrumental Value Change 
Since Terminal and Instrumental value change were 
differentially related to personality factors and 
improvement, it is important to interpret the results in 
light of the conceptual and empirical distinctions between 
these two value systems. This may help to explain not only 
why independent personality factors were singularly related 
to either form of value change, but also why Instrumental 
value change alone was related to improvement. 
Terminal values, as the reader may recall, refer to 
"desirable end-states of existence," while Instrumental 
values are defined as "desirable modes of conduct" or means 
to ends (Rokeach, 1973, p. 7, italics in original). Terminal 
values have been further distinguished by Rokeach as 
reflecting Personal versus Social goals. Examples of the 
former include "Family Security" and "Wisdom," whereas 
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examples of the latter include "Equality" and "Freedom." 
Instrumental values may be similarly distinguished by those 
values reflecting Competency (e • g •I "Independent," 
"Intellectual") or those values reflecting Morality (e.g., 
"Forgiving, " "Honest") . 
In regard to the observed relationship between 
Instrumental 
values may 
relatively 
value change 
simply be more 
short-term but 
and improvement, Instrumental 
directly targeted during a 
highly intensive inpatient 
treatment experience. Many Instrumental values, or "means to 
ends, " readily translate into ward behaviors with which a 
patient may be encouraged to experiment during the course of 
a psychiatric hospitalization. It is not difficult to 
imagine, for instance, how Instrumental values such as 
"Forgiving," "Honest," "Self-Controlled," and "Capable" might 
be fostered throughout ward therapeutic activities. 
Terminal values, in contrast, reflect more abstract or 
philosophical 
maintained, but 
positions that 
are by and large 
may be 
removed 
intellectually 
from immediate 
experience. Although a patient's perceptions of reality may 
change, there is little that can be done to experientially 
embrace Terminal values such as "National Security," "A World 
of Peace," "A Comfortable Life," and "Equality" within a 
secured psychiatric facility. 
Through appreciating the character of Rokeach's value 
sub-classes (i.e., Personal and Social goals, Competence and 
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Morality), one may further speculate as to why personality 
factors were differentially involved in value change. The 
personality factor of Conscientiousness, for example, 
includes a facet termed Competence, which is broadly 
concerned with self-efficacy. As the high Conscientiousness 
individual endeavors to re-organize his/her value system, 
he/she may therefore be drawn to and emphasize those 
Instrumental values reflected in the Rokeach Competence sub-
scale. Another Conscientiousness facet termed Dutifulness 
reflects a commitment to moral behavior. As the high 
Conscientiousness individual strives throughout treatment to 
develop a more adaptive system of values, he/she may tend to 
prioritize the types of values reflected in the Rokeach 
Morality subscale. Instrumental as opposed to Terminal 
values may therefore be more salient for the high 
Conscientiousness individual; hence the observed relationship 
between high Conscientiousness and Instrumental value change. 
In regard to Agreeableness, this personality factor, as 
"a dimension of interpersonal tendencies" (Costa & Mccrae, 
1992, p. 15), reflects a fundamental orientation toward self 
versus others. One might therefore expect Agreeableness to 
relate to Terminal values given the Personal versus Social 
sub-classes of the Terminal value system. The absence of an 
observed relationship between Agreeableness and Terminal 
value change, however, does not mean that these constructs 
are in no way related. Perhaps such a relationship would be 
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best conceived in terms of value preference, as in the case 
of Neuroticism (see above section on "Extraversion and 
Neuroticism"). Preliminary support for this hypothesis can 
be found in Luk and Bond (1993), given their finding that 
Agreeableness correlated with preference on eight out of 10 
broad-based value dimensions in a sample of Chinese 
university students. 
The interpersonal style captured by Agreeableness may 
indeed be related to an enduring preference with respect to 
Terminal values. The static nature of this relationship, one 
of preference (as opposed to dynamic change) , would partially 
account for why Agreeableness was singularly related to 
Instrumental as opposed to Terminal value change. 
Change in Instrumental values may be more tolerable and 
even desirable for the low Agreeableness individual. That 
is, Instrumental values may be more detached from both 
his/her core style of relating to others and his/her 
resulting value preference. Since the low Agreeableness 
individual may need to change in some fashion--his/her value 
system is presumably ineffective and he/she is hospitalized 
psychiatrically--it may therefore behoove such a person to 
focus on Instrumental values as a modality of change. 
In a similar fashion, since novel activities are 
eschewed by those individuals low in Openness, perhaps such 
individuals are reluctant to change Instrumental values 
which, by their nature, require more in vivo behavioral 
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change. Nevertheless, some value re-organization is 
necessary for low Openness individuals given the 
ineffectiveness of their existing value system, so they focus 
on an abstract or philosophical changing of Terminal values. 
No improvement is detected, however, because there has yet to 
be any modification of their day to day behavior. 
A final word or two is in order concerning the observed 
relationships between personality factors and value change. 
To some extent, these findings lend discriminant validity to 
Rokeach's distinction between Instrumental and Terminal 
values, given that independent personality factors correlated 
with change in either value system. The differential ability 
of personality factors (presumably stable) and value change 
(highly alterable) to predict symptomatic improvement further 
highlights the relationship between personality and values. 
Although intimately connected, both theoretically and 
empirically, it does not appear that personality factors and 
values are identical constructs, at least with respect to 
Costa and Mccrae' s five-factor model of personality and 
Rokeach's typology of human values. 
Additional Subject Variables Related to Value Change 
Although tentative, there is evidence to suggest that 
certain subject variables, in addition to personality 
factors, may be related to the value change process. Both 
religious preference and DSM-IV primary diagnosis accounted 
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for significant variance in the prediction of Instrumental 
value change. 
Those individuals 
preference were most 
identifying a protestant religious 
likely to experience change in 
Instrumental values. This effect, however, is difficult to 
interpret, particularly since the majority of participants 
responded negatively to the queries "Are you active? Do you 
attend services or worship regularly?" 
Perhaps this finding really says more about those who 
identified a religious preference of "Other" (which tended to 
include an "active" designation) or "None." That is, greater 
value solidification and stability may be associated with the 
process of actively choosing a religious preference and 
working through the relevant value issues (which, in turn, 
may be reflected in either current participation or rejection 
of any religious affiliation) in contrast to nominal but 
inactive membership. 
A DSM-IV primary diagnosis of Schizoaffective Disorder 
was associated with a form of value change that was 
relatively less conducive to favorable outcome. The low 
number of participants receiving this diagnosis makes 
conclusions extremely tentative, but it is possible that this 
form of psychopathology is associated with some degree of 
Instrumental value instability, at least during periods of 
decompensation. Further study is needed to clarify this 
hypothesis. 
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Alternatively, what appears as Instrumental value change 
for the Schizoaffective Disorder patients may be an artifact 
of their inability to complete the Rokeach value ranking task 
upon admission. The impingement of psychiatric 
symptomatology unique to this disorder, particularly deficits 
in effort and motivation, may have interfered with the 
initial assessment of their Instrumental values. A more 
valid ranking of such values obtained prior to discharge may 
therefore be very different from an initial ranking, but not 
necessarily due to a systematic process of value change. 
Additional Treatment Variables Related to Value Change 
The inclusion of select treatment characteristics 
allowed for a greater prediction of both Instrumental and 
Terminal value change than personality factors alone. In 
this instance, subjective data regarding the patient's 
perspective of the treatment situation proved to be a more 
powerful predictor of value change than objective data 
regarding the quantity of treatment participation. More 
specifically, the importance ratings given to both individual 
sessions and nurse interactions were positively correlated 
with Instrumental value change13 • There are several 
implications of these findings. 
First of all, it is important to underscore that the 
patient's phenomenological experience of the treatment 
13 It should be noted that an importance rating was 
generated for nurse interaction even though no objective 
participation data was available. 
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situation, the importance attributed to various ward 
activities, constituted one of the most powerful predictors 
of Instrumental value change. This type of information, 
framed from the perspective of the patient, has historically 
been lacking in studies of value change. 
Al though no specific hypothesis was rendered, these 
findings generally support the assumption underlying this 
project that patient perceptions are relevant to the value 
change process. The identification of multiple ward 
experiences as being significantly "important," and this in 
turn relating to Instrumental value change, suggests that the 
process of value change is much more complex than has been 
generally realized. The delineation of a sole criterion, 
framed from the researcher's perspective, toward which 
patient values are believed to shift may not fully account 
for the manner in which patient's pick and choose the values 
they opt to embrace. 
Secondly, it is equally important to point out that this 
type of data is not without its limitations, particularly in 
the present context. There really is no construct validity 
regarding what is actually being measured by the query "How 
important to your treatment was ... [a given ward experience] ? " 
This question, for example, may be tapping into how much a 
given patient attended the activity, enjoyed the activity, 
derived benefit from the activity, or any combination of the 
above. At this point, one can safely conclude that an 
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importance rating reflects in some way how meaningful a 
particular ward activity was for that patient, but the exact 
meaning remains unclear. 
Thirdly, the two ward experiences predictive of 
Instrumental value change, nurse interaction and individual 
therapy, are both based on individual rather than group 
interaction. Although additional research is needed to 
support this finding, it is possible that Instrumental value 
change is 1) more likely to occur through one-to-one 
encounters, and 2) possibly associated with the capacity for 
introspection. Furthermore, it is important to note that 
more than one therapeutic modality may be related to the 
value change process. 
Fourthly, mere exposure to ward activities was by and 
large unrelated to value change, a finding which goes against 
the tenets of associationistic theories suggesting that value 
change is the product of shaping by a given clinician. On 
the contrary, there was a trend (£< . 10) toward increased 
exposure to individual therapy leading to greater Terminal 
and Instrumental value stability. 
Toward a "Kuhnian" Interpretation of Value Change 
Kuhn's seminal work on the structure of scientific 
revolutions (1970) may provide a viable framework for 
conceptualizing the experience of the individual and his/her 
value change. The scientific community, according to Kuhn, 
adheres to a shared system of values, beliefs, and knowledge 
termed a paradigm. 
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This paradigm is akin to a basic yet 
pervasive world-view which, for the scientist, lends meaning 
to every observation. It is inevitable, says Kuhn, that all 
manner of science will be interpreted with respect to one's 
existing paradigmatic frame of reference. 
Periods of normal science are characterized by the 
implicit quest to advance the existing paradigm, to generate 
evidence which confirms and preserves the basic world view. 
The process of normal science, however, eventually encounters 
data inconsistent with fundamental paradigmatic assumptions. 
If this anomalous data can not be reconciled with the 
existing paradigm, the scientific community enters into a 
state of crisis as the inadequacy of it's world-view is laid 
bare. 
The anomaly is eventually resolved through the 
generation of a new preferred paradigm which supplants the 
earlier discredited paradigm. Many scientists will shift 
their allegiance from the former to the new paradigm and a 
period of normal science begins anew. For some, there 
remains a devotion to the discredited paradigm in spite of 
its apparent ineffectiveness. 
This Kuhnian process of change in the collective 
scientific community may parallel the process of value change 
experienced by the individual patient. Rokeach maintains 
that values subtly or directly influence all manifestations 
of human behavior. According to Rokeach ( 1973) , "It is 
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difficult to conceive of a human problem that would not be 
better illuminated if reliable value data concerning it were 
available" (p. 2 6) . It might be said, therefore, that values 
permeate one's contact with and experience of the world, much 
like a Kuhnian paradigm. 
An individual's value system may be more or less 
conducive to meeting a wide range of physical and 
psychological needs (Luk & bond, 1993), just as there may be 
varying degrees of success explaining data in light of a 
given scientific paradigm. During periods of "normal" 
functioning, like normal science, a person may seek out 
experiences which confirm and perpetuate his/her basic world-
view. Psychosocial functioning is also relatively adaptive. 
The failure of the individual to function in the world 
(which may result in psychiatric hospitalization) is 
analogous to a scientific crisis brought on by the 
incompatibility of paradigm and data. One's value system, as 
such, is no longer able to accommodate life circumstances. 
To the extent that psychiatric hospitalization could be 
characterized as a period of pronounced personal crisis, 
there is often the emergence of a paradigmatic shift in 
values leading to a new trial of normal functioning. Similar 
ideas have been frequented in the psychoanalytic literature, 
which suggests that decompensation or regression is a 
prerequisite for radical adaptive change (Purzner, 1988). 
This characterization implies that the process 
change may indeed be a therapeutic phenomenon. 
The results of the current study are 
consistent with this Kuhnian interpretation. 
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of value 
generally 
A re-
organization of one's Instrumental values was associated with 
beneficial outcome. In addition, two of the specific 
personality factors related to value change in the present 
study seem to correspond with this Kuhnian analogy. 
Both low Openness and low Agreeableness, to some extent, 
share an element of inflexibility. These factors reflect a 
form of behavior that is not easily amenable to change. The 
low Openness individual prefers the familiar, while the low 
Agreeableness individual is often viewed as intolerant. It 
makes sense that those individuals who may have stylistically 
adhered to a given value paradigm prior to hospitalization, 
regardless of its effectiveness, may find themselves 
necessitating a re-organization of their value systems as a 
means of emerging from personal crisis. Indeed, at least in 
this sample, individuals admitted psychiatrically tended to 
be rather low in Agreeableness, implying some relationship 
between inflexibility and poor psychosocial adaptation. 
This Kuhnian interpretation may also extend to studies 
of value change in an outpatient context. The process would 
presumably be less tumultuous, as the individual is in 
relatively less crisis. Still, the opportunity to adaptively 
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re-organize one's personal values may ultimately prove to be 
a nonspecific agent of therapeutic change. 
Methodological Limitations 
A non-intrusive approach was taken so as to investigate 
value change as it naturally occurred on two specific wards. 
Although a non-intrusive approach is both reasonable and 
perhaps even preferable in an exploratory study, this 
strategy places limitations on the degree of control over 
treatment and subject characteristics. It is necessary to 
proceed with caution when extending these findings to other 
settings or when drawing conclusions about the influence of 
treatment variables on the value change process. 
It has been assumed, for example, that the treatment 
situation is conducive to the value change process. 
Theoretically speaking, a comparable group of psychiatrically 
distressed individuals deprived of treatment would not 
necessarily experience a process of beneficial value change. 
Although the observed connection between value change and 
positive outcome suggests that value change is not 
incidental, a controlled group design is necessary in order 
to draw causal inferences regarding the effects of 
psychiatric treatment on value change. 
It is also quite likely that the final sample is biased 
in one or more ways. One example of sample bias includes the 
skewed distribution of several personality factors, given 
that these factors should be normally distributed in the 
population. 
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A different picture may have emerged, for 
instance, if the average Neuroticism score was a standard 
deviation lower. An incomplete representation of the 
personality factors sampled in this study limits our ability 
to fully understand the relationship between personality 
factors and value change. 
Since the final sample may possess other qualities which 
systematically affect the value change process, the results 
of this study may not generalize to other settings or 
populations. In particular, conclusions regarding the 
relationship between personality factors and value change are 
limited to the range or distribution of personality scores 
reflected in this sample, as well as a treatment process 
involving a fairly diagnostically homogeneous group of 
psychiatric inpatients receiving treatment on an acute care 
ward. 
Pragmatic considerations precluded the use of multiple 
dependent measures in this study. Several indications of 
improvement would have strengthened conclusions about value 
change as a therapeutic phenomenon, particularly since the 
nature of therapeutic benefit may vary throughout the 
treatment process (Howard, 
1993) . On the plus side, 
Lueger, Maling, 
however, this 
& Martinovich, 
is one of the 
relatively few instances in which value change has been 
positively related to a patient generated index of 
improvement. 
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Some significant relationships between personality 
factors, value change, and improvement may have been missed 
due to the duration of treatment specified in this study. 
Although some degree of standardization was gained by 
limiting the retest interval, the effects of treatment beyond 
this interval can not be determined. Practically speaking, 
an open-ended retest period may have made little difference 
in the present study, given that so few participants were 
hospitalized longer than two weeks. Unfortunately, in this 
age of psychiatric hospitalization where economic forces more 
readily influence treatment duration, it may be increasingly 
difficult to gauge the influence of long-term care. 
Finally, many issues of construct validity must be 
considered in this and other studies of value change. Can an 
individual' s values undergo a genuine or enduring change 
following no more than two weeks of intervention? Can such 
a change be measured on the basis of a questionnaire? These 
questions reflect the importance of identifying value-
relevant behavior. It is necessary to demonstrate, for 
example, that a person identifying "Family Security" as the 
most important value in his or her life acts differently than 
a person for whom this value has relatively low priority. 
Demonstrations such as these belong at the forefront of value 
research. 
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Directions for Future Research 
The results of this study indicate that the value change 
process may be more complicated than has generally been 
acknowledged. Individual differences in personality factors, 
religious preference, and perceptions of treatment, for 
example, have not been emphasized in the value convergence 
literature, yet such variables may indeed be relevant to 
value change. As such, the following issues all warrant 
further inquiry: 
1. It seems promising that the inclusion of 
phenomenological data, information framed 
perspective of study participants, would lend 
from the 
a viable 
dimension to future research in the area of value change. 
2. The relevant variables identified in this research 
should now be subject to a more rigorous study design. The 
use of a randomized control group design would be preferable, 
with special emphasis on greater standardization of 
treatment, the use of multiple dependent measures, increased 
diagnostic reliability achieved through structured 
interviewing, and post-treatment follow-up value measurement. 
3. It might prove informative to study the rate and 
nature of value change throughout the course of treatment. 
Does value change happen abruptly early on in treatment? 
Does a progressive change in values culminate just prior to 
discharge or termination? Periodic value assessment 
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throughout treatment would be a viable strategy for exploring 
this issue. 
4. Additional subject variables may be implicated in 
the value change process. The results of this study, 
moreover, need to be replicated with other samples (both 
inpatient and outpatient) . 
5. There is reason to suspect that personality factors 
and other subject characteristics may play a role in non-
patient value system stability. For example, do individuals 
high in Openness have particularly stable Terminal value 
systems? Are nominal Protestants characterized by unstable 
values? The answers to questions such as these, worthy in 
their own right, might also help to isolate aspects of the 
treatment situation relevant to value change. 
6. It is possible that values may change in ways not 
measured by the RVS. Consider, for example, those 
individuals for whom values did not visibly change (i.e., RVS 
test-retest reliability consistent with Rokeach norms) , yet 
they still got better. Perhaps these individuals stabilized 
or re-affirmed their existing values, or even discovered new 
and more adaptive means of actualizing their values--instead 
of arriving at a new value prioritization. There is clearly 
a need to further develop and refine techniques of value 
measurement. 
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Conclusions14 
It would seem that a beneficial Instrumental value 
change process may take place during the course of re la ti vely 
short-term inpatient psychiatric treatment. The "source" of 
this value change may be overdetermined. Personality 
factors, the nature of treatment, and the patient's 
perceptions of the treatment situation may all contribute to 
Instrumental value change. 
More specifically, there is evidence to suggest that 
patients bring certain characteristics to the treatment 
situation that are more or less conducive to Instrumental 
value change, including the personality combination of low 
Agreeableness and high Conscientiousness yielding the 
greatest degree of change. The personality factor of high 
Openness may be likewise related to Terminal value stability. 
It is also possible that both religious preference and 
psychiatric diagnosis may be additional subject variables 
related to the value change process, although further study 
is warranted. It is likewise noted, tentatively, that 
therapeutic modalities emphasizing one-on-one interaction 
(e.g., individual therapy or nurse interaction) may be more 
conducive to Instrumental value change than group-oriented 
activities. Finally, there is reason to suspect that the 
patient's perceptions of the treatment experience may be a 
14All conclusions are offered in the context of 
relatively short-term inpatient psychiatric treatment 
involving a fairly diagnostically homogeneous sample. 
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better predictor of Instrumental value change than the 
quantity of treatment. 
Taken together, these findings demonstrate that our 
understanding of the value change process may be advanced 
without assuming that a given patient's values are shifting 
toward some identified target (i.e., the values of a 
particular clinician) . It is also apparent that any viable 
theory regarding value change must be able to integrate the 
complex characterological, 
environmental factors associated 
change. 
phenomenological, 
with beneficial 
and 
value 
APPENDIX A 
Value Influence Scale15 
INSTRUCTIONS: Now that you have finished ranking your 
values, please use the following scale to indicate how 
satisfied you are with your current values. 
-3 
Very 
Dissatisfied 
-2 
Moderately 
Dissatisfied 
-1 
Slightly 
Dissatisfied 
0 
Neutral 
1 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
2 
Moderately 
Satisfied 
3 
Very 
Satisfied 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please indicate how important each of the 
following activities were in your treatment. You may circle 
the 11 N/A 11 next to any activity in which you did not 
participate. 
1. How important to your treatment was one-on-one 
individual counseling or therapy? N/A 
0 1 2 3 4 
Not at All A Little Bit Moderately Quite a Bit Extremely 
2. How important to your treatment was group therapy? 
N/A 
0 
Not at All 
1 
A Little Bit 
2 
Moderately 
Please go on to the next page. 
3 
Quite a Bit 
4 
Extremely 
15The VIS has been partially reduced in size to 
accommodate formatting requirements. 
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3. How important to your treatment was interacting with 
nurses? N/A 
0 1 
Not at All A Little Bit 
2 
Moderately 
3 
Quite a Bit 
4 
Extremely 
4. How important to your treatment was interacting with 
other patients? N/A 
0 
Not at All 
1 
A Little Bit 
2 
Moderately 
3 
Quite a Bit 
4 
Extremely 
5. How important to your treatment was participating in 
activity therapy or occupational therapy? N/A 
0 1 
Not at All A Little Bit 
2 
Moderately 
3 
Quite a Bit 
4 
Extremely 
6. How important to your treatment was meeting with your 
attending psychiatrist? N/A 
0 
Not at All 
1 
A Little Bit 
2 
Moderately 
3 
Quite a Bit 
4 
Extremely 
Please explain in the space below how you account for any 
value change you may have experienced. You may use the back 
of this page if necessary. 
Thank you for your participation. 
APPENDIX B 
Exploratory Multivariate Analyses 
Table 7. Multivariate Regression Analysis of Significant 
Personality Factors with the Addition of Religious 
Preference. 
Instrumental Value Change 
(N=56) 
Predictor Variable 
Agreeableness+ 
Conscientiousness+ 
Protestant+ 
COMBINED MODEL 
-
.314 
(.009) 
-.248 
(.033) 
-.378 
(.002) 
.314 
.090 
.145 
.549 
Adjusted 
R Squarec 
.082 
.050 
.129 
.261 
-
5.917 
(.018) 
5.176 
(.009) 
7.472 
(.000) 
Note. Subscript (+) denotes significant variables included 
in model. 
a Univariate correlation between personality factor and 
Instrumental value change, with significance level (1-tailed) 
in parentheses. 
b Multivariate correlation depicting incremental strength of 
association attributed to each variable. 
c Unique variance accounted for by each variable, corrected 
for error. 
ct E statistic testing variable inclusion, with significance 
level in parentheses. 
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Table 8. Multivariate Regression Analysis of Personality 
Factors Predicting Terminal Value Change, Without Inclusion 
of Schizoaffective Disorder Group. 
Personality Factor 
Neurotic ism 
Ext ravers ion 
Openness+ 
Agreeableness 
Conscientiousness 
TOTALS 
Terminal Value Change 
(N=51) 
.037 
(.398) 
-.171 
( . 115) 
.373 .373 
(.004) 
.055 
(.351) 
-.229 
(.053) 
.373 
Adjusted 
R Squarec 
.121 
.121 
-
7.910 
(.007) 
Note. Subscript (+) denotes significant variables included 
in model. 
a Univariate correlation between personality factor and 
Terminal value change, with significance level (1-tailed) in 
parentheses. 
b Multivariate correlation depicting incremental strength of 
association attributed to each variable. 
c Unique variance accounted for by each variable, corrected 
for error. 
a E statistic testing variable inclusion, with significance 
level in parentheses. 
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Table 9. Multi variate Regression Analysis of Personality 
Factors Predicting Instrumental Value Change, Without 
Inclusion of Schizoaffective Disorder Group. 
Instrumental Value Change 
(N=51) 
Personality Factor 
Neuroticism 
Ext ravers ion 
Openness 
Agreeableness+ 
Conscientiousness+ 
COMBINED MODEL 
-
-.056 
( . 34 7) 
-.227 
(.055) 
.181 
(.102) 
.324 
(.010) 
-.309 
(.014) 
.324 
.098 
.422 
Adjusted 
R Squarec 
.087 
.057 
.144 
-
5.756 
(.020) 
5.206 
(.009) 
Note. Subscript (+) denotes significant variables included 
in model. 
a Univariate correlation between personality factor and 
Instrumental value change, with significance level (1-tailed) 
in parentheses. 
b Multivariate correlation depicting incremental strength of 
association attributed to each variable. 
c Unique variance accounted for by each variable, corrected 
for error. 
d E statistic testing variable inclusion, with significance 
level in parentheses. 
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Table 10. Univariate Correlations Predicting Symptomatic 
Improvement, Without Inclusion of Schizoaffective Disorder 
Group. 
Symptomatic 
Improvement 
(N=51) 
Variables 
Terminal 
Value Change 
Instrumental 
Value Change 
Neuroticism 
Extraversion 
Openness 
Agreeableness 
Conscientiousness 
-.110 
(.222) 
- . 254 * 
(.036) 
.060 
(.338) 
.091 
(.264) 
-.216 
(.064) 
-.154 
( . 14 0) 
-.065 
(.324) 
a Univariate correlation with 
significance level in 
parentheses (1-tailed) . 
* :Q < .05. 
REFERENCES 
Almond, R., Keniston, K., & Boltax, S. (1968). The value 
system of a milieu therapy unit. Archives of General 
Psychiatry, 19, 545-561. 
Almond, R., Keniston, K., & Boltax, S. (1969a). Milieu 
therapeutic process. 
21, 431-442. 
Archives of General Psychiatry, 
Almond, R., Keniston, K., & Boltax, S. (1969b). Patient 
value change in milieu therapy. Archives of General 
Psychiatry, 20, 339-351. 
Anastasi, A. (1988). Psychological testing (6th ed.). New 
York: Macmillan. 
Arizmendi, T. G., Beutler, L. E., Shanfield, S. B., Crago, 
M., & Hagaman, R. (1985). Client-therapist value 
similarity and psychotherapy outcome: A microscopic 
analysis. Psychotherapy, 22(1), 16-21. 
Arnstein, R. L. (1986). Ethical and value issues in 
psychotherapy with college students. Journal of College 
Student Psychotherapy, i(1), 3-20. 
163 
164 
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator 
variable distinction in social psychological research: 
Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51(6), 
1173-1182. 
Bergin, A. E. (1985). Proposed values for guiding and 
evaluating counseling and psychotherapy. Counseling and 
Values, 29, 99-116. 
Bergin, A. E. (1991). Values and religious issues in 
psychotherapy and mental heal th. American Psychologist, 
46, 394-403. 
Berryhill-Paapke, E., & Johnson, M. E. (1995). Comparison 
of values of Alaska Native and non-Native alcoholics and 
counselors. International Journal of the Addictions, 
1..Q(4), 481-488. 
Beutler, L. E. (1971). Attitude similarity in marital 
therapy. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 
37 I 298-301. 
Beutler, L. E. (1972). 
psychotherapy: 
Psychotherapy: 
362-367. 
Value and attitude change in 
A case for dyadic assessment. 
Theory, Research and Practice, 2.(4), 
Beutler, L. E. (1979). Values, beliefs, religion and the 
persuasive influence of psychotherapy. Psychotherapy: 
Theory, Research and Practice, 1..§.(4), 432-440. 
165 
Beutler, L. E. (1981) Convergence in counseling and 
psychotherapy: A current look. Clinical Psychology 
Review, i, 79-101. 
Beutler, L. E., Arizmendi, T. G., Crago, M., Shanfield, S., 
& Hagaman, R. (1983). The effects of value similarity 
and clients' persuadability on value convergence and 
psychotherapy improvement. Journal of Social and 
Clinical Psychology, i(3), 231-245. 
Beutler, L. E., Jobe, A. M., & Elkins, D. (1974). Outcomes 
in group psychotherapy: Using persuasion theory to 
increase treatment efficiency. Journal of Consulting 
and Clinical Psychology, 42(4), 547-553. 
Beutler, L. E., & Bergan, J. (1991). Value change in 
counseling and psychotherapy: A search for scientific 
credibility. Journal of Counseling Psychology, .1§.(1), 
16-24. 
Beutler, L. E., Pollack, S., & Jobe, A. (1978). 
"Acceptance," values, and therapeutic change. Journal 
of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46(1), 198-199. 
Billington, L. (1983). Psychotherapy outcome as a function 
of client-therapist values relationships and client 
values change. Doctoral Dissertation, Fuller 
Theological Seminary, School of Psychology. (From 
=D....;;;;i;..;;;s:;..:s;:;;...e=-r=.....;;;;t..=:;;a::...::t:;..:i::...;o::..:n=--=Ab==s....;;;;t-=r;...;:;a;.;..;c;:;;...t=-s=---'I=n==t-=e=r:..:.n=a:::..t=-=i=o=n=a=l , 19 8 4 , 4 5 ( 4 - B) , 
Abstract No. 1277) 
166 
Boulet, J., & Boss, M. W. (1991). Reliability and validity 
of the Brief Symptom Inventory. Psychological 
Assessment, d(3), 433-437. 
Braithwaite, V. A., & Law, H. G. (1985). Structure of human 
values: Testing the adequacy of the Rokeach Value 
Survey. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
49 (1) t 250-263 • 
Brown, G. (1975) . Personality and value orientations in 
early adolescence. British Journal of Social and 
Clinical Psychology, 14(2), 139-146. 
Butt, D. S. (1966). Value and personality dimensions: 
Their constancies and their relationships. 
Psychological Reports, 19, 1115-1124. 
Cook, T. E. (1966). The influence of client-counselor value 
similarity on change in meaning during brief counseling. 
Journal of Counseling Psychology, 13(1), 77-81. 
Corey, G., Corey, M. S., & Callanan, P. (1990). Role of 
group leader's values in group counseling. The Journal 
for Specialists in Group Work, 15(2), 68-74. 
Costa, P. T., Jr., & Mccrae, R. R. (1985). The NEO 
Personality Inventory manual. Odessa, FL: 
Psychological Assessment Resources. 
Costa, P. T., Jr., & Mccrae, R. R. (1992). Revised NEO 
Personality Inventory professional manual. Odessa, FL: 
Psychological Assessment Resources. 
167 
Derogatis, L. R. (1992). The Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI): 
Administration, scoring. and procedures manual-II. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, 
Clinical Psychometrics Research Unit. 
Derogatis, L. R., & Melisaratos, N. (1983). The Brief 
Symptom Inventory: An introductory report. 
Psychological Medicine, 13(3), 595-605. 
Dolev, A. (1976). A medical model vs. a normative approach: 
The place of values in community psychiatry. Mental 
Health and Society, ~, 92-101. 
Dragan, J. (1974) An examination of the role of values in 
counselling and psychotherapy. Canadian Counsellor, 
~(4) I 272-279. 
Ehrlich, D., & Wiener, D. N. (1961). The measurement of 
values in psychotherapeutic settings. The Journal of 
General Psychology, 64, 359-372. 
Elzinga, T. J. (1981). The effectiveness of value education 
in changing values and self-regard in adult psychiatric 
inpatients (Doctoral dissertation, Michigan State 
University, 1980). Dissertation Abstracts 
international, 41(11-B), 4258. 
Eysenck, H. J., & Eysenck, S. B. G. (1975). Manual of the 
Eysenck Personality Questionnaire. London: Hodder 
& Staughton. 
168 
Freud, S. (1961). Recommendations to physicians practising 
psycho-analysis. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), The 
standard edition of the complete psychological works of 
Sigmund Freud (Vol. 12, pp. 111-120). London: Hogarth 
Press. (Original work published 1912) 
Furnham, A. (1984). Personality and values. Personality 
and Individual Differences, ~(4), 483-485. 
Gartner, J., Harmatz, M., Hohmann, A., Larson, D., & 
Gartner, A. F. (1990). The ef feet of 
clinician ideology on clinical judgment: 
patient and 
A study of 
ideological countertransference. Psychotherapy, 27, 98-
106. 
Gazda, G. M. & Sedgwick, C. (1990). Object relations and 
the development of values. Counseling and Values, 34, 
155-163. 
Gelfman, M. (1971) . The relationship of anxiety to faulty 
characterological value systems. 
Psychoanalysis, 31(1), 59-67. 
American Journal of 
Giglio, J. (1993). The impact of patients' and therapists' 
religious values on psychotherapy. Hospital and 
Community Psychiatry, 44(8), 768-771. 
Glossop, J., Roberts, C., & Shemilt, D. (1975) Value 
constructs: Relationships with intelligence and social 
background. British Journal of Social and Clinical 
Psychology, 14, 147-153. 
Gorkin. (1987). The uses of 
Northvale, New Jersey: London. 
169 
countertransference. 
Gralnick, A. (1985). Context, values and inhospital 
therapeutic process. The American Journal of Social 
Psychiatry, ~, 21-25. 
Grant, B. (1985). The moral nature of psychotherapy. 
Counseling and Values, ~(2), 141-150. 
Greenberg, J. R., & Mitchell, S. A. (1983). Object 
relations in psychoanalytic theory. Cambridge: 
Harvard. 
Grimm, D. W. (1994). Therapist spiritual and religious 
values in psychotherapy. Counseling and Values, .l§., 
154-164. 
Grosch, W. N. (1985). The psychotherapist and religious 
commitment. Psychotherapy Patient, i, 123-127. 
Grube, J. W. (1982). Can values be manipulated arbitrarily? 
A replication that controls for regression effects. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, ~(3), 528-
533. 
Hamblin, D. L., Beutler, L. E., Scogin, F., Corbishley, A. 
(1993). Patient responsiveness to therapist values and 
outcome in group cognitive therapy. Psychotherapy 
Research, ~(l), 36-46. 
Hankoff, L. D. (1979). Psychotherapy and values: Issues, 
conflicts, and misconceptions. 
and Judaism, ~(l), 5-14. 
Journal of Psychology 
170 
Heaven, P. C. L. (1993). Human values and personality 
dimensions: A test of the Social Values Inventory. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 15(3), 307-312. 
Heaven, P. C. L., & Furnham, A. (1991). Orientation to 
authority among adolescents: Relationships with 
personality and human values. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 12(10), 977-982. 
Hegselmann, R. (1987). Unified science: The positive pole 
of logical empiricism. In B. McGuinness (Ed.), Unified 
science (pp. ix-xxi), (H. Kaal, Trans.). 
Holland: Reidel. 
Dordrecht, 
Hoge, D. R., & Bender, I. E. (1974). Factors influencing 
value change among college graduates in adult life. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, .£2.(4), 
572-585. 
Horley, J. (1991). Values and beliefs as personal 
constructs. International Journal of Personal Construct 
Psychology, ~, 1-14. 
Howard, K. I., Lueger, R. J., Maling, M. S., & Martinovich, 
z. (1993). A phase model of psychotherapy outcome: 
Causal mediation of change. Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology, 61(4), 678-685. 
Humphries, R. H. (1982). Therapeutic neutrality 
reconsidered. Journal of Religion and Health, 21(2), 
124-131. 
171 
Jansen, D. G. (1973). Values and attitudes: Comparisons 
between staff and patients at a state hospital. Journal 
of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, iQ(2), 336. 
Joyce, C. (1977). The religious as group therapists: 
Attitudes and conflicts. Perspectives in Psychiatric 
Care, XV(3), 112-117. 
Ju, J. J., & Thomas, K. R. (1987). The accuracy of 
counselor perceptions of client work values and client 
satisfaction. Rehabilitation Counseling Bulletin, 
JQ(3) I 157-166. 
Kelly, G. A. (1955). The psychology of personal constructs. 
New York: Norton. 
Kelly, T. A. (1990). The role of values in psychotherapy: 
A critical review of process and outcome effects. 
Clinical Psychology Review, 10, 171-186. 
Kelly, T. A., & Strupp, H. H. (1992). Patient and therapist 
values in psychotherapy: Perceived changes, 
assimilation, similarity, and outcome. Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, .§Q(l) 34-40. 
Kessel, P., & McBrearty, J. F. (1967). Values and 
psychotherapy: A review of the literature. Perceptual 
and Motor Skills, 25, 669-690. 
Khan, J. A., & Cross, D. G. (1983). Mental health 
professional and client values: Similar or different? 
Australian Journal of Sex, Marriage & Family, ~(2), 71-
78. 
172 
Kovel, J. (1982). Values, interests, and psychotherapy. 
The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, 42(2), 109-119. 
Krasner, L., & Houts, A. C. (1984). A study of the "value" 
systems of behavioral scientists. American 
Psychologist, 39, 840-850. 
Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific 
revolutions, (2nd ed., Enlarged). Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Landfield, A. W., & Nawas, M. M. (1964). Psychotherapeutic 
improvement as a function of communication and adoption 
of therapist's values. Journal of Counseling 
Psychology, 11(4), 336-341. 
Leitner, L. M. (1981). Psychopathology and the 
differentiation of values, emotions and behaviours: A 
repertory grid study. 
138, 147-153. 
British Journal of Psychiatry, 
Little, B. R., Lecci, L., & Watkinson, B. (1992). 
Personality and personal projects: Linking Big Five and 
PAC units of analysis. Journal of Personality, .§Q(2), 
501-525. 
Luk, C. L., & Bond, M. H. (1993). Personality variation and 
values endorsement in Chinese university students. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 14(3), 429-437. 
Maddi, S. R. (1980). Personality theories: A comparative 
analysis (4th ed.). Chicago: Dorsey. 
173 
Mahoney, J. (1977). Values and neurosis: A comparison of 
American and Israeli college students. The Journal of 
Social Psychology, 102, 311-312. 
Martin, A. L. (1985). Values and personality: A survey of 
their relationship in the case of juvenile delinquence. 
Personality and Individual Differences, £(4), 519-522. 
Martini, J. L. (1978). Patient-therapist value congruence 
and ratings of client improvement. Counseling and 
Values, 23, 25-32. 
Martinez, F. I. (1991). Therapist-client convergence and 
similarity of religious values: Their effect on client 
improvement. Journal of Psychology and Christianity, 
10 (2) I 137-143 • 
Mccrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T., Jr. (1987). Validation of 
the five-factor model of personality across instruments 
and observers. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 52, 81-90. 
Mccrae, R.R., & Costa, P. T., Jr. (1989). More reasons to 
adopt the five-factor model. American Psychologist, 
44, 451-452. 
Meehl, P. E. (1959). Some technical and axiological 
problems in the therapeutic handling of religious and 
valuational material. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 
£(4), 255-259. 
174 
Merryman, H. M. (1986). Client-therapist values 
discrepancies and their relationships to psychotherapy 
process (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Oregon, 
1985) Dissertation Abstracts International, 47(1-B), 
381. 
Meyer, G. J. (1987). The comparison and convergence of the 
structures of affect and personality. Unpublished 
master's thesis, Loyola University Chicago, Chicago, IL. 
Meyer, G. J., & Shack, J. R. (1989). Structural convergence 
of mood and personality: Evidence for old and new 
directions. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 57(4), 691-706. 
Mickleburgh, W. E. (1992). Clarification of values in 
counselling and psychotherapy. Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 26, 391-398. 
Miethe, T. D. (1985). The validity and reliability of value 
measurements. Journal of Psychology, 119, 441-453. 
Mihalick, R. E. (1969). Values and psychotherapy. Doctoral 
Dissertation, Ohio University. (From Dissertation 
Abstracts International, 1970, }Q(9-B), No. 4377) 
Mitchell, C. L. (1993). The relationship of clinicians' 
values to therapy outcome ratings. Counseling and 
Values, 37, 156-164. 
Mitchell, J. V., Jr. (1984) Personality correlates of 
life values. Journal of Research in Personality, 18, 1-
14. 
175 
Mitchell, J. V., Jr. (1989). A multivariate analysis of 
relationships between personality traits and value 
choice. Counseling and Values, 34, 61-65. 
Morris, C., Eiduson, B. T., & O'Donovan, D. (1960) Values 
of psychiatric patients. 
312. 
Behavioral Science, ~, 297-
Moses, R. G. (1969). Perceived and tested value 
similarities between client and counselor and their 
relationship to counseling outcome criteria. Doctoral 
Dissertation, Columbia University. (From Dissertation 
Abstracts International, 1970, .d.Q.(9-B), No. 4378) 
Mueller, D. J. (1974). A test of the validity of two scales 
on Rokeach's value survey. Journal of Social 
Psychology, 94, 289-290. 
Nawas, M. M., & Landfield, A. W. (1963). Improvement in 
psychotherapy and adoption of the therapist's meaning 
system. Psychological Reports, 13, 97-98. 
Ney, P. G. (1985). Therapist code of ethics. Australian 
and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 19, 309-310. 
Norcross, J. C., & Wogan, M. (1987). Values in 
psychotherapy: A survey of practitioners' beliefs. 
Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 18(1), 
5-7. 
176 
Parloff, M. B., Iflund, B., & Goldstein, N. (1960). 
Communications of "therapy values" between therapist and 
schizophrenic patients. Journal of Nervous and Mental 
Disorders, 130, 193-199. 
Patterson, C. H. (1989). Values in counseling and 
psychotherapy. Counseling and Values, l}_, 164-176. 
Pentony, P. (1966). Value change in psychotherapy. Human 
Relations, 19, 39-46. 
Pepinsky, H. B., & Karst, T. 0. (1964). Convergence: A 
phenomenon in counseling and in psychotherapy. American 
Psychologist, 19, 333-338. 
Piersma, H. L., Boes, J. L., & Reaume, W. M. (1994). 
Unidimensionality of the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) 
in adult and adolescent inpatients. Journal of 
Personality Assessment, 63(2), 338-344. 
Piersma, H. L., Reaume, W. M., & Boes, J. L. (1994). The 
Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) as an outcome measure for 
adult psychiatric inpatients. Journal of Clinical 
Psychology, 50(4), 555-563. 
Purzner, K. (1988). Psychoanalysis as therapeutic crisis 
induction: Affect and emotion as a prerequisite of 
radical change. Psychopathology, 21, 143-148. 
Reiss, D., Costell, R., & Almond, R. (1976). Personal 
needs, values, and technical preferences in the 
psychiatric hospital. Archives of General Psychiatry, 
l}_, 795-804. 
177 
Rim, Y. (1984). Importance of values according to 
personality, intelligence and sex. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 2(2), 245-246. 
Rogers, C .. R. (1964). Toward a modern approach to values: 
The valuing process in the mature person. Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, ~(2), 160-167. 
Rokeach, M. (1973). The nature of human values. New York: 
Free Press. 
Rokeach, M. (1985) Inducing change and stability in belief 
systems and personality structures. Journal of Social 
Issues, 41(1), 153-171. 
Rokeach, M. (1988) . Rokeach Value Survey-Form G. Palo Alto, 
CA: Consulting Psychologists Press, Inc. 
Rokeach, M., & Regan, J. F. (1980). The role of values in 
the counseling situation. Personnel and Guidance 
Journal, .2..§., 576-582. 
Rosenthal, D. (1955). Changes in some moral values 
following psychotherapy. Journal of Consul ting 
Psychology, 19(6), 431-436. 
Rychlak, J. F. (1981). Introduction to personality and 
psychotherapy (2nd ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Schmitt, M. J., Schwartz, S., Steyer, R., & Schmitt, T. 
( 1993) . Measurement models for the Schwartz Values 
Inventory. European Journal of Psychological 
Assessment, 2(2), 107-121. 
178 
Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and 
structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical 
tests in 20 countries. Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology, 25, 1-65. 
Schwehn, J., & Schau, C. G. (1990). Psychotherapy as a 
process of value stabilization. Counseling and Values, 
35, 24-30. 
Serra, A. V., & Pollitt, J. (1975). The relationship 
between personality and the symptoms of depressive 
illness. British Journal of Psychiatry, 127, 211-218. 
Shaughnessy, J. J., & Zechmeister, E. B. (1990). Research 
methods in psychology (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-
Hill. 
Simmons, D. (1976). Personal values and Eysenck's two basic 
personality factors. Psychological Reports, ~, 912-
914. 
Simnegar, R. (1976). 
and behavioral 
The effects of group therapy on values 
adjustment of chronic hospitalized 
patients. Doctoral dissertation, Utah State University. 
(From Dissertation Abstracts international, 1978, ~ ( 12-
B), Abstract No. 6174-6175) 
Smyrnios, K. X., Schultz, C. L., Smyrnios, S. M., & Kirkby, 
R. J. (1986). Values: 
psychotherapy research. 
A pervasive issue in 
Australian Journal of Sex, 
Marriage & Family, 2(2), 91-98. 
179 
Strupp, H. H. (1980) . Humanism and psychotherapy: A 
personal statement of the therapist's essential values. 
Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, 17(4), 
396-400. 
Thompson, B., Levitov, J. E., & Miederhoff, P. A. (1982). 
Validity of the Rokeach Value Survey. Educational and 
Psychological Measurement, 42, 899-905. 
Tjeltveit, A. C. (1986). The ethics of value conversion in 
psychotherapy: Appropriate and inappropriate therapist 
influence on client values. Clinical Psychology Review, 
.§_, 515-537. 
Tucker, L. S. (1976). A comparison of the value preferences 
of emotionally disturbed adolescents and their parents 
with normal adolescents and their parents. Adolescence, 
XI(44) I 549-567. 
Tyler, J. D., Clark, J. A., & Wittenstrom, R. C. (1989). 
Mental health values and response to alcoholism 
treatment. Counseling and Values, ]]_, 204-216. 
Ukeritis, M. D. (1977). A study of value convergence in a 
group psychotherapy setting. Doctoral dissertation, 
University of Pittsburgh. (From Dissertation Abstracts 
international, 1977, ~, Abstract No. 4488-B) 
Walker, C. E., Ulissi, S. M., & Thurber, S. (1980). Values 
in behavior therapy with children. Psychotherapy: 
Theory, Research and Practice, 14(4), 431-439. 
180 
Warshaw, L., & Bailey, M.A. (1966). Congruency of patient-
therapist values for human happiness. Psychological 
Reports, 19, 592. 
Weisskopf-Joelson, E. (1980). Values: The enfant terrible 
of psychotherapy. Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and 
Practice, 17(4), 459-466. 
Welkowitz, J., Cohen, J., & Ortmeyer, D. (1967). Value 
system similarity: Investigation of patient-therapist 
dyads. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 31(1), 48-55. 
Yavornitzky, P. (1993). Natural spirituality and 
personality. Unpublished master's thesis, Loyola 
University Chicago, Chicago, IL. 
VITA 
Paul Yavornitzky, the son of John and Olga Yavornitzky, 
was born May 2, 1966, in Lorain, Ohio. 
His undergraduate studies were completed in 1988 at 
Cleveland State University, Cleveland, Ohio, where he 
obtained a Bachelor of Arts degree in Psychology. Mr. 
Yavornitzky earned a Master of Arts degree in Clinical 
Psychology from Loyola University of Chicago, Chicago, 
Illinois, in 1993. In 1996, he will complete the Doctorate 
of Philosophy degree in Clinical Psychology from Loyola 
University of Chicago. 
Mr. Yavornitzky received clinical training at several 
sites in the Chicago area including Illinois Masonic Medical 
Center, Lakeside Veterans Administration Hospital, the Doyle 
Center, and the Counseling and Developmental Services Center 
of Loyola University. His pre-doctoral internship in 
Clinical Psychology was completed in Richmond, Virginia at 
the Medical College of Virginia/Virginia Commonwealth 
University. 
181 
APPROVAL SHEET 
The dissertation submitted by Paul Yavornitzky has been read 
and approved by the following committee: 
Patricia A. Rupert, Ph.D., Director 
Associate Professor, Psychology 
Loyola University Chicago 
Daniel F. Barnes, Ph.D. 
Acting Vice President of Student Affairs 
Loyola University Chicago 
Fred B. Bryant, Ph.D. 
Professor, Psychology 
Loyola University Chicago 
Alan s. Dewolfe, Ph.D. 
Professor, Psychology 
Loyola University Chicago 
The final copies have been examined by the director of the 
dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies 
the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated 
and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the 
Committee with reference to content and form. 
The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
Date Director's Signature 
